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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION, LITERATURE REVIEW, AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Introduction
For the past century, crises and disasters have increasingly captured the attention of the
public, the media, business organizations, the government, and academics from a variety of
fields.

In the study of crisis most researchers, practitioners, and governmental officials

acknowledge the importance of communication in effective crisis management (Auf der Heide,
1989; Coombs, 1999; Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003; U. S. Governmental Accountability
Office [GAO], 2007). In fact, communication is arguably a core function that, if practiced
effectively, can significantly enhance preparedness, improve coordination and cooperation,
empower the public, facilitate logistics, reduce public anxiety and generally limit and mitigate
harm. Therefore, crisis response organizations and researchers have been focusing their attention
on the technological barriers between organizations (GAO, 2007) or identifying how to best
create a network of individuals who will communicate information between organizations
(Greve, 2005; Kapucu, 2006).
While beneficial, this will not solve the inherent communication differences between
organizations with divergent organizational cultures that must coordinate during crisis response.
Just as different countries encounter communication difficulties when attempting intercultural
communication (Hofstede, 2001); different organizational cultures of crisis response
organizations may create miscommunication and conflict between these organizations. This
problem is magnified during a crisis given the critical need to coordinate and the fact that
organizations are often forced to interact with entirely new social actors. Tensions can be further
magnified if crisis response organizations have vastly different conceptualizations of what
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coordinated response means or even expect collaboration instead of coordination. Thus, the aim
of this instrumental case study was to use qualitative methods to explore and describe the
cultures of two crisis response organizations and identify how their different communication
practices may influence crisis collaboration.
This study examined in depth two crisis response organizations that are active in most
Emergency Operation Centers (EOCs); a regional chapter of a disaster response organization
(DRO) and a metropolitan police department (MPD) in a large U.S. metropolitan city. EOCs are
one type of emergency management group that coordinates interorganizational crisis response.
These two organizations were selected because they have a great potential of having divergent
organizational communication cultures. The study therefore identified how their different
communication practices positively or negatively influence crisis collaboration.
A metropolitan police department not only handles emergencies on a daily basis, but is
often the “first line of response for public safety and security” during a crisis, including
“preserving life and protecting property” (Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA],
2013). The emergency management unit (EMU) of the MPD specifically handled crisis and
emergency response including bomb threats, hostage situations, and terrorist threats, among
others. Therefore, this specialized unit of the MPD was a primary focus of this study.
The regional chapter of a disaster response organization is an international non-profit
agency. Its disaster relief services program “helps vulnerable people and communities around
the world prepare for, respond to, and recover from natural disasters, humanitarian crises, and
health emergencies by mobilizing the power of the world's largest humanitarian network (DRO
chapter website, 2009). It is also recognized by federal, state and local governments across the
country as well as serving as the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) “principle
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supplier of mass care in federally declared disasters” (DRO chapter website, 2009). Both the
MPD and DRO are members of the city’s Metropolitan Emergency Operations Center (MEOC)
led by the city’s office of Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) that
coordinates and manages interorganizational crisis response.
It is important to identify how the different communication practices of these crisis
response organizations influence interorganizational communication and crisis collaboration
efforts for several reasons.

If members of these two organizations allowed their own

organizational culture to supersede EOC collaboration efforts, it may result in poor decisionmaking, time delays in action, or inadvertently increasing the harm. Some level of coordination
is necessary for the effective and efficient use of resources and or coordination can distract from
the immediate needs of the situation.

But crises also are unusual, unpredictable, and

overwhelming events that require the actions of hundreds and sometimes thousands of people
from a wide variety of sectors (e.g., first responders, public works, nonprofit disaster relief
agencies, businesses, healthcare, etc.) to rapidly manage the response and mitigate harm. The
nature of crises and the inherent time pressures of response also increase the difficulty and
complexity of managing the response beyond day-to-day emergency response and thus requires a
more collaborative rather than coordinated effort. Therefore, this study investigated the
following research questions: 1) What are the primary crisis related organizational cultural
features of the regional chapter of a Disaster Response Organization (DRO) and the Metropolitan
Police Department (MPD)?; 2) How are the crisis related organizational cultures of the
Metropolitan Police Department and the regional chapter of a Disaster Relief Organization
enacted through communication practices between members?; and 3) How do the differences in

4
these two organizational communication cultures influence their ability to practice crisis
collaboration?
This instrumental case study collected data using the qualitative approaches of participant
observation, interviews, and document analysis. The researcher spent a total of four and one-half
months in the field of both the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) and the regional chapter
of the national non-profit disaster relief organization (DRO). Data was collected by taking field
notes regarding the day-to-day operations as well as attending any crisis response planning
meetings. Several informal and semi-structured interviews were also conducted during the course
of this study. Appropriate organizational documentation, such as organization pamphlets,
websites, meeting documents, and crisis plans was collected and analyzed from both
organizations as they were germane to the study.
While some studies have focused on the communicative aspects of interorganizational
coordination in crisis management (Garner, 2006; Gray, 1985; Greve, 2005; Isbell & Goldstein,
2006; Kapucu, 2006), little effort has specifically been directed toward examining the effect that
different

communication

cultures

of

crisis

response

interorganizational collaboration during a large scale event.

organizations

may

have

on

These conditions could create

miscommunication and conflict between organizations that are not familiar with each other’s
different cultures or could increase situational awareness of the crisis thereby improving crisis
response. In addition, there has been a lack of clarity in the crisis response literature about what
crisis coordination means and how crisis collaboration is a distinct construct from crisis
coordination. Thus the aim of this instrumental case study was to use qualitative approaches to
explore and describe two crisis response organizational cultures and identify how their different
communication practices may influence crisis collaboration.
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Interorganizational Coordination, Collaboration, and Crisis Management
In a large scale crisis (defined here as “an unusual event of overwhelmingly negative
significance that carries a high level of risk, harm, and opportunity for further loss” [Seeger,
Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 4]), an individual organization cannot manage the event alone
because it simply does not have the necessary resources (e.g., information, money, labor,
equipment, etc.) or skills. Moreover, uncoordinated actions can create unanticipated problems for
other stakeholders and actually make the crisis worse (Gray, 1985, p. 912 & 914). Therefore,
coordination among several organizations is almost always necessary, but not necessarily
sufficient for an effective crisis response.
One problem with the current crisis management literature is that it rarely distinguishes
between crisis coordination and crisis collaboration, often using the terms interchangeably or
assuming that people intuitively know what these terms mean without defining them. This could
lead to confusion and conflict between scholars and practitioners as to the understanding and
goals of interorganizational crisis management and response. For example, the crisis
communication literature and the media have discussed instances of effective interorganizational
coordination, such as the Oklahoma City bombing, as well as ineffective interorganizational
coordination, as in the case of Hurricane Katrina. But these focus on how to have a higher level
of coordinated response and assume that everyone involved had the same understanding and goal
of crisis response.
Both crisis coordination and crisis collaboration are similar in that they utilize
“temporarily formed groups with representatives of many other primary organizations” (Keyton
& Stallworth, 2003, p. 236). I argue, however, that the traditional discussion of more or less
interorganizational crisis coordination does not accurately portray when crisis response reaches a
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level of crisis collaboration beyond coordination or when crisis collaboration is needed for
effective response management. This next section explores and defines the distinct constructs of
crisis coordination and crisis collaboration and why crisis collaboration should be the
superordinate goal of interorganizational crisis management.
Defining Crisis Coordination and Crisis Collaboration
A common definition of crisis coordination is “mutually agreed upon cooperation about
how to carry out particular tasks” (Quarantelli, 1997a, p. 48) or “any joint activity that is
intended to produce more public value than could be produced when organizations act alone” (U.
S. Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2005, p.4). Crisis coordination can include simply
informing others about what an organization will be doing in crisis response, centralized decision
making by one organization to other organizations, or mutually agreed upon cooperation
negotiated beforehand (Quarantelli, 1997a). One example of a method for crisis coordination is a
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that crisis response organizations create to pre-define
their roles and responsibilities during a crisis.
But crisis coordination implies a less integrated level of involvement between
organizations and more focus on individual organizational goals in crisis response and
mitigation. Coordination can be an acceptable level of response for everyday emergencies (e.g.,
fires, highway accidents, etc.) and responding to smaller crises (e.g., a bad snowstorm, seasonal
flooding, city-wide foodborne outbreak, etc.) However, in crisis coordination two independent
agencies can work in conjunction with one another but have minimal interaction and association
during a crisis response. A problem with crisis coordination is that it can cause what Auf der
Heide (1989) termed “Robinson Crusoe Syndrome” - when organizations continue focusing on
their own tasks and working independently in response to a crisis instead of “focusing on how
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their role fits into the overall response effort” (p. 57). This problem becomes magnified in more
dynamic circumstances and larger events that stretch the resources. These responses are going to
required partnerships where individual mission and response domain of the organization have to
become part of a larger domain and mission to be effective. In other words, crisis collaboration
connotes a deeper partnership between organizations where the crisis response mission,
decisions, and activities are jointly established and carried out. For example local, state and
federal (CDC) public health departments along with health care systems have their individual
missions for dealing with local disease outbreaks. But these organizations also have an integrated
public health mission and ongoing partnerships developed over time when crisis collaboration is
necessary during public health crises such as the 2009 H1N1 outbreak. Therefore, EOCs and
other crisis management groups should have collaboration as the superordinate goal of
interorganizational crisis response when responding to more dynamic or large-scale crisis or
disaster. While it is easy to initially dismiss the need for collaboration because the probability of
these types of crises occurring, 't Hart, Heyse, and Boin (2001) suggest that certain long-term
trends in Western society will make these crises more of a normal rather than exceptional state.
In addition, factors such as increased population density in high-risk areas, increased
technological risks, emerging infectious diseases, and increased terrorism, and increased
globalization and international travel also tend to increase this probability (Reynolds & Seeger,
2012, p. 2-5). For these reasons, while crisis collaboration may not be necessary in all crisis
response, it is necessary to define and develop if EOCs want to build ongoing relationships and
capitalize and enrich the capacity of various response groups.in managing and mitigating these
types of responses where crisis coordination is not sufficient.
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Although crisis collaboration is not currently defined in the crisis communication or crisis
management literature, one can look to the fields of organizational communication and group
communication as a guide. As Chrislip and Larson (1994) state, “Collaboration is more than
simply sharing knowledge and information [communication] and more than a relationship that
helps each party achieve its own goals [cooperation and coordination]” (p. 5). Collaboration is
the “process in which two or more organizations engage in shared decision-making and
coordinated joined action to address a common goal” (Keyton & Stallworth, 2003, p. 237). Stohl
and Walker (2002) speak about collaborating groups in general when they describe the benefits
of collaboration, but their observations can also apply to the problem of interorganizational
collaboration during a crisis.
The expectation is that by involving multiple partners, collaboration will alleviate some
of these concerns by allowing organizations to (a) complete difficult, complex projects in
a timely fashion; (b) pool financial and material resources; and (c) increase innovation
(especially in the area of new technologies) by leveraging the strengths, knowledge and
skills of each organizational partner involved. (Stohl & Walker, 2002, p. 240)
Crisis collaboration should therefore be the target outcome of crisis response
management

because crisis management groups, such as an EOC, must contend with the

uncertainty and complexities of mitigating a crisis under time constraints as well as managing the
actions of a wide variety of organizations and resources. In crisis collaboration, this means that
all members of the EOC create an alliance in which they value member interdependence, equal
input of participants, and shared decision-making (Keyton & Stallworth, 2003) in order to reach
their shared goal of effective crisis response and mitigation, even under severe time and
decision-making pressures. The research on collaborating groups by Keyton and Stallworth
(2003) and Stohl and Walker (2002), allows for further distinguishing the differences between
crisis coordination and crisis collaboration. These are presented in Table 1. [Please note that for
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the purposes of this project the author will use the term “coordination” when it is used in the
traditional sense in the crisis response literature and when organizational members generally
discuss working with other organizations. This is to acknowledge their general lack of clarity
between crisis coordination and crisis collaboration. When the author uses the term
“collaboration”, that indicates a distinction made in the research literature or a distinction made
by the author of the type of interorganizational crisis response organizational members are
discussing based on the features described in Table 1.]
Although

crisis

collaboration

should

be

the

superordinate

goal

of

EOCs,

interorganizational crisis coordination in itself is often challenging enough for EOCs trying to
manage any crisis. Many interorganizational coordination case studies of disasters suggest
process or procedural ways in which a disaster could have been better managed. From these
observations, suggestions are made about how similar disasters in the future could learn from
mistakes in coordination efforts (Tierney, 2007).

For example, Nigg (1997) reported on

jurisdictional coordination issues between the city, county, and state level organizations as they
responded to the 1994 Northridge earthquake. She found that the disaster plan added additional
levels that resources and assistance requests had to flow through that were not normally there in
the flow of information for day-to-day operations. This in turn caused confusion, mistrust, and
“going around” the disaster plan that resulted in coordination problems during the disaster.
Nigg, therefore, recommended that the procedures and levels for information sharing in response
to a disaster be as similar as possible to the non-emergency procedures.
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Table 1
Differences Between Crisis Coordination and Crisis Collaboration
Feature
Crisis Coordination
Crisis Collaboration
Goal of crisis
Concern for meeting individual
Common definition of problem by
response
organizational goal
group and agreed goal to reach
Tasks and
Organizations focus on “expert
Realization of interdependence of
resources
area” of crisis response; can lead
organizations; results in sharing of
to competing for resources or
resources and tasks to avoid
redundancies.
redundancies.
Communication
Lack of sharing of information
Continuous flow of communication
between organizations or one way and willingness to share information
from EOC to crisis response
between organizations and the
organizations.
collaborating group.
Decision-Making Top-down orders (command-and- Power and status among collaborating
control) from crisis manager or
group members equal so participation
incident commander to
and consensus decision-making is
organizations.
encouraged.
Member
To their individual organization;
To the collaborating group; sees other
Trust/Loyalty
sees other organizations as
organizations as partners.
competitors.
Organizational
Rigid – Members identify strongly Flexible – Members more willing to
Boundaries
with their organizational culture;
adapt to fit collaborating group culture;
organizational boundary spanning organizational boundary spanning of
of members is rare.
members is common.

Quarantelli (1988) in a summary of disaster crisis management research, found that in the
typical community disaster there were management problems in “the communication process and
information flow; the exercise of authority and decision-making; and, the development of coordination and loosening the command structure” (p. 375). Auf der Heide (1989) also found
crisis management problems in what he termed, the “Robinson Crusoe Syndrome” - when
organizations continue focus on their own tasks and working independently in response to a
crisis instead of “focusing on how their role fits into the overall response effort” (p. 57). An
example would be multiple ambulance services taking all victims of a disaster to one hospital
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and thereby overwhelming that hospital’s emergency response capability. A more effective
alternative is to coordinate with the fire departments, other EMS services, and area hospitals to
determine which hospitals should get which victims based upon the type and severity of injury
and the capacity of hospitals to receive those victims.
Three Perspectives on Coordination of Disaster Response
To deal with these interorganizational coordination problems, crisis managers and
researchers have described three perspectives regarding disaster response coordination - the
bureaucratic perspective, the structural perspective, and the network perspective (Tierney, 2005).
These are described in detail below (see Table 2).
The bureaucratic approach to crisis coordination was derived from U.S. military doctrine
responding to wartime conflict situations. Many emergency managers themselves “began their
careers in the armed services so it is logical that the early professionals would lean towards a
‘paramilitary’ approach” (Drabek & McEntire, 2003, p. 106). This “command and control”
model favored top-down, hierarchical decision-making and centralization of power in an attempt
to control the chaos inherent in disasters (Auf der Heide, 1989; Drabek, 2003; Quarantelli,
1997a; Tierney, 2007).

This bureaucratic perspective was also favored because it fit

government’s traditional norms of “clearly defined objectives, a division of labor, a formal
structure, and a set of policies and procedures” (Schneider, 1992, p. 137-138) that crisis
managers felt standardized the crises response processes and lessened decision-making
confusion.
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Table 2
Summary of Three Perspectives of Disaster Response Coordination
Coordination Philosophy
Structure
Strengths
Perspective
Bureaucratic Command-andRigid,
Clearly defined
Control response hierarchical
objectives,
to chaos in
division of labor,
disasters
formal structure,
standardized set of
policies and
procedures

Structural

Network

Disaster
response is a
blend of
elements of
structure
(domains and
tasks) and
agency
(resources and
activities)

A range of
different
organizational
forms created on
continuum from
formal
organizing (D-TR-A) to
collective
behavior (A-RD-T)
Networks of
Network
organizations are structures are
formed to
flexible and fluid
respond to a
to determine
particular
most successful
disaster based on strategies and
needs and
organizations
situation. Two
necessary to
types:
respond to each
1) Emergent
unique disaster
MultiOrganization
al Networks
(EMONs)
2) Joint
Information
Centers
(JICs)

Describes forms
of organizing
rather than
specific
organizations;
more flexible in
allowing for
different structural
forms to be
organized as
disaster changes
Incorporates
emergent groups
more easily into
disaster response
strategies; gives
emergency
managers and
Public
Information
Officers (PIOs)
specific strategies
for effective
coordination
response

Weaknesses
Perpetuates “panic
and chaos” myths of
public’s response to
disasters; doesn’t
account for
emergent groups;
doesn’t allow for
flexibility as disaster
situation changes
Does not capture
network features
such as
communication
structures, density,
or nodes of
centrality

Network is limited
in scope to that
particular disaster
which leads to little
consistency in
coordinated action
from disaster to
disaster. Emergency
managers may also
not correctly
identify those
groups necessary for
disaster response
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So to return to the example used earlier, if several ambulance services were called to
respond to a disaster site, they would communicate the information about the victims up the
incident command system to the incident commander or “the individual responsible for all
incident activities, including the development of strategies and tactics and the ordering and the
release of resources” (FEMA, 2013). The incident commander would then communicate with the
hospitals and then communicate back to the ambulance service which hospital to transport the
victim. This would assist in preventing any one hospital from being overwhelmed with victims.
This bureaucratic model is primarily used by the military, first responder organizations
(i.e., police, fire, EMS), and anyone utilizing the federal government’s National Response
Framework or Incident Command System. But, some researchers have criticized this model.
Drabek and McEntire (2003) explained that this model perpetuates the panic and chaos myths of
the public’s response to disaster. They also said the bureaucratic approach does not take into
account the emergence of new or different groups and the necessary role they play in effective
large-scale disaster response (p. 107). Another criticism is that the model is ineffective for largescale disaster response because its centralized structure cannot mesh with “the political and
structural realities [of localism, lack of standardization, unit diversity and fragmentation]
inherent in American society” (Drabek, 1985, p. 91). In addition, the model does not allow for
the flexibility of collective improvisation and resourcefulness needed as a disaster increases in its
size and complexity (Tierney, 2003). Neal and Phillips (1995) also argue that this model creates
jurisdictional disputes and interagency competition that may prevent effective response to a crisis
(p. 331). One dramatic example of this was the bickering and blame-shifting between the New
Orleans mayor, governor of Louisiana, and FEMA over who was in charge of the Hurricane
Katrina response. This resulted in trucks of food and water waiting until they received orders that
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they could start their relief efforts.

Although this perspective still dominates most

interorganizational crisis coordination, researchers have called for the use of more-realistic, and
flexible perspectives that can better react to the inherent ambiguity and creative problem-solving
needed in crisis management.
A second perspective is the structural approach. Kreps and his colleagues developed a
social theory of disaster response to describe various organizing processes and role enactments
that take place when organizations transition from “more routine circumstances to those of
crises” (Kreps & Bosworth, 1993, p. 428). When all four structural elements of domains (D),
tasks (T), human and material resources (R), and activities (A) are present, “a disaster-relevant
organization has been socially constructed” (Kreps & Bosworth, 1993, p. 433). This model better
describes dynamic stability and change elements that happen in disaster response and now reflect
a continuum of structural forms with “D-T-R-A or formal organizing at one end” where
“structural ends (domains and tasks) precede and constrain structural means (resources and
activities)”, “A-R-D-T or collective behavior at the other end” which “structural means precede
and constrain structural ends” and 22 other structural forms in between (Kreps & Bosworth,
1993, p. 433-434). As Tierney (2005) explains, this format allows for flexibility for when
organizations have to improvise to new disaster situations other than what they were trained for
(e.g., firefighters who fight building fires now have to respond to a burning aircraft). This format
also allows for response-related tasks not in the crisis response plan to be handled by creating
different organizational forms (e.g., search and rescue, sheltering of victims, etc.) (Tierney,
2005).
This model is more flexible in allowing for different structural forms to be organized for
successful coordination of disaster response depending on the type, severity, and duration of a
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crisis. However, Gillespie (1991) argued that this taxonomy did not capture network features
such as communication structures, density, centrality, or the increasing complexity of the
management of coordinated response. Therefore, Drabek (2003) proposed a third perspective of
crisis coordination, the network perspective.
A third coordination perspective, created as an alternative to the bureaucratic perspective,
is the network approach. This approach privileges the instrumental communication dimensions
of coordination. With a network perspective organizations are pulled together to respond to a
particular disaster based on the needs and scope of the disaster. For example a public health
crisis such as pandemic influenza most likely would involve the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC), community health offices, hospitals, primary care physicians and schools. A
terrorist attack (not involving biological weapons) would need more law enforcement and
paramilitary groups such as the FBI, National Guard, and the Department of Homeland Security.
Two types of coordination networks have been documented in disaster response. The
first is the Joint Information Center (JIC). JICs have been around at least since the 9/11 attacks
but were formalized as part of the National Response Plan (now the National Response
Framework) to help coordinate and disseminate information to the public (typically via the
media). This is accomplished on a local, regional or national level, depending on the severity and
magnitude of the crisis (FEMA, 2013). A JIC is usually located next to or near the Incident
Command Center or Emergency Operations Center which is managing the disaster coordination
efforts. Its members are typically the Public Information Officers (PIOs) of the organizations
involved in the disaster response. Actions include providing information about where disaster
victims can get assistance, major updates or briefings concerning recovery efforts, and even
rumor control (FEMA, 2013; May, 2006). “By developing media lists, contact information for
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relevant stakeholders, and coordinated news releases, the JIC staff facilitates dissemination of
accurate, consistent, accessible, and timely public information to numerous audiences” (FEMA,
2013, p. 37). The primary purpose of the JIC is to leverage communication resources and insure
a coordinated communication strategy and a unified message.
The importance of establishing a JIC was realized when response agencies failed to
establish this coordinating structure during Hurricane Katrina.

As Under Secretary for

Preparedness George Forsman recalled,
It was a real bad situation because we lost any element of relationship between the media
at large and the DHS organization, the state of Louisiana, and their organization in New
Orleans—and the result was critical. We spent so much time being critical that we didn’t
get critical information out to the populous at large. (May, 2006, p. 11)
Because the government wasn’t getting the information out to the public via a JIC about
how the public should respond to the escalating disaster, the government was portrayed as doing
nothing and the media took on the role of the JIC. Instead of objectively reporting what was
going on, they created a unified message to communicate to the federal government the urgency
of the situation and created greater situational awareness of the dire needs of citizens stranded on
rooftops and in convention centers and arenas.
A second network perspective found in coordinated response to disasters is emergent
multi-organizational networks (EMONs). EMONs are networks of organizations that are formed
to respond to a particular disaster based on the unique needs and situation. Drabek studied
EMONs that emergency managers used to coordinate in response to a disaster. He found that
emergency managers “must implement sets of strategies that collectively will help to lace the
resources of diverse agencies into an integrated whole within rapidly changing and highly
uncertain decision environments” (Drabek, 2003, p. 68). Through interviews and response
questionnaires of 62 emergency managers and 89 contact agency executives covering 10
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different U.S. disasters in 1999, Drabek identified 26 strategies which are organized into five
broader categories - core strategies, consequence strategies, customer strategies, control
strategies, and cultural strategies (Drabek, 2003). Core strategies such as domain clarification,
jurisdictional negotiation, and resource familiarization help to define the purpose of the EMON.
Consequence strategies deal with the management of network decisions and activities such as
use of information technologies and maintaining a hospitable EOC climate. Customer strategies
involve the EMON dealing with the public in terms of receiving citizen requests, dealing with
the media, documenting damage assessments as well as disaster repairs and restoration. Control
strategies showed how a clear EOC mission and values could allow others in the group to make
decisions on tactic implementation that produce results. This is opposite of what control usually
means in the bureaucratic perspective mentioned earlier.

Finally, cultural strategies were

strategies that emergency managers utilized to help foster interorganizational understanding and
communication, as well as helping the EMON understand the needs of a diverse community with
vulnerable populations. While social factors such as characteristics of the emergency manager,
characteristics of the disaster, and characteristics of the community, did have an effect on
response effectiveness, those emergency managers” who used the largest number of [strategies]
were found to have guided the most effective disaster responses” (Drabek, 2003, p. 201).
A benefit of the network approach to coordination is that it allows for emergent groups
(e.g., search and rescue, assessment groups, volunteers, etc.) and organizations not originally part
of the crisis response plan, but affected by the crisis, (e.g., businesses, faith-based organizations,
community groups, etc.) to be integrated effectively into the crisis response (Drabek, 1985;
Drabek & McEntire, 2003; Neal & Phillips, 1995).

This approach also “minimizes ritual
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behavior, tolerates decentralization and learning, and fosters effectiveness as it is flexible and
innovative” (Britton, 1989, p. 15).
One drawback to utilizing the network form of coordination is that it is limited in scope
to that particular disaster. This leads to little consistency in coordinated action from disaster to
disaster because the members may be too overwhelmed with the disaster response efforts to
accurately document actions. Networks can also make coordination and information sharing
more difficult because the trust between network members may not be established in comparison
to long-established teams or bureaucratic structures. Another limitation is that the network is
determined by the emergency manager and she/he may not identify groups that are important to
include in the network for a particular disaster response. For example, in Hurricane Katrina, the
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) quickly learned that the one of the most effective ways to
disseminate public health information was through local faith-based organizations (FBOs),
which were not part of their original communication plans nor were they involved in any precrisis planning exercises. “The relationship established between local FBOs and those seeking
assistance already made these organizations trusted sources of health information” (Vanderford,
Nastoff, Telfer, & Bonzo, 2007, p. 13).
While these three crisis coordination perspectives are generally described as unique and
viable alternatives to the other two, Harrald (2006) argues that one can have the discipline of
similar structures and processes of the bureaucratic perspective while allowing for the flexibility
and innovation found in the network perspective to solve problems that a large scale disaster
creates. He believes that although bureaucratic structures have the potential to be more flexible,
most crisis managers come from a military or paramilitary background steeped in bureaucratic
processes and will fall back on those when placed in high-stress, decision-making situations.
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Harrald (2006) even concedes that it is difficult to find and train emergency managers who are
both innovative and technically competent (p. 268). The structural and network perspectives
seem to be a better fit even though one deals with organizations (network) while the other deals
with ways of organizing (structural). Moreover, he concludes that the best perspective may be
for crisis managers to utilize the network perspective while also introducing some common
policies and interoperability of systems of the bureaucratic perspective.
In summary, at minimum, some level of interorganizational coordination is needed to
manage large-scale crisis response and mitigation because one organization alone does not have
the necessary resources to deal with the crisis. To help with the issues of interorganizational
coordination crisis managers and researchers have developed three perspectives of disaster
coordination response – bureaucratic, structural, and network. Although the network perspective
does come closest to meeting the superordinate goal of crisis collaboration in terms of its
flexibility and willingness to partner with emergent organizations, it doesn’t address all crisis
collaboration issues. All three perspectives do agree though that effective communication is an
integral part of interorganizational coordination efforts.

However, while the bureaucratic

perspective tends to be more focused on interoperability issues, the network perspective is more
focused on information sharing. The importance of these two communication issues in
interorganizational coordination are discussed further in the next section.
Communication and Interorganizational Coordination
Coordination and communication has been a persistent theme in both crisis management
literature and practice. Auf der Heide, for example, describes a close conceptual relationship
between interorganizational coordination and communication in his 1989 book, Disaster
Response: Principles of Preparation and Coordination.
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In disasters, communication difficulties are often hard to separate from coordination
difficulties, and the greatest coordination difficulties are inter-organizational. Therefore,
many of the communication problems are those related to inter-agency information
sharing. Frequently, the means for communication exists, but for a number of reasons,
persons are hesitant to communicate with others outside their own organization. (p. 79)
Many researchers agree with Auf der Heide’s contention that problems with disaster
coordination are often related to the communication of information between organizations.
These information sharing issues typically fall into two camps – 1) the interoperability of the
technology used to communicate information and 2) information sharing or the content of what
is communicated.
Technology such as cellular phones, radios, computer databasing systems, and
geographic information systems (GIS) are all used to facilitate the exchange of information
between organizations during a crisis but are only effective if everyone is utilizing the same
system. The process of connecting and integrating these diverse communication and information
systems is called interoperability (Auf der Heide, 1989; Libenau, 2003) and has often been
described as the solution to the coordination and communication problem. For example, Libenau
(2003) in studying interorganizational communication during the September 11, 2001 disaster
found that firefighters' radios were not networked with police, other groups of firefighters, or
other emergency services so they could not talk to one another and coordinate action (p. 48).
After the September 11, 2001 disaster, the issue of interoperability has been the focus of
governmental coordination efforts and research (GAO, 2007; Harrison, Gil-Garcia, Pardo, &
Thompson, 2006; Lund, 2002; National Task Force on Interoperability, 2003). In fact, the federal
government has funded over $2.15 billion from 2003 to 2005 for communication interoperability
projects (GAO, 2007, p. 2-3). However, the 2007 General Accountability Office report found
that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) did not ensure that states that received funding
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were aligning their interoperability plans with statewide emergency communication plans and
the DHS had not yet addressed interoperability issues with federal agencies (GAO, 2007, p. 3).
Finally, national standards of interoperable communication devices have been slow, and have
resulted in the premature purchase of some equipment (GAO, 2007, p. 4). Additional questions
remain about the reach of the technology, what organizations have access to the technology, and
resilience of the technology in a disaster.
Some researchers, such as Quarantelli (1997b) suggest that the more important
communication issue with disaster response and management is with information sharing “[T]he real problem was the flow of information content that was inaccurate, incomplete or
misdirected, the kind of difficulties not solvable by more communication equipment” (p. 95).
During a crisis, the amount of information greatly increases and will flow “within every
responding organization; between organizations; from citizens to organizations; and from
organizations to citizens” (Quarantelli, 1997a, p. 45). This amount of information typically
overwhelms the member of an organization receiving the communication, therefore he or she has
to “filter all but the most essential information to pass along to decision-makers” (Auf der Heide,
1989, p. 55).

Interorganizational coordination issues arise when information not deemed

important by one organizational member is not shared but may be important information to the
overall disaster effort. This is because another organization may have needed that information to
complete an important response task (Auf der Heide, 1989, p. 56).
Other studies have examined the importance of communication as information sharing in
interorganizational coordination to help manage crises more effectively. In examining the 2003
Columbia disaster, Garner (2006) said that the interorganizational relationships NASA had with
its external contractors and the government contributed to a NASA culture of poor decision-
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making. Gray (1985) described a process model examining conditions during three
developmental phases of planning (problem-solving, direction-setting, and structuring) that lead
to successful coordination. In interviewing directors of non-profit disaster relief agencies, Isbell
and Goldstein (2006) determined that successful coordination during a crisis consisted of preplanning to agree upon what non-profit agencies will have what responsibilities in the crisis
response, the need for a structured response by all collaborators involved, and a collaborative
state that fluctuated between active and passive states.

Greve (2005) speculated that

interorganizational learning through interbranch job rotation, a combined searchable database for
all members, and network ties to informational holders by governmental agencies such as the
FBI and CIA might have led to better coordination and may have prevented the September 11
terrorist attacks. In another study of the September 11 terrorist attacks, Kapucu (2006) found that
to

foster

interorganizational

network

coordination,

organizations

should

establish

communications and social networks with other organizations before disasters occur. Moreover,
integrated IT communication systems would have helped interagency communication and
decision-making on September 11.
In summary, practitioners and researchers agree that interorganizational communication
is the key to facilitating crisis coordination.

The US federal government has pushed

interoperability of communication systems as the solution to interorganizational communication
issues during a crisis. Other researchers argue that information sharing between organizations is
the larger communication issue and advocate for pre-crisis development of professional and
social interorganizational networks to develop trust and common avenues for information
sharing and learning. Past research on crisis coordination helps to explain how communication
can be improved in the pre-planning stages of crisis management as well as improving the
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interoperability of communication systems. However, research on crisis management and crisis
communication has not yet addressed how the interorganizational members of an Emergency
Operations Center (EOC) influence crisis collaboration efforts. This next section presents the
bona fide group perspective as a way of framing how an EOC can be understood as a complex
system that deals with internal processes and external exigencies, which in turn can affect crisis
collaboration efforts.
Crisis Collaboration and the Bona Fide Group Perspective
The bona fide group perspective first conceptualized by Putnam and Stohl (1990) can
help further understanding of crisis collaboration within EOCs “because of its focus on the
communication influences that emanate from group membership and group environmental
characteristics” (Keyton & Stallworth, 2003, p. 239). EOCs are constituted as bona fide groups
exhibiting many of the traditional characteristics and functions thereof.

Bona fide groups

“exhibit the characteristics of stable but permeable boundaries and interdependence with
context” (Stohl & Putnam, 1994, p. 286).
Stable yet permeable boundaries means that although group membership is defined (in
group versus outgroup) these group boundaries tend to be fluid and permeable because group
membership can fluctuate and change depending on how others identify with the group (or not)
(Stohl & Putnam, 2003; Stohl & Putnam, 1994). These stable yet permeable boundaries are also
determined by intergroup communication and group-member relationships outside the group
(Stohl & Putnam, 1994, p. 286). EOCs have stable yet permeable boundaries because group
membership is often in flux in two ways.

First, EOC members representing a particular

organization can change over time as people are promoted or leave their representative roles or
organizations. Also members from other organizations can be added or excluded from an EOC
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either gradually over time, based on the goals of the EOC, or suddenly as the EOC needs a
particular organization to manage a particular crisis.
Interdependence with context means that bona fide groups are embedded in multiple
environments such as historical, economic, physical, and cultural that all have an effect on
intragroup communication, intergroup relationships, and coordination efforts (Frey, 2003, p. 56). As Keyton and Stallworth (2003) further explain, members of a bona fide group “are not
starting from scratch; rather, they bring with them the history and politics of their own
organizations, as well as any positive and negative influences from their previous organizational
history” (p. 257). This interdependence with context can also apply to EOCs. For example, if
two organizations have a negative history of working with each other outside of the EOC then
the members representing those organizations can bring that history into the EOC and hinder
collaboration efforts of the EOC.
Therefore, the importance of viewing an EOC’s crisis collaboration efforts from a bona
fide group perspective is that one does not focus exclusively on the internal processes (e.g.,
information sharing between members) of the group or the external environments (e.g., groups
have a history of competing for funding). Both are intricately linked and one cannot be
privileged over the other. As Stohl and Walker (2002) state, “to understand what is going on
‘inside’ any group we must also understand what is going on ‘outside’ it and the relation between
these two spaces” (p. 242). The communicative context is the essential element in which
collaboration is managed by its members. “Though communication, the various participants
manage their boundaries, borders, contexts, roles and tasks” (Stohl & Walker, 2002, p. 242).
As stated previously, most crisis collaboration studies in the past have typically focused
on internal processes and have assumed that collaborative groups such as the EOC are groups
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with stable and impermeable boundaries. This is why their focus has been on information
sharing and on interoperability of communication systems. But in order to understand an EOC’s
crisis collaboration efforts and challenges the focus needs to be on internal processes and the
external environments, which have an equally important effect on crisis collaboration. For that
reason, to better understand interorganizational collaboration of EOCs one external environment
to examine further is the individual organizational culture of EOC members. EOC members are
embedded in the organizational culture to which they are primary members (e.g., police, public
works, government, hospital, etc.). Thus one can argue that the influences, politics, history, and
communicative practices of that organization (which make up its organizational culture) can
have an effect on how that member works within the EOC group. This next section reviews the
concept of organizational culture in greater depth and how communication is an integral part of
organizational culture. Additionally, organizational culture concepts are identified that are the
most salient in studying crisis response organizations.
Organizational Culture
The study of organizational culture began in the 1960’s but became popular beginning in
the 1980’s when trade magazines like Business Week and Fortune, and a best-selling
management book In Search of Excellence explored the topic (Eisenberg & Riley, 2001, p. 293).
Culture has become a broad paradigm for organizational inquiry in a variety of fields, including
business, sociology, anthropology, and communication. At its most basic level, organizational
culture has been described as “the way we do things around here” (Schein, 1999, p. 27).
Researchers in the social sciences and business have also defined culture in a variety of ways
which in turn has affected how they studied the concept in organizations. Pettigrew (1979)
defines culture as “the system of such publicly and collectively accepted meanings operating for

26
a given group at a given time” (p. 574). Van Maanen and Barley (1984) explain culture as codes
and assumptions that create meaning systems “which give rise to behavioral and cognitive
diversity” (p. 308). After reviewing the various definitions of organizational culture, , for the
purpose of the current study I choose to define it as how organizational members subjectively
create shared patterns of symbols and meanings through communication that defines, guides,
and sometimes constrains their everyday thoughts and behaviors in organizational life. This is a
continuous and dynamic process that most closely relates to the symbolic-interpretative concept
of organizational culture. This concept also centrally locates communication as the process that
helps organizational members create and maintain organizational culture. Finally, this definition
is influenced by concepts of organizational culture as symbolism and meaning described by
anthropologist Clifford Geertz (1973) and management professor Andrew Pettigrew (1979). This
is further described in the next section.
Culture as Symbolism and Meaning
The concept of culture in organizations was heavily influenced by anthropologist Clifford
Geertz’s notion of culture. Geertz noted, “man is an animal suspended in webs of significance
he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an
experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning” (1973, p.5).
Like the spider, man’s “webs of significance” contain many things about his life and existence –
interactions with others and interactions with himself, choices he has made, sensational events
and mundane events – all woven together, crisscrossing, and supporting each other to create
meaning and culture. A person’s reality and how they live is defined and interpreted through
their beliefs, symbols and values that constitute their culture or whom they are. People then
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interpret and make sense of the world through social discourse and other communication
practices.
Pettigrew expanded Geertz’s work by linking it to the study of organizations. Pettigrew
(1979) felt that one did not understand the dynamics of an organization through a functionalist or
“snapshot” view of an organization, but advocated for a more interpretive view of organizational
culture.
In describing and defining the various forms and functions of symbols, language,
ideologies, beliefs, rituals, and myths…These concepts direct attention toward the
mobilization of consciousness and purpose, the codification of meaning, the emergence
of normative patterns, the rise and fall of systems of leadership and strategies of
legitimization. It is through such mechanisms and processes that culture evolves,…Man
creates culture and culture creates man. (Pettigrew, 1979, p. 576)
Pettigrew’s work created interest among organizational communication scholars interested in
examining organizations from this cultural perspective.

Specifically, he pointed out the

importance of studying the use of language in an organization to relate values, power
distributions and other concepts (1979). By observing people in an organization, through their
everyday talk, their documents, their nonverbal signs, we can determine how they develop and
reify their meanings, norms, values into their organizational culture and in turn how that
organizational culture affects how people talk, dress, and interact.

Thus, “communication

develops shared meaning, which leads to organized action” (Donnellon, Gray, & Bougon, 1986,
p. 45).
While early researchers studied culture by examining rare organizational events, talk or
artifacts that had deeper cultural meaning through its symbols and metaphors (i.e., Schein, 1992),
more recently communication and management scholars have turned to everyday talk, rituals,
and nonverbal communication between organizational members (Eisenberg & Riley, 2001, p.
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296). This work shows that culture is created and maintained just as much from the mundane as
by the sublime. Trujillo and Dionisopoulos noted that rhetorical scholars such as Kenneth Burke
and Erving Goffman argued that every day “communication is the very action which creates
social identities and social realities” (Trujillo & Dionisopoulos, 1987, p. 199). For example,
although Manning (1982) and Trujillo and Dionisopoulos (1987) studied police cultures of three
different departments (2 in the US and 1 in the UK), they found that members of these
organizations use communication to reify the notion that society is dangerous and the police are
the only ones able to handle the danger and control society.
This leads to the question of what every day organizational talk a researcher should
study. Pacanowsky and O’Donnell-Trujillo (1982) identified the following broad functional
dimensions that can guide communication researchers exploring organizational culture: relevant
constructs (how members define general organizational concepts), facts (“social knowledge” of
proper organizational behavior), practice (how members perform tasks or activities), vocabulary
(vernacular or jargon), metaphors (how members structure their experiences), stories, and rites
and rituals (p. 124-126). Other researchers (Conquergood, 1991; Pacanowsky & O’DonnellTrujillo, 1983) have added that seeing communication as a performance or drama allows them to
see organizational members as “actors who creatively play, improvise, interpret, and re-present
roles and scripts” (Conquergood, 1991, p. 187). Conquergood (1991) also advocates observing
how organizational culture can be communicated in nonverbal ways such as “dance, music,
gesture, food, ritual artifact, symbolic action, as well as words” (p. 189).
However, communication researchers also must be cautious about taking too wide or too
narrow a view of organizational culture. Carbaugh (1988) and Hatch (1993) suggest that not
everything should be considered a symbolic action or meaning of an organization’s culture.
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Carbaugh explains that patterns of symbolic action and meaning should only be considered
“culture” if they are “a) deeply felt, b) commonly intelligible [it resonates with the collective],
and c) widely accessible” (Carbaugh, 1988, p. 38). Hatch (1993) notes that artifacts themselves
are not symbols, but artifacts can become symbols of an organizational culture if they are
produced and used by organizational members “to produce a socially constructed reality to
express their self-images and to contextualize their activity and identity” (p. 673). On the other
hand, Trice and Beyer (1984) when creating a typology of organizational rites, cautioned
scholars on researching “single, discrete elements of culture - such as symbols, myths or stories that seemed important in the settings they analyzed” (p. 653) for fear of researchers getting a
limited or distorted view of the organizational culture.

Therefore organizational culture

constructs selected for this study were those that best encapsulated organization events, talk, and
artifacts of crisis response organizations.
Organizational Culture Constructs Relating to Crisis Response Organizations
Taking the guidance from past researchers that one should not take too wide or narrow a
view when studying an organizational culture, one must also acknowledge a balance between the
scope of a particular study and accurately portraying an organizational culture. No one study can
or should claim to completely capture all the complexity, dynamics, and nuances of an
organizational culture.

The study of organizational culture has inspired communication

researchers (Bantz, 1993; Hofstede, 2001; Pacanowsky & O’Donnell Trujillo, 1982; Schein,
1992) to identify many constructs in order to determine how organizational members
subjectively create shared patterns of symbols and meaning through communication to define,
guide, and sometimes constrain their everyday thoughts and behaviors in organizational life.
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It is acknowledged that other frameworks could be used. Given the fact the primary
emphasis of project is on crisis coordination and collaboration it is necessary to choose a set of
constructs to examine the issue of culture. Other markers or indices of culture also can be
represented within these four large categories. Therefore, I choose the following four
organizational culture constructs of vocabulary, rites and rituals, stories and symbols as the most
relevant to my study of crisis response organizations and how they communicate their
organizational culture. These four constructs also are often the standard elements the researchers
above have used in the conceptualizations of organizational culture. These were selected as they
specifically reference a communicative action such as the choice of words used by organizational
members (vocabulary) or using words to convey a particular understanding of a crisis or one’s
role in crisis response (stories). Organizational symbols such as dress, logos, and office décor are
often powerful vehicles for nonverbal communication for those inside and outside the
organization. And rites and rituals are evident in the collective crisis preparation and crisis
response activities of planning meetings, trainings, and protocols and procedures. A more in
depth discussion follows of the four constructs most relevant to the focus of the current study.
Vocabulary. Words are the essential way by which we communicate and are an
important way that members distinguish their organization from other organizations as well as
signal membership. Jargon, and how common words have a particular meaning within an
organization, becomes a short-handed way for members to work effectively with one another as
well as protect themselves from outsiders. This specialized organizational vocabulary often
provides clues as to what are the relevant constructs, facts, and practices of organizational life
(Pacanowsky & O’Donnell-Trujillo, 1982) as well as a way to “draw inferences about a group’s
metaphors and values” (Driskill & Brenton, 2005, p. 45). Vocabulary thus becomes an easy way
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to determine how crisis response organizations create and maintain symbolic boundaries as well
as how they might infuse common words such as “crisis” and “coordination” with different
meanings from organization to organization.
Quarantelli (1997a), for example, has noted that different organizations have assigned
different meanings to the word “coordination”.
Some groups view coordination…as informing other groups about what they will be
doing. Others see coordination as the centralization of decision-making within a
particular agency or among a few key officials, usually including themselves. Others
again see coordination…as mutually agreed cooperation about how to carry out particular
tasks. (Quarantelli, 1997a, p. 48)
As discussed earlier, the lack of clarity and distinction between crisis coordination and crisis
collaboration is another vocabulary choice that causes confusion in the expectations of working
with other organizations. Therefore, when organizations come together to respond to a disaster,
they may become easily frustrated with one another because other groups are not “coordinating”
or “collaborating” with them as they believe they should because they ascribe different meanings
to the same word.
Another example of vocabulary differences can be seen with the language used in an
Emergency Operations Center (EOC). When attending a regional disaster response exercise in
2008, the researcher discovered that an EOC uses many acronyms and terminology that may be
familiar with some organizational members and unfamiliar with others because it is not a part of
their everyday organizational culture.

An EOC member must know that “800 MHz” and

“ETEAM” are all interoperability technologies used within the EOC. They must also know what
the terms, “hot wash” and “duty logs” mean, who the “incident commander” is, and decipher
phrases such as “Due to credible threats on September 10 of explosions at soft targets, the threat
level was increased from Yellow to Orange level”. This level of vocabulary and terminology

32
may be easier for members of paramilitaristic organizations to understand than other
organizations because most of the earliest emergency managers started their careers in the
military (Drabek & McEntire, 2003, p. 106). Therefore emergency management procedures,
which are used by EOCs, tend to be steeped in militaristic and paramilitaristic language, largely
due to the background of participants. Language is clearly an important part of the emergency
management culture.
Rites and rituals. Hofstede (2001) suggests rites and rituals are “collective activities that are
technically unnecessary to the achievement of desired ends, but that within a culture are
considered socially essential, keeping the individual bound within the norms of the collectivity”
(p. 10). Rites and rituals can either be formal (i.e., initiation) or informal (i.e., how meetings are
run), performed regularly or occasionally, but are enacted collectively to provide the rules,
norms, and values of organizational life for members (Pacanowsky & O’Donnell-Trujillo, 1982;
Hofstede, 2001). Trice and Beyer (1984) identified six types of rites – rites of passage, rites of
degradation, rites of enhancement, rites of renewal, rites of conflict reduction, and rites of
integration (p. 657). Rites and rituals are also drawn on by members and talked about to make
sense of an organizational reality and of those members’ actions within it (Pacanowsky &
O’Donnell-Trujillo, 1982, p. 136).
As Trice and Beyer (1984) argue, rites and rituals “may not be a ‘master key’ that unlocks all
of the meanings of a culture, but they are events in which much of a culture surfaces” (p. 656).
For example, regular meetings in themselves may not alone represent an organizational culture,
but meetings can be communication events in which people try to make sense of what is
happening to them and see their place in the organization and the process of meetings can
produce and reproduce structures of an organizational culture (Schwartzman, 1993, p. 39-41).
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Rites and rituals of an organization can help define and reify how crisis response
organizations frame crisis and crisis response. For example, if an organization’s rites and rituals
are mostly private and formal occasions, they could reinforce to members the organization’s
closed boundary and reinforce power structures.

This in turn could hinder organizational

members coordinating during crisis response because they only trust their organization to get the
job done.
Some rites and rituals are common throughout the crisis cycle. Organizations have
regular crisis trainings, drills, and exercises to prepare for crisis. These can either enhance
coordination efforts to be enacted when a crisis occurs or they can reinforce lack of coordination
between organizations. Another kind of crisis ritual occurs when an organization forces out one
or more of the dominant leaders because the public has determined that the organization could
have prevented the crisis (Seeger, Sellnow & Ulmer, 2003, p. 81). Examples of this include the
Enron crisis, the American Red Cross’s handling of 9/11 funds, and Hurricane Katrina resulting
in the resignation of the FEMA director. These firings can be described as a rite of degradation
by an organization because the organization wants to show that it is breaking away from long
held beliefs and procedures and “making room for fresh perspectives and new voices” (Seeger,
Sellnow & Ulmer, 2003, p. 81).
Another common post-crisis rite and ritual is the memorial event. When crises cause
great tragedy and loss, people, organizations, and communities feel the need to remember and
memorialize these events. These ceremonies, whether private or public, help with the grieving
process, but are also meant as a form of learning because they serve “as a reminder that the
community must remain vigilant in preparing for and, if possible, preventing similar crisis in the
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future” (Seeger, Sellnow & Ulmer, 2003, p. 77). Therefore rites and rituals are an important
identifying feature of organizational culture and appear to play a specific role in crisis response.
Stories. Stories are narratives that are generally based on actual events and experiences
(Trice & Beyer, 1984, p. 655) members tell to other members and to those outside the
organization to share organizational experiences. Reasons for telling stories are important to
organizational culture because they “typify certain experiences as being, in principle, worthy of
emulation (when the story glorifies success) or deserving of caution (when the story accentuates
failure)” (Pacanowsky & O’Donnell-Trujillo, 1982, p. 139). Stories help to socialize newcomers
as well as constituting values or morals that members should adhere to or avoid (Driskill &
Brenton, 2005, p.44). Stories can appear in conversations, interviews, informal discussions and
other events in organizational life and can be an account of something that happened in the past
or presented as examples of particular points (Schwartzman, 1993).
Stories about a crisis or a “critical incident” in the life of an organization or community
“allow current members to richly experience the past” (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 80)
as well as encode beliefs, lessons, and values that “allow for meaning and lessons to be
transposed to current circumstances” (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 80). Stories of a crisis
event by the media can even become a morality play, in which “good and evil are clearly
presented along with the consequences of unethical acts” (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p.
225).

These morality plays can result in organizational learning by other organizations that

“may modify their actions and structures to avoid similar scandals” (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer,
2003, p. 225). In fact, in the 1980’s many public relations professionals and academics became
interested in crisis management strategies after hearing stories of successful crisis management
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by Johnson & Johnson in the 1982 Tylenol tampering case and in the unsuccessful management
of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill (Heath & O’Hair, 2009, p. 5).
For crisis response organizations, stories might also emphasize heroes within the
organization or outside the organization that should be models for behavior in crisis response
(Hofstede, 2001, p. 10). But heroes in one organizational culture can be outlaws in another. For
example while some people praised New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin for his swearing to convey
the urgency of his constituents’ situation, others saw it as going beyond the bounds of what being
a “proper leader” in a crisis should be. Therefore stories can be a powerful way for organizations
to reinforce their culture. The dramatic features of crisis stories may make them particularly
compelling influences.
Symbols. Symbols are physical objects or non-verbal acts that “serve as a vehicle for
conveying meaning, usually by representing another thing” (Trice & Beyer, 1984, p. 655).
Symbols can be dress, gestures, music, logos, buildings, pictures, titles and so on, but not all
physical objects or non-verbal acts are symbols. For example, Hatch (1993) suggests that
artifacts themselves are not symbols, but artifacts can become symbols of an organizational
culture if they are produced and used by organizational members “to produce a socially
constructed reality to express their self-images and to contextualize their activity and identity (p.
673).
Symbols help reinforce norms, values, and meanings by organizational members and may get
carried into interactions with outsiders (i.e., crisis response coordination) where members may
assume that others understand their meaning. Batteau, Brandenburg, Seeger, and Eaton (2007)
explain that in law enforcement organizations (but sometimes in EMS organizations and
firefighters), being “badged” or “sworn” “establishes both formal and informal lines of authority
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and cooperation, and creates patterns of expected deference” (p. 2). Because of this they might
also expect this same deference to their authority when coordinating with other organizations on
crisis response. If this doesn’t occur, then it creates conflict between the organizations.
Another example of symbols can be seen within the Emergency Operations Center (EOC).
Although crises are typically seen as chaotic and highly uncertain events, the EOC is set up to
symbolize the command and control its members want to have over the crisis situation. One must
have credentials to access the EOC, nameplates indicate where each organization member is
supposed to work, and there are TV screens to monitor the media’s coverage of the crisis
response.
Finally when organizations want to create new symbols to change the culture, they
sometimes forget to examine the rest of the artifacts in their culture to make sure their meanings
are not contradicting one another. For example, when the researcher observed a disaster training
exercise at an EOC, the leader emphasized that members should use new collaborative
technologies such as 800 MHz radios, smart phones, and collaborative database systems during
the training. But the room was still set up where similar agencies (e.g., police, hospitals, public
works, etc.) were grouped together and facing inward toward each other conveying parallel
instead of collaborative communication.

Therefore it was no surprise when agencies

communicated mostly with their similar counterparts and also utilized their own organizational
communication systems. Symbols can be powerful representations of organizational culture and
can illustrate the contradictory nature of organizational life.
So far I have argued for a distinction between crisis coordination and crisis collaboration
in the review of crisis management, crisis communication, and organizational communication
literature. I then described how organizational culture can significantly shape how organizational

37
members view crisis response and how they communicate with other organizations. The next
section demonstrates how the organizational culture to which a member belongs (outside of the
EOC) can influence interorganizational collaboration efforts within the EOC.
Organizational Culture and Interorganizational Collaboration
People create their individual identity through their social experiences. An important
component of this identity comes from their membership in groups (Abrams, O’Connor, & Giles,
2002, p. 229). Since individuals spend an average of 38.5 hours a week (Department of Labor,
2013) working in an organization, one could conclude that their organizational membership is an
important part of their identity.

“Organizations tend to develop internal myths, traditions,

heroes, unique symbols and language, ceremonies and customs, all of which set them off from
other community bodies” (Granot, 1997, p. 306). Organizational members then use culture to
identify with their organization and to also differentiate themselves, and therefore the
organization as a whole, from those they perceive as competitors.

If a member identifies

strongly with their organizational culture, these organizational identities tend to remain a part of
a person’s identity outside of work as well. For example police officers “carry courtesy cards,
off-duty revolvers, and wallet badges” (Van Maanen & Bradley, 1984) so they can always be
ready to protect the public. Even when off the job, their identity is closely associated with their
jobs.
Creating identity through organizational culture also creates and maintains organizational
boundaries. Boundaries can be either rigid or more flexible through the use of both physical
(e.g., badges, uniforms, etc.) and informational means (e.g., stories, jargon, etc.). Reflecting on
Oakes, Haslam, and Turner’s (1994) work on in-group versus out-group behavior, Abrams,
O’Connor and Giles (2002) stated that organizational members maintain rigid boundaries
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between in-group and out-group identities by developing different ways of communicating
within the organization and externally to others (p. 230). It is through these communicative
actions that “members display their belongingness to the organization as well as their opposition
to those outside the organization” (Trujillo & Dionisopoulos, 1987, p. 199), as well as “constitute
a system of common social meanings and shared interpretive schema within an organization”
(Trujillo & Dionisopoulos, 1987, p. 199).
Membership in an organizational culture imparts several benefits. It helps members
categorize and structure the work world, gives members a sense of commonality (within group)
and uniqueness (with others outside the group) (Van Maanen & Barley, 1984), and makes work
meaningful instead of “just another paycheck”. If members develop tight social networks within
the organization, organizational members also tend to socialize and participate in leisure
activities outside of work as well (Van Maanen & Bradley, 1984). But these benefits may
become liabilities when the need arises for organizations to collaborate in crisis response and
mitigation efforts.
Organizational Culture and Barriers to Collaboration
As described earlier, a crisis or disaster needs the coordinated action between
organizations because one organization alone does not have sufficient resources to manage the
crisis. Communities and governments have chosen different coordination strategies and many
have developed plans and policies such as the National Response Framework or mutual aid
agreements that detail how coordination should occur between organizations in disaster response.
But as Eaton and Brandenburg suggest, “forced partnerships cannot penetrate to a deeper level
[of coordination] without cultural acceptance from all partners” (2008, p. 105). Drabek (2005)
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illustrates some these cultural differences between agencies responding to a disaster by this
interview response from an emergency manager.
You see each department has a personality. Our public works people work well with
personnel from our utilities. So we keep them together although they rotate the chair
every few hours. They can resolve their differences despite the competition among them
because they talk the same language, but it is more than just technical terminology. In
contrast, you have your PIO [Public Information Officer] cluster. You really have to let
them know who is in charge. They really differ from the fire culture. They’re used to
being heroes and are eager to be helpful. That contrasts to the police who seem to react
as if it is them against the world. Consequently, police personnel don’t want to look
indecisive or admit that they don’t know. So they don’t seek our help. In contrast, the
fire guys are quick to tell us what they need and we can get on it. But the police, they
simply will not admit they need resources. They had officers trapped under debris but
they were reluctant to let anyone in the EOC [Emergency Operations Center] know about
this. They just don’t seem to have the capacity to see the big picture and be able to open
up for discussion of problems. They seem locked into an “either/or” type of thinking.
When you work with people from all of these different cultures in a high stress
environment where there is a lot of uncertainty in the information coming in and things
are changing rapidly, you really see this. (p. 59)
Therefore, these members from different organizations have to overcome three cultural barriers
to enhance interorganizational collaboration in disaster response.
Organizational expertise. The first cultural barrier to crisis collaboration is the “belief
that only the membership possesses the proper knowledge, skills, and orientations necessary to
make decisions as to how the work is to be performed and evaluated” (Van Maanen & Bradley,
1984). Most organizations tend to work successfully on their own in their day-to-day operations
because many communities’ services are fragmented and highly specialized. Since crises are
rare events, this belief will be prevalent and difficult for members to break out of when they are
thrust into a disaster response situation. For example, during the 1994 Northridge earthquake,
Nigg (1997) found that “Ocean City” agencies did not have much interaction or pre-planning for
interorganizational coordination prior to the earthquake. Nigg describes the city’s response as
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“uncoordinated and ‘individualistic’” and “although the city’s EPC [Emergency Preparedness
Coordinator] had the EOC operational within the day of the earthquake, many departments did
not bother to send representatives to the EOC nor did they use it to channel requests for
personnel or material resources” (1997, p. 5).
Competition between organizations. A second cultural barrier among organizations
during disaster response is a result of long-standing rivalries or competition between
organizations. Increased demand for services results in organizations having to vie against each
other for public attention in order to secure the same pool of limited resources or funding
available (Granot, 1997; Isbell & Goldstein, 2006). Rivalries also are a way for organizations
that provide similar services to differentiate themselves and create a unique identity.

For

example, Tierney (1985) documented how hospitals tried to affect their participation in EMS
disaster response because of long-standing rivalries among themselves (e.g., high-status versus
low-status hospitals, public vs. private hospitals) in order to maintain control over “whom they
treat and what services they offer” (p.80). Eaton and Brandenburg (2008) also described how
two organizations who had “a long history of criticizing each other” wouldn’t attend crisis
planning exercises hosted by the other organization (p. 99). These rivalries can be temporarily
suspended if organizations are overwhelmed by a crisis, like the 1997 Red River Valley floods
(Sellnow, Seeger, & Ulmer 2002). But if the organizational cultures of these groups are strong
enough, these rivalries can lead to great mistrust and lack of action, such as the war of words
between officials of the city of New Orleans, the state of Louisiana, and FEMA during Hurricane
Katrina.
Unit diversity. A third cultural barrier unique to interorganizational crisis collaboration
is the wide-range of unit diversity (Drabek, 1985) that is found among all of the organizations
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that respond to disasters. These organizations range from typical emergency or first responders
(e.g., fire, police, EMS, search and rescue teams, hospitals, etc.), to public works agencies (e.g.,
utilities, water, sanitation, etc.) to disaster relief agencies (e.g., American Red Cross, Salvation
Army, Volunteers of America, etc.), to governmental agencies (e.g., city, region, state, federal).
Although typically not part of disaster planning operations, other organizations will also respond
depending on the type of disaster – for example, military organizations (i.e., the National Guard),
faith-based organizations (FBOs), commercial companies (e.g., home improvement stores,
grocery stores, etc.), and public health organizations (e.g., Centers for Disease Control,
community health agencies, poison control centers, etc.). These varied organizations leads to
different organizational cultures clashing with one another as they try to coordinate a disaster
response effort.
Some organizations are highly disciplined, others disorderly; some with sharp
hierarchical structure, others informal and egalitarian; in some authoritarian decisionmaking prevails, while others tend towards democratic sharing…Organizations may
range from frank openness about their activities to-closed-mouth secrecy. (Granot, 1997,
p. 306)
Following the September 11, 2001 attacks a congressional investigation determined that lack of
coordination and information sharing between governmental agencies would be improved if
these agencies were centralized under one department, thus the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) was created (Kettl, 2003). But the service culture of FEMA, who primarily
responded to natural disasters, clashed with the more paramilitary culture of the DHS whose
mission was preventing terrorism. This resulted in a mass exodus of skilled FEMA employees,
which resulted in managers with little disaster response experience taking their place.
Consequently, the remaining FEMA managers were poorly prepared to manage the Hurricane
Katrina disaster (Bier, 2006). Therefore, the wide-variety of disaster response organizations can
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have a negative effect on interorganizational collaboration efforts if their organizational cultures
clash with each other.
Strategies for Increasing Crisis Collaboration
To overcome the three cultural barriers of interorganizational collaboration in disaster
response, two solutions have been proposed by scholars from a review of the research literature.
Increase boundary spanning of group members. One proposed solution to the problem
of coordination among organizational cultures is encouraging boundary spanning among
organizations through frequent communication among coordinating activities in the form of
practice drills, planning, and informal networking (GAO, 2005).

Boundary spanning occurs

when organizational members reach across the boundaries of their group or organizational
membership in order to seek or share information (Leifer & Delbecq, 1978). When a need arises
for organizations to seek information or resources to reduce uncertainty or make decisions, some
members of an organization will engage in boundary spanning activities to communicate with
members in other organizations. But organizational members are so used to their own coding
schemes and conceptual frames in communicating intraorganizationally, that they first assume
that their references and meanings are the same (Bennington, Shelter, & Shaw, 2003, p. 121).
Just as a single organizational culture can have a primary culture and sub-culture or several subcultures, organizational cultures within the same type of organization (e.g., emergency services,
hospitals, service organizations, etc.). For example, first responder organizations (fire, police,
EMS) have a paramilitary macroculture that they all ascribe to, but police cultures can be
different from fire departments, and even can be different among different departments (i.e. state
vs. local) if their assumptions, values, experiences, and symbols give them different references to
the same terms or experiences (Bennington, Shetler, & Shaw, 2003; Malone, 2003). This
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interorganizational collaboration is now made more difficult because members now have to learn
“local coding schemes and languages as well as the specialized conceptual frames” (Tushman &
Scalan, 1981, p. 291) in order to ensure that interorganizational members are agreeing on
symbolic meanings.
Batteau, Brandenburg, Seeger, and Eaton (2007) propose that three boundary spanning
concepts may facilitate disaster coordination and more effective communication between disaster
response organizations. 1) Boundary permeability is the ability of the crisis collaborating group
to be flexible and fluid in its membership of crisis response organizations. 2) Institutional
familiarity is how well collaborating group members know and understand the other
organizations they are working with. This is often facilitated through participation in past crisis
response efforts or in pre-planning training and exercises. 3) Cultural similarity is how much
organizational cultural values, norms, and structures overlap with their own organizational
culture. For example similar units such as paramilitaristic units of police and fire departments
may coordinate more easily with each other because they have similar identification of members,
missions, and hierarchical structures. Boundary spanning by EOC members therefore will lessen
the boundary defining tendencies of organizational membership.
Have a strong collaborating group culture. Another solution to the negative effects of
members’ adherence to their individual organizational culture is to create a unique and strong
organizational culture within the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) group. This would be an
organizational culture of disaster response that encourages the flow of information and rewards
risk sharing, empowerment of members, and innovation (Westrum 2004) and emphasizes
interorganizational crisis collaboration. While time and the development of informal network
relationships can help the process of negotiating meaning through communication (Auf der
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Heide, 1989; Bennington, Shetler, & Shaw, 2003; Kapucu, 2006; Tushman & Scalan, 1981),
during a crisis the time needed to decide which information to share and which organization(s)
should handle what tasks decreases dramatically. Nathan and Mitroff (1991) contend that
“organizations must subscribe to a single negotiated order [agreeing on the rules and structure of
network communication] if they are to proceed in a rapid and integrated fashion to respond to a
crisis” (p. 172). This also assumes that all of the potential organizational responders can be
identified ahead of time and have the time and resources necessary to engage in pre-crisis
planning to develop this unified organizational culture. However, which members from various
organizations come together to respond to a disaster vary depending on what type of crisis they
are responding to, and even members within an EOC can change often enough to make it
difficult to develop a unified culture (Drabek, 2003).
Stress and ambiguity also create conditions in which EOC members may forget to utilize
the emergency operations procedures (EOPs) which details how interorganizational collaboration
should occur. Instead members may revert to their own organization’s way of communicating
and handling a crisis which may be vastly different from the EOC’s procedures. According to
Seeger, Sellnow, and Ulmer (2003), “The most immediate and salient conditions of this [crisis]
stage are high levels of uncertainty, confusion, disorientation, surprise, shock, and stress. High
levels of emotional arousal, including fear, anger, sadness, and loss, accompany the event” (p.
125).

The members of different organizational cultures responding to the crisis become

important since, “under pressure, those responses acquired more recently and practiced less
often, should unravel sooner than those acquired less recently and practiced more often, which
have become more habitual. Thus, requisite variety [the relative variety of enactment capacity
available within an organization] may disappear right when it is most needed” (Weick, 1990, p.

45
577). In other words, even with crisis communication plans pre-determined and enacted by the
incident command structure of an EOC, organizational members coming together with other
organizations during a crisis could revert to their own organization’s way of communicating.
This could be expected to create communication problems between organizations that are not
familiar with each other’s different communication cultures.
For example, when I previously observed a regional Midwest joint crisis training exercise
in September 2008, the interorganizational members of the EOC could not use the coordinated
communication system because they forgot their access codes, members seemed reluctant to talk
across units to share information, and lot of organizational unit jargon was used in the update
meetings. Also at the debriefing, the director of the training exercise chided the organizational
participants because no one brought or used their emergency operations procedures during the
exercise. Since joint crisis training exercises are supposed to mimic interorganizational response
during an actual crisis, this failure highlights the potential communication problems between
organizations that are not familiar with each other’s different communication cultures and how
easily members forget the policies and procedures of the newer EOC organizational culture.
To summarize the review of literature, there has been a lack of clarity in the crisis
response literature about what crisis coordination means and how crisis collaboration is a distinct
construct from crisis coordination. Several interorganizational coordination perspectives and
strategies have been proposed by researchers and practitioners. But I argue that the traditional
discussion of more or less interorganizational crisis coordination does not accurately portray
when crisis response reaches a level of crisis collaboration beyond coordination or when crisis
collaboration is needed for effective response management. Previous studies have disregarded
the important distinction between crisis coordination and crisis collaboration and the challenges
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and benefits of each to interorganizational crisis response efforts. In addition, scholars and
practitioners have neglected to examine how the different organizational communication cultures
of crisis response organizations may affect crisis collaboration efforts. Therefore the goal of this
study is to offer important new evidence not previously explored in interorganizational crisis
collaboration. The next section will discuss the research questions that will frame this study.
Research Questions
The aim of this study was to use qualitative methods to describe and understand two
cultures of crisis response organizations and identify how their communication practices may
have influenced crisis collaboration within the context of an Emergency Operations Center
(EOC). Therefore, this study explored the following research questions:
RQ 1: What are the primary crisis related organizational cultural features of the regional chapter
of a Disaster Response Organization (DRO) and the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)?
RQ 2: How are the crisis related organizational cultures of the Metropolitan Police Department
and the regional chapter of a Disaster Relief Organization enacted through communication
practices between members?
RQ 3: How do the differences in these two organizational communication cultures influence
their ability to practice crisis collaboration?
The first question sought to identify and describe the organizational cultures of a regional
chapter of a disaster relief organization (DRO) and metropolitan police department (MPD). As
stated in the earlier discussion, people create part of their identity through their group
membership (Abrams, O’Connor, & Giles, 2002, p. 229).

“Organizations tend to develop

internal myths, traditions, heroes, unique symbols and language, ceremonies and customs, all of
which set them off from other community bodies” (Granot, 1997, p. 306). Organizational
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members then use culture to identify with their organization and to also differentiate themselves,
and therefore the organization as a whole, from others. By choosing an emergency response
agency that tends to be bureaucratic and authoritative in nature (the emergency management unit
of a local police department) and a disaster response agency that is a non-profit agency with a
strong humanitarian mission and also heavily utilizes volunteers in its crisis response efforts, this
made it easier to identify the differences between the two organizational cultures. Moreover,
understanding the emergency management culture of these organizations is important. While
others have investigated what might be termed routine organizational cultures, little is known
about the disaster response culture.
The second research question explored specifically how organization members in the
DRO and MPD subjectively created shared patterns of symbols and meanings through
communication that defines, guides, and sometimes constrains their everyday thoughts and
behaviors in organizational life. Using the four communication constructs of vocabulary, rituals,
stories, and symbols, explained earlier, each communication culture was examined through this
interpretive lens. During data collection the researcher observed each organization trying to
answer these general questions, “(1) What are the key communication activities [grounded in
culture], the unfolding of which are occasions when sense-making is accomplished? and (2)
What is the sense members of any particular organization have made of their experiences?”
(Pacanowsky & O’Donnell-Trujillo, 1982, p. 124).
Since this is a study of organizations that respond to crises, it also needed to be
determined how each organizational culture viewed crisis, their role in responding to a crisis, and
their views on collaborating with other organizations during large scale crises. Although crises
are defined as “unusual events”, these events typically have a lasting impact on organizations

48
that experience one and therefore are likely to create strong organizational narratives that help to
shape that particular culture’s view of crisis. These two organizations have dealt with crises in
the past, even though the current membership may not have. Even if an organization or its
members have not personally experienced a crisis, large scale crises, such as the September 11
terrorist attacks and the Hurricane Katrina flooding of New Orleans, have created such strong
reactions in people that they are likely to create organizational narratives of “what they would
have done in that situation”, which would also have helped to shape a cultural view of crisis.
Once the communication cultures of the two crisis response organizations have been
determined, the researcher turned to the third research question to examine how the
organizational communication cultures of the DRO and MPD may influence crisis collaboration.
One would expect that these organizational cultures would be similar during everyday operations
and in crisis response because the units within these organizations deal with emergencies
response and crisis planning on a daily basis. So for them, crisis is a relatively routine
experience. The goal was to determine how the individual organizational cultures of members
may help or hinder the interorganizational crisis collaboration process.
Summary
When a large scale crisis affects a community (i.e., the Virginia Tech shooting), region
(i.e., Hurricane Katrina), or sometimes an entire country (i.e., the 2010 earthquake in Haiti), the
response efforts must also be large scale involving many different agencies “requir[ing]
coordination of a variety of resources, technical skill and response capacity” (Seeger, Sellnow, &
Ulmer, 2003, p. 189). Dozens and sometimes even hundreds of organizations, often with very
different missions, methods, technologies and cultures, are called upon to work together in order
to mitigate the crisis and assist in the recovery efforts. This management group is typically
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called the Emergency Operations Center (EOC).

Although several interorganizational

coordination perspectives and strategies have been proposed by researchers and practitioners,
they are neglecting to define and explore the benefits of crisis collaboration. Crisis collaboration
takes place when members of several crisis response organizations create an alliance in which
they value member interdependence, equal input of participants, and shared decision-making
(Keyton & Stallworth, 2003). This allows them to reach their common goal of crisis response
and mitigation, even under severe time and decision-making pressures. The bona fide group
perspective shows us how communication constitutes the collaboration process and how internal
processes of the EOC are intricately linked to the external environments in which the group is
embedded.
To better understand interorganizational crisis collaboration, one environmental exigency
that needs to be examined further is the individual organizational cultures of crisis response
organizations that come together to manage and mitigate a crisis. Individual organizational
cultures can provide barriers to crisis collaboration efforts unless there are strategies that are put
into place to mitigate these issues. If the individual organizational cultures are too strong then
conflicts and miscommunication could inhibit collaboration efforts, the consequences of which
could prolong or intensify a crisis instead of mitigation. Thus the aim of this study was to use a
qualitative approach to explore and describe two crisis response organizational cultures and
identify how their different communication practices may influence crisis collaboration.
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CHAPTER 2
METHODS
This chapter describes the methodology employed to answer the research questions and
provides a justification for using qualitative approaches and an instrumental case study. These
approaches were used to describe and explore two crisis response organizational cultures and
identified how their different communication practices may influence crisis collaboration. First
this chapter describes the instrumental case study and how it diverged from a typical crisis
communication case study. Next the chapter discusses the organizations selected for the study, a
regional chapter of a national non-profit disaster relief organization (DRO) and the emergency
management unit of a metropolitan police department (EMU MPD). Then, an explanation of the
qualitative data collection methods of participant observation, interviews and documents are
given as well as how they were applied to this study. Finally the procedures for analysis are
described.
Instrumental Case Study
This instrumental case study used qualitative methods to explore and describe two crisis
response organizational cultures and identified how their different communication practices may
influence crisis collaboration. Robert K. Yin defines a case study in the social science context as
“an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context,
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident” (2003,
p. 13). The case study method is probably the most popular approach to studying crisis
communication (Sellnow & Seeger, 2013; Fearn-Banks, 2007). This is because “Crises occur
with little perceived warning, hence manipulation of the contexts in which they occur is at best
unreasonable and at worst unethical” (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 1998, p. 261). The case study
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was the best choice for this project as it sought to explore and describe the phenomenon of
organizational cultures and crisis collaboration in the context of crisis response organizations that
can aid in theoretical development (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 198, p. 262). Therefore the goal
of this study is to offer important new evidence not previously explored in interorganizational
crisis collaboration.
Stake (2005) defines three types of case study as intrinsic, instrumental, and collective.
The instrumental case study places the context of a particular crisis response secondary and the
case is examined “mainly to provide insight into an issue or to redraw a generalization” (Stake,
2005, p. 445
An instrumental case study was the method chosen for the current study because its
primary interest is in better understanding the phenomenon of how organizational cultures of
crisis response organizations can affect crisis collaboration efforts.
Even though the current study employed an instrumental case design, it diverged from a
typical crisis communication case study.

Most case study research in this area has

communication researchers studying either a recent crisis or a crisis that has happened years ago
in order to gain better understanding of the communication processes or patterns of that event.
Because the crisis event has already occurred, the researchers rely on documentation, archival
records, and/or interviews to piece together what happened to aid in theoretical development
(Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 262) and/or results in learning that can be passed along to
others as “what to do” or “what not to do” in a crisis (Fearn-Banks, 2007). This case study was
also different from typical crisis case studies because it incorporated qualitative methods of
“doing fieldwork”, specifically participant observation and interview fieldwork. This type of
fieldwork was necessary for this study because it allowed for the immersion needed to
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understand the organizational cultural experience as members do (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw,
1995) and how members constituted organizational culture through their communication.
Pacanowsky and O’Donnell-Trujillo also agree that typical case study methods do not insure
“the gathering of the kind of data we think is required for telling a ‘good organizational story’”
(1982, p. 127). As Stake (2005) argues, “case study is defined by interest in an individual case,
not by the methods of inquiry used” (p. 443). Now that the type of study has been described the
next section will discuss the selection of organizations for this study.
Case Study Organizations
This study sought to understand how organizational cultures of crisis response
organizations can affect crisis collaboration efforts in a metropolitan area. To explore the
research questions, this project examined two organizations that typically participate through an
interorganizational crisis management group, such as an Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
that is managed by a governmental emergency management agency whenever it is activated for
crisis response.

The study focused on organizations under a particular metropolitan EOC

(MEOC) under the city’s Homeland Security and Emergency Management agency (HSEM)
because it is the crisis management entity for any large-scale crises that occurs in the city. The
mission of the MEOC is
to provide leadership in coordinating the development of a sustainable and all-hazard,
regional approach to large-scale emergencies or disasters. To emphasize an integrated
process for establishing preventative measures, emergency operations, planning and
training to minimize the impact of catastrophic events on the people, property,
environment and economy of the City of _____. (MEOC website, 2009)
The goals of this study were to understand how crisis collaboration can be influenced by the
interorganizational communication of MEOC members. Therefore, this study examined in depth
two crisis response organizations that are active in most MEOC crisis response operations; the
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emergency management unit of a metropolitan police department (EMU MPD) and a regional
chapter of a national non-profit disaster relief organization (DRO). These organizations were
selected because they have the greatest potential of having divergent organizational
communication cultures. The study could therefore identify how their different communication
practices may positively or negatively influence crisis collaboration.
The MPD not only handles emergencies on a daily basis, but is often the “first line of
response for public safety and security” during a crisis, including “preserving life and protecting
property” (FEMA, 2013). The emergency management unit of the MPD specifically handles
crisis and emergency response including bomb threats, hostage situations, and terrorist threats.
Therefore, this unit of the MPD was the primary focus of this study.
The regional chapter of the national non-profit disaster relief organization (DRO) “helps
vulnerable people and communities around the world prepare for, respond to, and recover from
natural disasters, humanitarian crises, and health emergencies by mobilizing the power of the
world's largest humanitarian network (DRO website, 2009). The DRO is recognized by federal,
state and local governments across the country as a “principle supplier of mass care in federally
declared disasters” but also does daily emergency response for citizens affected by fires (DRO
website, 2009). In addition, the regional chapter of the DRO is also a standing member of the
Metropolitan Emergency Operations Center (MEOC).
The researcher initially gained access to the two organizational gatekeepers using her
prior connections with persons at her university that previously worked with these organizations.
In this case, a co-worker had volunteered and been a member on a regional board with the DRO
and the Chief of Police at the University had participated in crisis response planning meetings
with the EMU MPD. These two persons allowed her to use their names in initial reach outs to the
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two organizations. After receiving written organizational support for the study from the
gatekeeper of the two organizations and Human Investigation Committee approval from the
University, the researcher spent four and one-half months in the field of both the Metropolitan
Police Department (MPD) and the regional chapter of the national non-profit disaster relief
organization (DRO) to collect data on their individual organizational cultures.
The goal was to identify how the different communication practices of these two
organizations may influence interorganizational communication and crisis collaboration efforts.
If the MEOC members of these two organizations allow their own organizational culture to
supersede the collaboration efforts, it could also hinder crisis collaboration efforts during an
actual crisis response. Next the data collection methods for the study are described.
Data Collection
Researchers can use multiple methods of data collection to gather their evidence over a
defined period of time to “create as complete an understanding as possible of the complex
interactions” of a crisis (Sellnow, Seeger, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 275). During the course of this
study, three methods of data collection were employed – participant observation, interviews, and
documents. An electronic log book of what data was collected when (i.e. field observations,
interviews, archival documents) as well as code names and titles of participants in various
organizations was kept by the researcher (see Appendix A).
Participant Observation
“Participant observation is a method in which a researcher takes part in the daily
activities, rituals, interactions, and events of a group of people has the means of learning the
explicit and tacit aspects of their life routines and their culture” (DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002).
Participant observations, also called fieldwork, requires some level of immersion into the
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organizational life over time so that researchers can study communication in context by social
actors to create meaning (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995). This is so the researcher can gain a
rich understanding of the processes, complexities and patterns to be able to produce “thick
description” (Geertz, 1973) of that culture. The level of immersion can vary from complete
observer, observer-participant, participant-observer, to complete participant (Bantz, 1993;
Lindlof, 1995), but the goal is to become a part of the culture as much as the organization or
community will allow.
Participant observation includes, but is not limited to, “observing, asking questions
[informally and formally], participating in group activities, and testing the validity of one’s
perceptions against the intuitions of natives” (Saville-Troike, 2003, p. 3).

This process is

recorded through the writing of field notes. Writing field notes is the regular and systematic
method of documenting what the researcher observes and learns while participating in
organizational life (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995, p. 1). What this means is that the researcher’s
observations (data) are not to be separated from how the researcher experiences the observations
(findings).

“It thus becomes critical for the [researcher] to document her own activities,

circumstances, and emotional responses as these factors shape the process of observing and
recording others’ lives” (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 1995, p. 11). The researcher also sees the
writing of field notes as a continuous process of learning and reflection to help the researcher to
build insights and understandings of future observations of the organizational culture (Emerson,
Fretz, & Shaw, 1995, p. 13). In addition, the researcher must remain open “to categories and
modes of thought and behavior which may not have been anticipated by the investigator”
(Saville-Troike, 2003, p. 3). Next the specific procedures of participant observation and the
writing of field notes for the study are explained.
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When entering each organization, the researcher took the stance of the “novice”, just like
new members do upon entering an organization. The goal was to observe as many people,
settings, interactions, and events as possible in a non-judgmental manner to gain a basic
understanding of the organizational culture. “Novices watch what other people are doing, ask
others to explain what is happening, try things out for themselves – occasionally making
mistakes – and so on” (Hamersley & Atkinson, 2002, p. 99). In other words, the researcher
looked for things that were confusing for her but seem to be clear to members so she could start
to understand their perspective (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 153-157). In this phase of research,
field notes were more like “scratch notes” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002) or “jottings” (Emerson,
Fretz & Shaw, 2002) writing down as much detail and impressions as quickly as possible to
preserve observations. The goal here was to be as descriptive and concrete as possible without
making assumptions or analysis of what is happening. These jottings occurred either in the field
or after the researcher left the field that day depending on the appropriateness of the setting and
sensitivities of the organizations and its members. Drawing maps of various rooms and settings
will also aided recollection while typing up field notes to help in understanding the
organizational culture through the interaction of physical context and members.
Next, field notes were typed up and expanded using the jottings from the field and the
reflections of the participant observation to create a chronological “thick description” of what
was experienced that day. The expanded field notes consisted of “description of the physical
context, the people involved, as much of their behavior and nonverbal communication as
possible, and in words that are as close as possible to the words used by the participants”
(DeWalt & DeWalt, 2002, p. 149). This helped to generate a clearer analysis later and helped
trigger other important details and memories to add what was not recorded in the original
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jottings. While avoiding making any analysis or assumptions of the observations, field notes
included any questions or confusions the researcher had about what was being observed. These
were labeled clearly through parenthetical notations so not to confuse them with the other
observations or attribute them to organizational members. It was important to include these so
the researcher was aware of future observations or questions that need to be asked through
informal interviews the next time the researcher was in the field to better provide further
clarification of the observations.
After becoming more familiar with the “what” and “how” of each organizational culture
in the initial period of participant observation, subsequent field notes included a chronological
description of interactions and events. In addition, the researcher started to do an initial analysis
by documenting “recurring patterns of social action, and how participants understand them”
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 166). However, in looking for patterns, the researcher remained
open to variations and contradictions to patterns to avoid forcing the observations to match
developing constructs or themes (Emerson, Fretz, & Shaw, 2002, p. 29).
In this study, the researcher’s role could be classified as a participant-observer for the
non-profit disaster relief organization (DRO) and as an observer for the emergency management
unit of the metropolitan police department (EMU MPD). This distinction was made because of
the level of access granted by each organization. The researcher was able to observe the daily
lives and interactions of organizational members in several facets of the DRO, including
attending a quarterly volunteer meeting, a day-long seminar with another crisis response
organization, a high school club meeting associated with the organization, an annual social event
for volunteers, and three different ride alongs with members to observe how they responded to
emergency calls and interacted with clients. This resulted in approximately 23 total hours of
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time in the field with the organization (see Appendix A). Throughout the study, the members of
the DRO identified her as a fellow member of the organization by introducing her to clients as a
member of the organization and by on-the-job training in the process of interviewing clients so
she could participate in the activities of members such as walk-throughs of buildings and
providing organizational information and resources to clients.
In contrast to the DRO, access to the EMU MPD organization was more difficult to
obtain and maintain throughout the study. For example, the researcher knew she needed a trusted
member to the EMU MPD to introduce her to the organizational gatekeeper, the Chief of Police
at the university who had coordinated with the unit on several crisis response meetings and
trainings. But it took several emails and phone calls from both the researcher and the Chief of
Police over two months to set up the initial research study meeting.
Then after negotiating and gaining initial access for the study by the EMU MPD the
researcher was limited by the organizational gatekeeper to attending law enforcement and
security planning meetings of the Auto Show in which crisis planning occurred. The MPD was
the lead law enforcement agency in this effort. She also was able to do a walk-around with her
informant for a couple of hours at the Auto Show event and visit two interorganizational
management centers set up for the event. Finally the researcher attended a “non-first responder
Fusion Liaison Officer (FLO)” training led by the state police department mentioned at one of
the meetings, but not attended by MPD members. The researcher was denied the request to
observe the daily organizational life of the EMU MPD for “security reasons.” Although the
researcher was only able to spend 13 hours in the field with the MPD (with an additional 6 hours
in FLO training; see Appendix A), those hours were rich in content. For example, the Auto Show
meetings provided a great opportunity to see how members interacted with other organizations

59
and observe active crisis planning meetings. In addition, interviews and documentation provided
other rich sources of data on crisis response and working with other organizations.
Scholars of organizational culture have often discussed where the researcher positions
him/herself in the observations and writing of organizational culture (Conquergood, 1991;
Eisenberg & Riley, 2001). So it is up to the organizational culture researcher to decide how
his/her experiences both in the field and own life experiences get reflected in their writing so that
both the “reality” of the organizational culture can be represented and others (outsiders,
academics, practitioners, group members) can also learn from the researchers insights into the
culture.
In this case, the failure to gain particular kinds of access to information and daily
operations by the EMU MPD that emerged during the study was indicative of organizational
culture because of what it inherently reflected about cultural norms and in-group versus outgroup culture. As Kleinman and Copp (1993) state,
[Fieldworkers] can learn from any vantage point as long as we know what roles we
occupy in different situations. Our feelings while in a particular role might mirror those
who hold a similar role in the setting…Thus our feelings suggest hypotheses about how
others, members of a subgroup in the setting or perhaps outsiders, feel about themselves
and each other. (p. 31)
The positioning of the researcher as “outsider” or “other” by EMU MPD members and her
access experiences became a theme germane to this study. Control of access and information is a
primary process whereby organizational membership is signaled and maintained. Therefore
anytime the researcher was denied access by the EMU MPD, it served as an important indicator
of the organization’s culture and communication practices and was analyzed as such.
In addition, from the onset of the study the researcher knew she could not take a purely
functionalist or objective approach to her observations due to the active and participatory nature
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of her fieldwork. But as the differences in gaining access to the two organizational cultures
became apparent and affected her experiences, the researcher started to utilize rhetorical
reflexivity in her observations and later analysis in order to “seek out these sites of tension,
displacement, and contradiction between the Being There of performed experience and the Being
Here of written texts” (Conquergood 1991, p. 193). Rhetorical reflexivity was documented by
the researcher throughout the data collection process in fieldnotes, separate analytical memo, and
in email conversations with her dissertation advisor. The researcher was also able to spend 10
hours in the field with the Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) office that
manages the metropolitan emergency operations center (MEOC). This occurred through one
visit during the Auto Show and at HSEM headquarters as they participated in a three-day crisis
response exercise to test a new secure database software package to potentially be used in crisis
response. But neither the DRO nor the MPD participated in the exercise so that data from the
exercise was excluded for this study.
Participant observation was employed as an interpretative, reflexive process to more fully
understand the intricacies and complexities of organizational life and to guide interactions and
informal interview questions later in the data collection process. Next, interviews are discussed
as another form of data collection that aided in the understanding of organizational culture.
Interviews
Another important data source for this case study was interviews. Interviewing in this
context involved “Asking questions and listening to others tell what they know, feel, and
believe” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 170). Interviewing also enables the researcher “to
understand the sensemaking that animates communicative performances” (Lindlof & Taylor,
2002, p. 172). Therefore, interviews served the following purposes for this study:
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Understanding the social actor’s experience and perspective through stories, accounts,
and explanations; understanding native conceptualizations of communication, eliciting
the language forms used by social actors in natural settings, gathering information about
things or processes that cannot be observed effectively by other means, inquiring about
occurrences in the past, verifying, validating, or commenting on information obtained
from other sources, and testing hypotheses developed in the field. (Lindlof & Taylor,
2002, p. 173)
In other words, participant observation was useful to understand how organizational culture was
constituted between members within a particular context. Interviews also aided in corroborating
any insights culled from the observations and documentation during the study as well as, more
importantly, contradict any information or assumptions (Lindlof, 1995; Yin, 2003). This was
especially important as a control since the researcher is not a member of any of these
organizations.
Throughout the study, interviews were either informal or semi-structured. The first,
called informal interviewing or ethnographic interviewing arose during participant observation.
One type of informal interview occurred in the field when the researcher had an introductory
meeting with individual organizational members and they described their roles and
responsibilities with the organization. These were not done with an interview guide to build
rapport between the researcher and organizational members and to mimic how a new member
would interact with members and learn about an organization and its culture. But the researcher
did have general topics jotted down to cover such as, “History with the organization”, “Title,
roles, and responsibilities”, “What they do day-to-day and in emergency or crisis”, “What do
they like or not like about working in the organization”, “Tell me a story about an event”, and so
on.
Informal interviews also occurred in the field when there was a lull in the action of daily
organizational life and the researcher could probe for clarification and understanding of the
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meaning of certain terms, conversations, behaviors, or actions. These lulls during participant
observation included travel time with members in the same vehicle to and from headquarters to
other locations, informal time before and after meetings or events, and during breaks or meals.
While some of this could be understood through further field observations, it was also necessary
for the researcher to ask specific questions to gain understanding of what meanings the members
attributed to these terms, behaviors, or actions. Some of this was done through the natural
conversations with other members where clarifying questions were asked to explain something
such as an acronym or term that was just used. At other times while typing up her fieldnotes, the
researcher would come across terms or processes she didn’t understand or other topics she
wanted to follow-up with members during her next interaction with them. She would note these
in her field journal, and when an opportunity arose during a lull in participant observation, she
used the opportunity to ask questions about a particular area of interest or to follow-up on a
previous conversation to clarify something she did not understand (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p.
176). By doing this informally, this again mimicked the process a new member would use to
understand organizational life and organizational culture.
Semi-structured interviews were more structured that informal interviews, lasted much
longer than informal interviews, and were often set-apart from the daily organizational life of
members. The researcher used an interview guide (see Appendix B) which consisted of a “list of
open-ended questions that direct conversation without forcing the interviewee to select
preestablished responses…to elicit from the interviewee rich, detailed materials that can be used
in qualitative analysis” (Lofland, Snow, Anderson, & Lofland, 2006, p. 17). These questions
were developed to learn what members felt their organization’s role was in a crisis, the
communication process during a response, what organizations it interacts with on a daily basis
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and during larger responses, and crisis planning and trainings they are involved with, both
internally and with other organizations. The overall interview guide questions did not change
throughout the data collection process to give the researcher some level of reliability or
consistency of observations during data collection (Lindloff & Taylor, 2002, p. 239, Yin 2003).
This consistency in semi-structured interviews aided in data analysis of the study by verifying
cultural constructs among members within each organization and for comparative analysis
between organizations.
Although semi-structured, these types of questions were open-ended so the researcher is
open to new information and insights within established parameters (Lindlof, 1995; Yin, 2003).
This allowed the researcher the freedom to inquire about new or interesting information
presented in the interview that was germane to the study but not anticipated by the researcher.
Finally, some questions were included that were specific to the member the research interviewed
or the time in which the interview was conducted to allow for the interpretative and reflexive
process of qualitative data collection. These questions mostly arose during the process of typing
up earlier fieldnotes and consisted of either follow-up questions from earlier member/researcher
interactions, probe about a particular organizational process, or to gather information on specific
constructs underrepresented in the data. Lack of access to particular members during participant
observation mainly drove the addition of these questions to the semi-structured interviews.
To elicit the most comprehensive and honest responses in interviews (from the
interviewee viewpoint), it was important for the interviewees to feel both comfortable and safe.
This is achieved by attaining rapport with interviewees. In interview situations, “Rapport is a
quality of a communication event, not of a relationship” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 189).
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Rapport was developed first by getting to know the participants in a field setting before
requesting an interview.
To develop rapport for the semi-structured interviews, the researcher encourage the
interviewee to choose the time and place for the interviews that was convenient for them and
allowed for the level of privacy with which they felt comfortable (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p.
185). This allowed them to be relaxed and not worry about who may overhear the conversation.
As part of the informed consent process, the researcher also allowed the interviewee to choose
his or her own pseudonym. Most did not. However one person did request that a gender neutral
name and masculine pronouns be used whenever that person was quoted or described in the
study. Therefore all participants in the study are referred to as “he” or “him” regardless of actual
gender except in the cases where the researcher was describing her own experiences or
interactions.
Next, since researchers are expecting interviewees to be truthful in their interviews, the
researchers showed reciprocity by being clear and truthful in the purpose of her interview.
“Participants should be given clear, honest reasons for why they have been contacted, what the
project goals are, and how the interview will be conducted” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 189).
The researcher also worked to set a comfortable tone for the interview as well as help each other
become familiar with each other’s communicative styles (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 190) by
starting the interview meeting with reciprocal self-disclosure about their jobs, family, or life.
For this study, the researcher worked to establish good rapport with all interviewees and used
open-ended questions to create a positive atmosphere and tone for the interviews so the
interviewees felt comfortable answering questions openly and honestly.
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Finally, while informal interview data was captured through the fieldnote writing process,
semi-structured interviews were, when allowed, recorded using a digital tape recorder. Care was
taken at the beginning of each interview to explain to interviewees that the purpose of tape
recording is so the researcher can focus on the conversation and listen instead of note-taking
(Lofland et al., 2006, p. 106). The other purpose was to ensure that their words are captured as
they said them and not forgotten or remembered differently by the researcher at a later time
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 187) which could result in misunderstanding or substituting the
researcher’s meaning for that of the interviewee. However if the interviewee chose to not be
tape-recorded, as occurred in all EMU MPD semi-structured interviews, then the researcher
respected the interviewee’s wishes.
Regardless of tape recording, the researcher took extensive notes in case of technological
failure and to keep track of what information had been talked about and new topics or
information that came up so the interviewer could ask follow-up questions. This ensured that the
interview goals were accomplished.

Immediately following the interview, a post-interview

comment sheet was completed whereas the researcher jotted down field notes after she left the
scene. Included on this comment sheet were descriptions on the setting, the interviewee, the tone
of the interview, the researcher’s feelings on the experience including any difficulties
encountered, and initial insights and reflections (Lofland et al., 2006, p. 103). This was a useful
for reference as the transcript of each interview was typed up and also became analytic memos to
reference before subsequent interviews or later data analysis.
In this study, the researcher conducted semi-structured interviews with two members of
the DRO. She also conducted several “informational interviews” in meeting with four members
of the DRO, three full-time staff members and one volunteer. These interviews fell in between
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informal and semi-structured interviews because they took place outside of field observations in
a meeting set up with a member to initially gain information about field observation
opportunities. However these members were often eager to share information about the
background and structure of the organization, their role in the organization, and recent or past
events without being prompted by the researcher. Therefore, seeing an opportunity to gather
valuable information, the researcher took fieldnotes, which were then expanded upon when typed
up later. Informal interviews were also conducted in discussions with DRO members in the field
to clarify information or meanings of actions and conversations as they occurred or during a lull
in the action or conversation.
In the case of the EMU MPD, the researcher had one initial informational interview with
her informant and one semi-structured interview with the same informant. That semi-structured
interviewed was also modified slightly to discuss communication procedures in responding to
emergency calls or more regular operations and preparing for the major international event in
order to elicit answers that would yield information about the EMU MPD’s organizational
culture. After multiple requests via email and phone calls were made over several months to
interview the head of the unit, the head of the unit finally acquiesced to participate in a semistructured interview. This interview occurred over two meetings due to him arriving late for the
first interview and his limited availability due to his schedule.
Interviews are valuable sources of data because they can help the researcher better
understand members’ meanings as well as the organizational cultures being studied. Since the
researcher was not a member of the organizations being studied, interviews gave valuable
insights into the organizational cultures from the point of view of the members.

While
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participant observation and interviews were the primary types of data collection, documents were
also a valuable resource for this study.
Documents
Documents are important because they are the paper trail left behind after a crisis. They
also explain the preset processes and procedures organizational members should be enacting in
crisis response. Documents can add to the robustness of a study because institutional texts “are
inextricably linked to the social contexts in which they are produced” (Miller, 1997, p. 77).
“Documents can also help researchers reconstruct past events or ongoing processes that are not
available for direct observation…and…reflect certain kinds of organizational reality at work”
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 117).
In this study, the following documents were collected as they were germane to the study
as they related to crisis planning, meetings, exercises or response, or the organizational culture,
such as organizational structure, emails, and publicly available communication materials (e.g.,
website, social media, pamphlets, etc.). From the DRO the following documents were obtained: a
volunteer recruiting pamphlet, a reference guide to services the organization provides to the
public, a recovery information booklet given to clients, agenda and information sheets from their
quarterly volunteer meeting, the chapter disaster response plan, and a controller/evaluator
handbook from a 2004 crisis training exercise. From the EMU MPD, the researcher obtained the
meeting agenda and information materials when she attended the law enforcement and security
planning meetings of the Auto Show in which crisis planning occurred. She also received a
threat assessment for the Auto Show through an email sent by the state police department who
ran the non-first responder training session. Requests were made to negotiate access to view and
take notes on procedure documents the MPD unit used for crisis response and/or major events,
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but the researcher was only able to view and access the procedure document related to Auto
Show. Information from organizational websites was also collected and analyzed as it was
germane to the study.
Data Analysis
As previously stated, although data collection and analysis are discussed as separate steps
in this dissertation, often they occurred simultaneously during this study. This is because “It is
all too easy to let one’s field notes and other types of data pile up day by day and week by
week…But it is a grave error to let this work accumulate without regular reflection and review.
Under such circumstance the sense of progress may prove illusory, and a good deal of the data
collection could be unnecessarily aimless” (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995, p. 191).

The

specific process of data analysis is discussed next.
Data Management
Data management consists of using tools for “categorizing, sorting, and retrieving data”
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 211). All handwritten field notes and documents were filed in
chronological order by organization. All typed up field notes, digital interviews, interview
transcripts, analytic memos, reports, etc. were stored electronically in folders by organization
chronologically as well. In addition a general chronological log (see Appendix A) of the study
kept electronically listed the actions of the researcher (e.g., data collection at Site A, Interview
with Site A, Participant C, etc.), and a brief description of what data was collected or analyzed
on that date. A running log of codes and their definitions (i.e., a codebook) as well as important
thematic constructs and their definitions were kept electronically to ensure consistency in coding
schemes. This also ensured that specific data was located quickly for analysis and referenced
accurately throughout the course of this study.
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In addition to the storage and retrieval of data, qualitative data analysis software was also
utilized. In this study the researcher used Atlas.ti version 6.2 qualitative data analysis software.
She utilized this software to help her more easily import data documents (i.e., fieldnotes, memos,
interview transcripts, scanned documents) into a central location, group and filter data into
“families” by organization, define and assign codes to texts, and quickly and thoroughly retrieve
those codes while still maintaining the ability to analyze the information within the larger
context. While data management was important in the organization of the data, data reduction
strategies were also employed to assist with data analysis.
Data Reduction
Data reduction is “the process of selecting, focusing, simplifying, abstracting, and
transforming the data that appear in written-up field notes or transcriptions” (Miles & Huberman,
1994, p. 10). This is primarily done through analytic memos, coding, and data displays. Every
few weeks in the data collection process the researcher paused to develop analytic memos by
carefully reading over all of the data collected at that time (e.g., field notes, interview transcripts,
documents). As Hammersley and Atkinson (1995) state, in analytic memos
One looks to see whether any interesting patterns can be identified; whether anything
stands out as surprising or puzzling; how the data relate to what one might have expected
on the basis of commonsense knowledge, official accounts, or previous theory; and
whether there are any apparent inconsistencies or contradictions among the views of
different groups or individuals, or between people’s expressed beliefs or attitudes and
what they do. (p. 210)
Analytic

memos

helped

the

researcher

to

assess

progress,

identify

emergent

ideas/themes/constructs found in the data, and strategize next steps in the study (Hammersley &
Atkinson, 1995, p. 191).
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In addition to analytic memos, conducting analytic coding every few weeks when there
was a lull in data collection also helped to condense and order the data collected in the study.
“Codes are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the descriptive or inferential
information compiled during a study...attached to words, phrases, sentences or whole paragraphs,
connected or unconnected to a specific setting” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 56). Using Atlas.ti
qualitative analysis software for analytic coding allowed the researcher to mark the data at that
time without separating it from its context but still allowed for quick retrieval and clustering of
the data later when it was needed to be related to constructs, themes, or research questions (Miles
& Huberman, 1994, p. 57).
Initial open coding occurred by reviewing the data line by line and placing sections of
texts, whether specific terms, phrases, or paragraphs, into loose categories, such as “information
sharing”, “organization self-identification”, and “jargon”. “This stage of coding is ‘unrestricted’
because the analyst has not yet decided the range of categories or how the categories are defined,
and has also not unitized the coding procedure (i.e., decided what constitutes a textual unit)”
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 219).

These initial codes became more refined as the study

continued using the constant comparison method of Glaser and Strauss (1967). The constant
comparison method helped by noting “similarities with and difference to other data that have
been similarly categorized” (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1995, p. 213). Therefore, some codes
were dropped (e.g., “engaging volunteers”) while new codes were discovered (e.g., “previous
crisis response job experience”) and some codes were combined or split apart to be re-coded into
more defined categories.
The researcher then analyzed the data again using the study’s initial four cultural
constructs of vocabulary, rituals, stories, and symbols as well as the categorizations of crisis
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coordination and crisis collaboration identified in chapter one to determine whether these
constructs were already found during initial coding and what constructs needed more data
collected so it could be analyzed. However it was important at this stage of coding to also be
open to meanings that may not have been initially chosen by the researcher but were still
germane to addressing the research questions of this study. As Stake (2005) explains, “A plan is
essential, but the [researcher] needs to anticipate the need to recognize and develop lateemerging issues” (p. 453). For example, “access issues” was a code that emerged later in the
study as these experiences became an indicator of organizational culture during the study.
Once again utilizing Glaser and Strauss’s constant comparison method coded data was
reviewed again as the researcher looked for connections between constructs and communication
practices to start to integrate the data together (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 220-221). This helped
to collapse a large amount of codes into smaller, broader categories or codes and was a higher
level of data analysis. For example, in this study the researcher was looking for specific cultural
constructs and communication practices, but she needed to connect these to determine the
primary crisis related cultural features of each organization being studied and then later compare
and contrast the two organizations.
Analytic memos and coding helped in reducing the large amount of data collected in this
study to a few categories. This led to determining the cultural features of each crisis response
organization and how their organizational cultures shaped their worldview of crisis response as
either crisis coordination or crisis collaboration. These common categories were then used for the
final data analysis stage of interpretation.
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Interpretation
“Interpretation involves the translation of an object of analysis from one frame of
meaning into another” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 232). Interpretation transforms the study
from one of simple description of the data to a deeper explanation and “more coherent
understanding of what, how and why” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 91).
One strategy that aided interpretation in this study was using data displays.

Data

displays are visual formats of information that are “focused enough to permit a viewing of a full
data set in the same location, and are arranged systematically to answer the research questions at
hand” (Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 91-92). Data displays can take many forms from tables and
matrices to charts to decision-models, to time-ordered or role-ordered models (DeWalt &
DeWalt, 2002; Miles & Huberman, 1994). In this step of data analysis, common categories or
coding from the earlier analysis were be turned into data displays to “permit careful
comparisons, detection of differences, noting of patterns and themes, seeing trends, and so on”
(Miles & Huberman, 1994, p. 92) between two or more elements. This was useful when doing
the within-case analysis to determine how each crisis response organization was structured and
how it related to other crisis response organizations and crisis management or coordination
groups. Data displays were also useful to distinguish the different crisis response worldviews of
the two organizations and how these worldviews could influence an EOC. Therefore, data
displays of tables and figures are located throughout this paper to help the reader better
understand the researcher’s interpretations of the research literature, research design, results and
conclusions.
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Quality Measures for Case Study Methodology
Finally in this instrumental case study, three tactics were taken in research design and
analysis to determine good quality measures of case study validity and reliability (Yin, 2003).
First, triangulation was important to verify the construct validity of the findings. Triangulation is
“the comparison of two or more forms of evidence with respect to an object of research interest”
(Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 240). By gathering multiple types of data – participant observation,
interviews and documents – the findings of this study were corroborated and seen as more
accurate and convincing (Yin, 2003, p. 92). This also allows the weaknesses of one single
method to be diminished or “the biases of the individual methods are thought to ‘cancel out’ and
validation of the claim is enhanced” (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 240). Another way that the
researcher attempted to triangulate the data was to use multiple sources of data by sampling a
variety of sites, settings, people, activities, events, and times (Lindlof & Taylor, 2002, p. 121).
This triangulation of data was more successful in the non-profit disaster relief organization
(DRO) than the metropolitan police department (MPD) because the researcher was given greater
access by the DRO. By sampling from a variety of sources and using three different types of
data collection over a period of time, one can be reasonably confident that these data collection
methods “create[d] as complete an understanding as possible of the complex interactions” of the
two crisis response organizations in this study (Sellnow, Seeger, & Ulmer, 2002, p. 275).
Second, internal validity standards were met by following a careful data analysis strategy
determined before collecting data (Yin, 2003). The theoretical propositions outlined in chapter
one guided the case study data collection and analysis. After initial open coding, the researcher
analyzed the data again using the study’s initial four cultural constructs of vocabulary, rituals,
stories, and symbols as well as the categorizations of crisis coordination and crisis collaboration

74
to determine whether these constructs were already found during initial coding and what
constructs needed more data collected so it could be analyzed. Utilizing Glaser and Strauss’s
constant comparison method data was reviewed multiple times throughout the study as the
researcher looked for connections between constructs and communication practices to start to
integrate the data together. A running log of codes and their definitions (i.e., a codebook) as well
as important thematic constructs and their definitions were kept electronically to ensure
consistency in coding schemes. This also ensured that specific data was located quickly for
analysis and referenced accurately throughout the course of this study. Data collection was
determined to be complete when the researcher determined that continuing data collection was
resulting in redundancy and clear regularities emerged that felt integrated (Patton, 2002, p. 466).
Finally, the researcher met reliability standards by detailed the steps of study design, data
collection and analysis in this chapter and in Appendix A. According to Yin, reliability in a case
study design is “demonstrating that the operations of a study – such as the data collection
procedures can be repeated, with the same results” (2003, p. 33). An electronic case study
database was created at the start of the study to organize and document data collected (Yin, 2003,
p. 94). This database contained all typed up field notes, interview transcripts, analytic memos,
archival documents, etc. stored electronically in folders by organization. In addition a general
chronological log (see Appendix A) of the study kept electronically listed the actions of the
researcher (e.g., data collection at Site A, Interview with Site A, Participant C, etc.), and a brief
description of what data was collected or analyzed on that date. Although qualitative case
studies do not lend to replication on the same level as experimental studies, investigators should
be confident that they can follow the procedures outlined in this chapter to conduct a similar case
study.
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In summary, this chapter provided an overview of the study design, background on the
organizations recruited for the case study, data collection methods, and data analysis and
interpretation procedures (see Figure 1). In the next two chapters, the results of data collection
and analysis of the DRO and EMU MPD organizations are discussed. Specifically the results
will describe the organizational communication culture of each organization and how the four
theoretical organizational culture constructs affected how they viewed interorganizational crisis
communication and collaboration.

Figure 1: Research Design
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CHAPTER 3
RESULTS: DISASTER RELIEF ORGANIZATION
As noted earlier, different crisis response organizations have distinct organizational
cultures and communication practices. Moreover, these differences may affect coordination or
collaboration when organizations are required to work together during a crisis response. To
discover how this may occur, one needs to first describe the crisis related organizational cultural
features of the disaster relief organization (DRO) and the metropolitan police department (MPD)
This chapter describes the DRO and the following chapter describes the MPD.

It is also

important to examine how the organizational cultures are enacted through communication
practices between members. This chapter starts with describing the DRO’s cultural constructs of
vocabulary, rites and rituals, stories, and symbols and how together they are communicated
through members, documents, and policies to create their open and service-oriented
organizational culture. The chapter then explores how DRO’s organizational communication
culture influences its view of interorganizational crisis response as being a more collaborative
effort. Finally, the bona fide group concept of interdependence of context will be explored to
discuss how historical, economic, and political contexts have affected the DRO at the national
and local level, resulting in tension between the two groups and its effect on the regional DRO’s
organizational culture.
Disaster Relief Organization (DRO)
As described in chapter two, the regional chapter of the national non-profit disaster relief
organization (DRO) “helps vulnerable people and communities around the world prepare for,
respond to, and recover from natural disasters, humanitarian crises, and health emergencies by
mobilizing the power of the world's largest humanitarian network” (DRO chapter website, 2009).
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The DRO is recognized by federal, state and local governments across the country as a “principle
supplier of mass care in federally declared disasters” but also does daily emergency response for
citizens affected by fires” (DRO chapter website, 2009).
The DRO is a national organization with over 800 chapters in the U.S. and its territories.
It describes its structure in its New Employee Guide (2006) as an inverted pyramid with
community needs and resources at the top and the national headquarters at the bottom. This
indicates the reliance of the DRO on the community for donations and volunteers and its focus
on serving the community (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: DRO’s organizational structure (modified from New Employee Guide, 2006).
This particular chapter of the DRO is considered a regional chapter because it covers
three counties as well as a large city in its metropolitan jurisdiction. Part of the mission of the
emergency and disaster services unit of the DRO is to “provide relief to disaster victims” (DRO
Annual Report, 2009) and the chapter fulfills this in its daily operations by providing relief to
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people who have had their home damaged or lost in a fire. This unit within the DRO is one of
the busiest in the country responding to “an average five home fires and other disasters a day”
and “provides emergency food, clothing, temporary shelter, and personal care items” (DRO
chapter website, 2010) to those affected by home fires. If a fire or other disaster (e.g., tornado,
flooding, etc.) affects more than fifteen people or ten families, then the DRO will open a facility
to provide food, shelter, and other basic needs and staff with shelter teams from the unit.
These services are provided by the emergency and disaster services unit seven days a
week and 365 days a year through seven full-time staff (one director, one disaster manager, five
emergency services specialists) and five crisis duty workers that cover the 24-hour phone lines.
The majority of the workforce in the unit are volunteers, anywhere from 60-75 of them, divided
into twelve volunteer response teams who respond to calls between 6 p.m. – 6 a.m. on weekdays
and on weekends and holidays. Volunteers’ years of service range from under a year to over 15
years. Most volunteers are women between 45-65 or retired persons and work(ed) in a variety of
fields such as health care, education, mental health, first responder, and business. Some
volunteers, like Jim, are treated as informal leaders in the unit because of his further commitment
to the organization in leading fundraising activities and being the instructor of all emergency and
disaster response courses completed by new unit volunteers (Sue, volunteer party, Dec. 2010;
Des interview, Feb. 2011), In addition, volunteers and staff of the emergency and disaster
services unit that have been with the DRO for at least one year and have completed the three
month training may be sent to other areas of the country to provide additional disaster relief
services to areas in need (Des interview, Oct. 2010).
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Organizational Culture
As described in chapter one, organizational culture concerns how organizational
members subjectively create shared patterns of symbols and meanings through communication
that defines, guides, and sometimes constrains their everyday thoughts and behaviors in
organizational life. This is a continuous and dynamic process that centrally locates
communication as the process that helps organizational members create and maintain
organizational culture. To better understand the organizational culture of the DRO, the four
cultural constructs of vocabulary, rites and rituals, stories, and symbols identified in chapter one
are used to create a “thick” description of how the organization views crisis response and its role
in it.
Vocabulary
As discussed in chapter one, words are the essential way in which organizational
members communicate and are an important way members distinguish their organization from
other organizations and signal membership. Words and language encode culture and through
their use enact that culture. Vocabulary thus becomes an easy way to determine how the
regional DRO’s emergency and disaster services unit created and maintain symbolic boundaries
as well as how they defined crisis response and working with other organizations. First, the
vocabulary of the DRO is a hybrid of its organization’s humanitarian mission and the realities of
working within emergency management systems created by first responder organizations (e.g.,
police, fire, EMS) and governmental agencies. This is followed by a discussion of the way DRO
used vocabulary to convey how it struggled with constraints imposed by the national
headquarters and the ever-present need for funding to carry out its operations.
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Social service language. First, the DRO’s humanitarian focus is reinforced by its use of
social service language. Although the public literature on its website, social marketing sites, and
pamphlets called people affected by fires and other disasters, “disaster victims”, members in the
DRO prefer to use the term “client”. As Jim, one of the informal volunteer leaders, explains, “the
term [victim] is demeaning; this way maintains dignity” (Jim interview, Oct. 2010). The word
“client” was used by staff members in meetings and by volunteer team members during fire
response calls. It was also used to describe DRO resources. For example, the paperwork on each
fire was called the “client casework” and the debit cards given so people can purchase food and
clothing were called “client assistance cards”. Then the client information was entered into the
national DRO database system called the “Client Case System”. For this organization, the word
client, not only erased the stigma of being called a victim, it was a specific term used throughout
the social services, human services, and social work fields to describe people that they served.
Therefore, “client” reinforced the service aspect of the DRO.
Other social services terms were used by members to reify the service culture of the
DRO. Although staff members’ official job title was “Emergency Services Specialist”, the
disaster recovery handbook and volunteer team members referred to DRO staff as
“caseworkers”. These caseworkers gave “referrals” to other agencies to help clients recover
personal identification documents, get furniture, or apply for emergency assistance. When
volunteer response teams responded to fire calls, they distributed “comfort care kits” containing
personal care items to each client. They also had teddy bears in the van to give to children they
interacted with. Team members always introduced themselves as volunteers to clients to show
that they were “not there because we have to but we want to” (Jim interview, Dec. 2010). Team
members were trained to always ask the clients before they leave the scene, “Have your
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immediate needs been met by us today?” The team member completing paperwork at the scene
was then required to write down whether “client needs were met”.
Finally, the service culture was reinforced in how the volunteers and staff talked to and
about clients. The researcher observed a volunteer team on fire response calls taking time to
listen to stories from clients about what they lost and making sympathetic comments such as
“I’m sorry for your loss,” “We are here to help,” and “Losing a pet is awful. It’s like losing a
family member.” Members of the DRO, whether volunteers or paid staff, often told the
researcher that they see value in what they do because they were providing valuable services to
people who are thankful that they came. As director Des says, “When I help kids, those are the
best days…If I give food or comfort to them for night, I feel good. I know that night that they
have something” (Des interview, Feb. 2011). Volunteer leader Jim adds, “We go home with a
good feeling because we give them hope, counseling, and resources. This is equally important as
material things. We take as much time as necessary” (Jim interview, Dec. 2010).
Adopting emergency management language. The DRO staff expressed that providing
disaster relief is the unit’s main mission in helping clients, but members also needed to work
with fire departments and other emergency management agencies in order to provide those
services and coordinate response efforts. Fire fighters often alerted the crisis duty workers at the
DRO that they’ve just responded to a fire and some people need their services because the home
was damaged or destroyed. The DRO volunteers and coordinators also interacted with fire
fighters at the scene of a fire response to get information on damage assessments and if it was
safe for the DRO members, to do their own assessment of the property.
The DRO staff also worked with city emergency management agencies to coordinate
response efforts and have them open city owned properties that the DRO could turn into
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emergency shelters. Many of these relationships were developed through regular disaster
trainings and exercises the DRO was invited to take part in. To accomplish this, some members
of the DRO staff have adopted emergency management vocabulary to more effectively
communicate with these organizations. This language tended to be similar to military and
paramilitary language (i.e., first responder organizations) – disasters were “incidents”, personnel
were “deployed” to help, the emergency manager was called the “incident commander”. Since
2001, this language has been standardized and privileged by the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) through the Incident
Command System (ICS). Training was also required by DHS and FEMA if organizations wanted
to be part of larger disaster response efforts and have a seat in an Emergency Operations Center
(EOC). Thus, the DRO was even more fully integrated to the larger structure and culture or
emergency response.
This emergency management language was clearly and regularly used by the two
managers of the emergency and disaster services unit of the DRO. The emergency services
director was already familiar with this language because he worked as a paramedic for the city’s
fire department and was also the emergency manager for the city before working at the DRO.
They also reported that they had taken the Professional Emergency Manager training run by the
state police agency. Although not from an emergency management background, Ken, a DRO
manager, saw this training as valuable because he “knew it was a good link to emergency
management so we could use this as a non-profit; we could use the same sort of language they’re
using” (Ken interview, Feb. 2011). Later in the interview Ken, elaborated on the importance of
learning the language of other emergency management and first responder organizations when
discussing the value of disaster trainings with other organizations.
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We as non-profit responders, we don’t necessarily have to attend the same training that
the emergency managers have to attend. I’ll give you a language [example]. There’s a
form of a leadership model, incident command, and that is typically what fire
[department] uses, and what also EMS the emergency medical service [uses]. Well it’s
good for us, the [DRO], to know incident command because then we have a feel for how
they think. The incident command system has terms that maybe we don’t use every day,
and their org. charts, if we know the org. charts for incident command, we can kind of
adopt it for us to….So in knowing their incident command system, I can link it to the
team members and say, “Well the fire department has an incident command person,
there’s somebody there’s a person in their org. chart responsible for planning. Let’s see
how similar to us, even if we’re responding to an apartment fire, which person is
responsible for planning and we can use the same lingo. In the middle of the night, my
person at the apartment, the [DRO] person at the apartment fire can remember, “Oh, there
must be an incident commander out here from the fire department. I need to go talk to the
incident commander because that incident commander can maybe tell me when it is safe
for the clients to go back into the apartment”, so we learn that language. (Ken interview,
Feb. 2011)
Des, as a former emergency manager himself, also saw the value of talking the language
of emergency response agencies. “They [FEMA] want us to learn [the Incident Command
System (ICS)] but [DRO] is resisting. The line of demarcation between emergency management
and [DRO] is dying - now many of the trainings are the same. Some [DRO] people don’t
understand ICS and its importance” (Des interview, Feb. 2011). Ken and Des understood that by
learning the emergency management language, they could more easily understand other agencies
and effectively communicate with them during a crisis.
Although the DRO chapter was not mandating ICS training or instituting special training
for its volunteers, Ken and Des were trying to get most of their staff and some volunteer leaders
trained so they could learn the language and associated protocol and procedures. This was
especially important when the DRO needed a representative to be a part the Metropolitan
Emergency Operations Center (MEOC). The MEOC is the interorganizational crisis
management group run by the city’s Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM)
department. The MEOC is typically activated for coordination of a larger disaster response and
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special events such as the Super Bowl and All-Star game. Ken further described why being a
part of the MEOC and knowing the language was important for the DRO.
If an event had occurred [at the Super Bowl]… Noah’s role would have been sort of a
communications person since he’s in the room with the fire department. And they do a
round robin and Noah will say, “Well this is what we’re doing here and there.”…But
there’s certain training too. To sit in the Emergency Operations Center… [he] must have
certain Incident Command training, certain levels, I think 100-400 because they’re using
that language; it’s all about that language. And so in the Emergency Operations Center
there’s a lot of Incident Command lingo and so that affects who can sit in an Emergency
Operations Center too. (Ken interview, March 2011)
The DRO’s past experience of working with emergency management organizations on
special events, smaller emergencies, and larger crisis response efforts has also allowed this
emergency management language to be included in the language of their disaster plans. For
example, the Chapter Disaster Response Plan first outlined its “hazard risk assessment and
impact analysis” (2009, p. 12-13). It then described the DRO’s “disaster health services
protocols” (p.14), when a “disaster incident report” should be completed (p. 19), when the
volunteer response team should be “deployed in order to assess the situation” (p. 15), what
“response triggers” or situations that would “activate this plan” (p. 15), and how DRO personnel
should not be deployed into “hot” or “warm” zones during a WMD/T event involving CBRNE
(p. 30). The purpose of the chapter’s Disaster Response Plan was to help guide staff members
and even some volunteers in disaster response. Therefore, Des and Ken were correct in
suggesting they need to know what these terms mean and how to use them correctly in order to
effectively communicate with other emergency management organizations.
This adoption of more first responder or emergency management language by members
also reflected how the historical and cultural context of crisis response has affected the DRO at
the local level. Bona fide group perspective, first discussed in chapter one, theorized that groups
are embedded in multiple environments such as historical, economic, physical, and cultural that
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all have an effect on intragroup communication, intergroup relationships, and coordination
efforts (Frey, 2003, p. 5-6). The DRO has increasingly interacted with various emergency
management and first responder agencies that used the ICS response structure and language in
crisis response. Through these interactions, DRO leadership learned that understanding the ICS
structure and adopting the language resulted in them working and communicating more
effectively with them. But using that language wasn’t just restricted to interactions with outside
agencies. It also seeped into the organizational culture as it became used more between members,
in communication materials such as the chapter Disaster Response Plan, and as the leadership
required more members to take ICS training. This affect was not surprising to the researcher
given how the organization saw itself as a collaborating partner in crisis response. This will be
discussed further in this chapter under the “Crisis Response as Collaboration” section.
“National” headquarters. Another way in which external environments have impacted
the vocabulary and organizational culture of the DRO is in how DRO members’ expressed tense
relationship with the national DRO headquarters. As stated earlier, the DRO is a regional chapter
of a national non-profit disaster relief organization. DRO members used vocabulary to convey
how it struggled with the increased constraints given by the national headquarters in raising and
using funds and the ever-present need for local community fundraising to carry out its
operations.
As bona fide group perspective suggests, members “bring with them the history and
politics of their own organization, as well as any positive or negative influences from their
previous organizational history” (Keyton & Stallworth, 2003). But over the past ten years,
historical, political, and economic factors at the national level of the DRO have tarnished its
image as a humanitarian disaster relief organization. After the September 11, 2001 attacks,
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fundraising for large-scale disasters became more prevalent over the traditional community-type
fundraising. In the ten years since, non-profit organizations like the national DRO headquarters
have dealt with the additional pressure and scrutiny from the public and politicians to “wisely”
use funds raised for large-scale disaster relief operations. In fact, the national DRO was criticized
after a couple of major disasters for not distributing all of the money people donated to that
particular disaster relief operation, not distributing it quickly enough, and even allegations of
embezzlement of funds by DRO members and local chapters (CNN.com, Nov. 2001; Associated
Press, Sept. 2005; Holguin, Feb. 2009).
Therefore, in response to this criticism, the national headquarters has been changing its
policies and processes as to how individual chapters raise and use public funds in disaster relief.
This standardization and centralization of decision-making has frustrated many members of the
regional chapter of the DRO. Members have taken to calling national headquarters “National”.
This term was often said in a tone that conveyed frustration and a “Big Brother” attitude because
of headquarters’ bureaucratic policies and processes it embodied.
During the study the DRO chapter was struggling financially to locally fund its disaster
relief operations and that concern was felt throughout the organization. At a quarterly meeting of
the DRO fire response and disaster volunteers, the director of the unit bluntly explained the
situation the chapter was in financially and what budget changes national headquarters was
making.
The [national headquarters of DRO] is changing again and I’m going to talk about how it
is going to affect local response of multiple family fires. Historically we have responded
to disasters and emergencies. For house fires, we are still the second busiest chapter in
the nation in house fires…Historically we use to get funds from families and
organizations such as United Way. But today American disasters are so large that we
cannot rely on the public to make donations work. Therefore we need the government’s
help for large disasters…Certain money that [DRO] can keep is less than 10% for
operations…Funding is not there for small disasters. For example, tornadoes - look at
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what little to no emotion people react to them now…Chapters such as San Diego
Milwaukee are wealthy but not as busy as us. National has now said that we are all
[DRO] - Everybody’s money is everybody’s. They are asking chapters to cut the fat
improve the budget. I was in DC at National one week ago - they know who we
(Des, quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb. 2011)

and
one
and
are.

This concern for chapter funding and budget cuts by the DRO manager has trickled down
to other staff members and volunteers. The members of the DRO often talked about how critical
it was for the public to recognize the importance of what they do. They felt that this was
accomplished at the local level to the media and the public by better marketing what the DRO
did in response to fires and other disasters. The increased recognition would then result in an
increasing of funding from the community. As Jim, a volunteer leader, described, “If we want to
improve our donations, we have to let people know what we do…Every time we get media to
cover and get exposure we get a spike in donations 1-3 days after” (Jim interview, Dec. 2010).
However, DRO members felt the budget cuts and new policies the national headquarters put into
place hampered their fundraising ability.
Members communicated this collective frustration by using the term “National” to
describe national headquarters’ restrictive policies and actions. A couple of days before the
February 2011 quarterly volunteer meeting, a large apartment fire occurred in which the DRO
and the Salvation Army both responded. During the meeting, volunteer team member Jerry
expressed his displeasure at the lack of credit DRO received as part of the response.

He

explained that a local radio station reported how the Salvation Army was the only organization
helping people affected. Jerry explained that his wife had to call in so the DRO would also get
recognition.

Jerry wondered why they have no media department to ensure they also get

mentioned. This complaint was reaffirmed by several other volunteers nodding their heads or
verbally agreeing with Jerry. The next 30 minutes of the meeting then shifted to a discussion
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with Mark from the local PR firm hired by the DRO, the managers, and the volunteers as to what
the DRO was doing to market itself to the public and the media.
To shift blame from himself and the PR firm, Mark stated that “National” had put new
policies in place that restricted their local fundraising efforts. Again when, a volunteer team
member commented that “We don’t have any TV campaigns like the old days had,” Mark
responded that “All advertising campaigns are now run out of National and local chapters are not
allowed to do any on their own” (quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb. 2011). By using the term
“National”, Mark redirected their frustration toward the national headquarters, which many DRO
members already feared was constricting this DRO chapter through several recent changes in
process and policies. Again, when another volunteer asked about commercials and billboards he
saw in another city, Mark emphasized that “the new policy from National in the last few
months…is also tying our hands development-wise” (quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb. 2011)
Fundraising restrictions were also reinforced in the chapter’s Disaster Response Plan
(DRP), which was a localized version of national headquarters’ DRP. Examples of the rules of
fundraising include, “Ensure that public information, Fund Raising, and other program activities
are done in accordance with guidance from national headquarters” (2009, p. 5); and, “When a
disaster occurs, the chapter will immediately inform the community that [DRO] disaster services
are being provided to people impacted by the disaster. The community will also be informed that
the [DRO] is dependent upon voluntary contributions to provide such disaster services and that
all [DRO] disaster assistance is free” (2009, p. 16). Through these examples, one could see how
the local PR firm and the chapter members were correct when they complained that “National”
put constraints on their fundraising efforts that they felt contributed to their lack of local
recognition for their disaster relief operations.
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In addition to fundraising constraints, national DRO’s standardization and centralization
of decision-making in regard to spending funds conflicted with the DRO chapter’s service and
local community focused culture. This resulted in organizational members struggling with how
maintain

their organization’s humanitarian focus of providing disaster relief while also

following new spending restrictions imposed by the national organization.
In addition, DRO chapter members felt increasing pressure from National to be good
“stewards” of how they spent money for disaster relief operations. In one of the researcher’s first
visits with the DRO, Jim told her, “There is a well-known [DRO] verbiage – ‘We are stewards of
the donor’s money’” (SART mtg., Nov. 2010). One way this was reinforced was through the
changes in spending policies and processes “National” had recently implemented. As stated
previously, chapter DRO members assisted people who had been involved in fires or other
disasters by providing food, clothing, and shelter through “client assistant cards” (debit cards)
and hotel stay vouchers. National set a formula as to how much money each adult or child could
receive for food and clothing based upon the extent of fire damage to the home. A hotel voucher
could also be given for 1-3 nights stay depending on damage to the home. But national
headquarters new policy was to emphasize opening up a shelter instead of giving hotel vouchers
because it was more cost effective (Des interview, Feb. 2011). Other policy changes from
National had prescribed what types of shelters to use and where disaster volunteers stayed when
traveling to help another chapter with disaster response.
Now we cannot use the big box stores [as a shelter] because we don’t have the money to
pay. We’re told by National to find something small. National is coming in next week
and we need to show staff in the field, not here on the computer drinking coffee. [DRO]
volunteers when they travel now have to triple bunk in hotel or have staff in shelter and
tents because we don’t have money and it looks bad to the public. (Des interview, Feb.
2011)
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The DRO national headquarters also required local chapters to input all services they
provided to clients into a national database. The Disaster Response Plan states, “The chapter will
use the Client Assistance System (CAS) as the standard method of documenting, issuing CACs
and reporting [DRO] assistance to clients. The Client Assistance System will be used to provide
and record assistance provided to clients in all disaster types and events” (2009, p. 19). These
changes in policies and rules and increased accountability by national headquarters made some
DRO members hyper-aware of how they spent money for disaster response as they felt that
National was watching every funding decision they made. Manager Ken gave an example of how
he had to notify others if he was going to spend a higher than typical amount for a fire response.
If I think it is gonna be a lot of money, I then need to give a heads up to our finance
department. We issue cards, like [DRO] debit cards, and if I think there’s gonna be 30
cards issued in one night, that’s a lot. And we all get emails from a place when these
cards are issued and Shelia [the accountant] gets that same email…Anytime we think
we’re gonna spend that much money, my boss needs to know cause he needs to tell his
boss, and sometimes National. Oh I didn’t mention National. Sometimes National will
call. Someone in DC is monitoring/watching CNN local stations and if they see a big fire
in [city], they’ll call too. They’ll call the crisis duty worker; they’ll call the 800 number.
And so, we can get notified a lot of ways. (Ken interview, Feb. 2011)
The researcher also noticed how this increased scrutiny by National with how the DRO
spends money has created a tension with members seeing themselves as helping others without
judgment but also more wary about those who might abuse their generosity. “If they were to take
this [DRO] out of the community - what a void. People get debit cards and carry around as
status. Police have sometimes found cards because they were used to cut up cocaine. We monitor
the cards - can use for 7 days then cut off. Each time you use a card it costs me $2. [DRO] Cards
are a status symbol.” (Des interview, Feb. 2011). This quote showed that Des knew of the value
DRO has in the community. But at the same time, his use of phrases such as “we monitor the
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cards,” “cut off,” and “it costs me $2” shows a more cynical view of how they have to monitor
how people use their funds.
The following examples illustrate how the DRO members used the term, “National” to
convey their frustration with the constraints and limitations they felt national headquarters gave
them with its recent policy and rule changes concerning fundraising and spending funds for
disaster relief operations. This tension between the organization’s mission and the policy and
process constraints imposed by National is also illustrated further in the stories section of this
chapter. The next section describes how the second organization culture construct, rites and
rituals in the DRO chapter helped organizational members commit to the values and norms of the
organization.
Rites and Rituals
As described in chapter one, rites and rituals are “collective activities that are technically
unnecessary to the achievement of desired ends, but that within a culture are considered socially
essential, keeping the individual bound within the norms of the collectivity (Hofstede, 2001, p.
10). Rites and rituals can either be formal or informal, performed regularly or occasionally, but
are enacted collectively to provide the rules, norms, and values of organizational life for
members (Pacanowsky & O’Donnell-Trujillo, 1982; Hofstede, 2001). In the Disaster Relief
Organization (DRO) chapter, the researcher observed the rites and rituals of the quarterly
volunteer meeting and social events. Through interviews with members and examining artifacts,
the researcher determined rites and rituals of crisis response trainings and exercises, and
fundraising activities such as disaster relief telethons. These rites and rituals helped volunteers
engage with and show commitment to the values of the organization and value working with
other organizations in crisis preparation. Some rituals, such as employee and volunteer training
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and disaster fundraising, were becoming more carefully controlled by national headquarters
(National DRO) to generate loyalty and commitment to the National DRO from members and the
public, rather than the DRO regional chapter. This also gave national headquarters a way to
control the regional DRO.
Quarterly volunteer meetings. The DRO had quarterly meetings with its disaster relief
volunteers. According to Jim, a volunteer leader, the purpose of the meetings was to “keep
people engaged” (Jim interview, Dec. 2010). Previously, they held meetings once a month, but
attendance was poor because “volunteers didn’t get anything out of them” (Jim interview, Dec.
2010). Now that they’ve changed to quarterly meetings, they get almost all of the volunteers
attending. The meetings took place on a Saturday morning at the chapter’s headquarters and
typically lasted 2-3 hours. Volunteers were notified about the meeting through email. Food was
provided as well as an agenda for the meeting and any necessary handouts. For the February
meeting the researcher attended, approximately 40 people attended and the agenda consisted of
self-introductions around the room, updates by chapter leadership, updates from volunteer
leadership, “communication”, and closing remarks. As was the purpose of most meetings,
information was conveyed from the DRO staff and informal volunteer leader Jim to the
volunteers, such as upcoming volunteer events, how to operate the new 800 MHz radios in the
vans, new policies from national headquarters, and how to complete paperwork correctly.
As discussed in chapter one, regular meetings in themselves may not alone represent an
organizational culture, but meetings can be communication events in which people try to make
sense of what is happening to them and see their place in the organization and the process of
meetings can produce and reproduce structures of an organizational culture (Schwartzman, 1993,
p. 39-41). These regular and formal quarterly meetings also served a higher purpose as an
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organizational ritual because they symbolized and reinforced the regional DRO’s collective
values, beliefs, and rules (Pacanowsky & O’Donnell-Trujillo, 1982; Trice & Beyer, 1984). These
included the organizational culture values of service and treating volunteers on an equal level as
full organizational members while in return reinforcing volunteer commitment to the
organization’s mission and following the rules and procedures of the organization.
For example, unlike other organizations that may treat volunteers as temporary workers,
and without the same status or responsibilities as full members of the organization, the DRO
engaged its volunteers as valuable members of the organization. By treating volunteers as full
members of the organization, they were encouraging them to represent the organization as equal
status members as well as get involved in problem solving organizational issues.
This is also an illustration of the bona fide group concept of stable but permeable
boundaries discussed in chapter one. The DRO had permeable boundaries because it accepted
community volunteers as full members and freely shared information, including challenges and
problems the organization was having. In turn this created volunteers with a strong in-group
identification of being committed members of the DRO who leveraged their out-group
relationships to help the organization. This is demonstrated further in the examples below and
contributed the DROs open and collaborative culture discussed at the end of this chapter.
For the February volunteer meeting, the chapter leadership encouraged and empowered
volunteers to take initiative in helping the chapter promote itself and its fundraising efforts. They
did this by engaging volunteers in a discussion about the issues and inviting Mark from the PR
firm to be at the quarterly meeting. As the chapter leadership was discussing the lack of funding
for marketing, volunteers spoke up to complain about how another volunteer organization was
getting recognition for fire response by the media while the DRO was also on the scene assisting
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clients. The volunteers first blamed the DRO and the PR firm for not doing more to market the
organization and generate media coverage. Mark from the PR firm deflected some of the
marketing criticism by blaming the new policies of national headquarters that severely restricted
how individual chapters could market themselves.
But he and Michelle, the DRO marketing person, also engaged the volunteers in problem
solving and supporting the organization. For example, Michelle said to the volunteers “we are
going to have to be more creative” by promoting the DRO through local media and social media
to get recognition for their efforts and increase fundraising. This lead to a comment from a
volunteer about how they are the “unknown silent angels in this room” and how “we need to talk
to the media about silent angels working in the night” (quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb. 2011). One
of the DRO staff members then said they liked that term, “silent angels” and the discussion
turned to how volunteers could be the “silent angels” and help promote the organization more
broadly and effectively. Mark suggested that volunteers who use Facebook and Twitter should
follow their chapter’s pages and pass them along to friends so they “can go viral”. Des, the
director of the unit, passionately described how he felt that the volunteers were the face of the
organization.
If you are literate and compassionate go to microphone and talk [to the media]. You are
it. I met a friend whose house was firebombed. Who pulls up, but George [DRO
volunteer member]. I’m scared but George is on it. I saw firsthand what you do. That’s
the commercial. That’s what people need to see to give money. (Feb. 2011)
Jim, a volunteer leader, also suggested that if a volunteer on a fire scene thinks the response is
“different, new or interesting from the standard” then they should call a DRO coordinator to see
if the media can cover it.
This engagement of volunteers in the meeting to problem solve and support the
organization also occurred later in the meeting in a discussion about fundraising. One volunteer
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offered to go to a retailer to get some GPS systems for their vans donated if the DRO needed
more. And Jim described several upcoming fundraising events at sporting events, motorcycle
rides and other summer events the DRO was hosting that needed volunteers to sign up to work
the DRO tent or tables. This purposeful inclusion of the volunteers helped raise awareness of the
DRO’s funding and marketing problems but also allowed volunteers to be fully engaged
members of the organization by offering to be part of the solution. Again, this inclusion and
engagement was unique compared to how volunteers are typically treated by organizations and
reinforced that the DRO values volunteers as active members and contributors to the
organization.
Social gatherings. Annual rites of integration (Beyer & Trice, 1987) were another way
the DRO showed that it valued and supported its volunteers as active members of the
organization. It also enabled volunteers to recommit to the values of the organization. Rites of
integration are those work-related social gatherings that “encourage and revive common feelings
that bind members together and commit them to [an organization]” (Beyer & Trice, 1987, p. 11).
The DRO understood that almost its entire disaster response staff was made up of volunteers
(96%, DRO chapter blog, April 2011). These volunteers mostly worked nights, weekends, and
holidays so clients could receive the DRO’s services they need. The bad economic climate had
resulted in a decrease of public funding of NGOs, which in turn caused the national headquarters
to increasingly cut funding for full time staff and impose new rules on fundraising at the chapter
level. Chapters then have to rely on their volunteers more to take on responsibilities of staff
members as well as promote the organization. Therefore, work-related social gatherings, such as
the annual Volunteer Recognition Dinner and Christmas party, helped volunteers feel valued and
recommit to the organization. Such socialization also helped build a sense of community among
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members and stronger member identification that binded them to each other and to the
organization. These aspects are further illustrated below.
As part of National Volunteer week, the DRO chapter used social media and a Volunteer
Recognition Dinner to publicly thank its volunteers. The DROs Twitter site posted, “It is
National Volunteer Week! Thank you to all of our volunteers! Your hours and dedication are
what the [DRO] are made up of!” (DRO chapter Twitter site, April 2011). At the Volunteer
Recognition Dinner, volunteers received awards and pins for years of service. This information
was also placed on their social media sites with a picture of two smiling volunteers. In addition
they had an annual Christmas Party at chapter headquarters where volunteers and their family
members were invited to share in a meal, play games, and receive raffle prizes, which were
donated by staff and volunteers. The DRO staff served the meal to the volunteers and their
family and took time throughout the evening to thank the volunteers and shared stories of how
volunteers were an important part of the organization. The CEO of the chapter even appeared at
the beginning of the evening to mingle with the volunteers and say a few words of thanks before
gracefully exiting.
Although these may seem like simple, low-cost gestures, these rites of integration
actually served important organizational cultural purposes that benefitted the organization. These
benefits included saving additional staff time or resources in additional volunteer recruitment and
training and low-cost positive marketing of the organization in the community from committed
and satisfied volunteers.
Volunteers, who by definition don’t get paid, needed to feel valued in other ways so they
would recommit to the organization. One DRO volunteer at the Christmas party, who had been
with the organization for over 15 years, said that he volunteered with the DRO because, “we’re
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treated like family here” (Christmas party, Dec. 2011). The extended family metaphor was
reinforced at these rites of integration where family and friends were welcomed and sociality and
laughter were evident. This recognition of volunteers was also reinforced publicly through social
media. Volunteers, encouraged to join the social media sites of the organization, felt valued
because of this public recognition and could easily share this information with family and friends
through social media. This recommitted volunteers to the organization as they felt bound
together as family members and shared in the celebrations of volunteer recognition and holiday
celebrations.
This volunteer recognition also helped the organization promote itself and recruit new
volunteers. Whenever the organization posted a message about what their volunteers were doing,
such as being sent to respond to a disaster, they included information on how people could
volunteer (DRO chapter blog, April 2011). This helped increase their pool of volunteers. In
addition, these rites of integration reinforced the image to the public of the service culture of the
local chapter DRO; how it wanted to help people and was not mandated by profit or regulation to
do so. Finally, the DRO staff modeled the service culture of the organization by serving the
meal, providing raffle prizes, and having several staff members thank volunteers throughout the
events. Because the DRO relied on the work and commitment of these volunteers to the
organization, these rites of integration were vital to maintain those ties. As DRO manager Ken
explained, “they work hard and the volunteers, I want them acknowledged ‘cause they’re there.
They’re there at an apartment fire for 10 hours” (Ken interview, Feb., 2011).
Crisis response trainings and exercises. Finally, the DRO engaged in rituals, such as
crisis response training and exercises and disaster response fundraising through telethons. As
described in chapter one, crisis response trainings and exercises are common rituals for many
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crisis response organizations that reinforces a shared understand of members’ responsibilities
during crisis response and how they should coordinate or collaborate with other organizations.
Participating in these disaster trainings and exercises are also crisis response rituals because they
occurred regularly (mostly because of government regulation) and are an important part of the
overall culture of crisis response organizations. By expecting volunteers to engage the same
training and fundraising responsibilities as organizational members, these two rituals created a
shared understanding by the organization that volunteers need to be committed members of the
organization.
Crisis response trainings and exercises at the DRO occurred on two levels; basic disaster
response training, and interorganizational crisis response exercises. DRO volunteers must have
completed six training courses within an approximate 3 month time frame before they could be
active volunteers. These courses included: Online Orientation, Disaster Services Overview,
Disaster Assessment, Client Casework – Providing Emergency Assistance, Shelter Operations
and Simulation, and a final class, in which a volunteer leader talked about the reality of
volunteering for disaster services of the DRO (Des interview, Oct. 2010; Jim interview, Dec.
2010; Training Schedule, 2011). These online and classroom-style courses combined learning
about the organization and its services with practical training on learning the rules, policies, and
procedures of responding to fires calls and working in a shelter. These courses also served as a
rite of passage because they taught the volunteers what it meant to be a member of the DRO and
to commit to representing the organization. For example, the Online Orientation was called
“[DRO] Culture” and included modules describing the organization’s history, foundations
(mission, structure, strategic direction), key services, and commitments (DRO national website,
Feb., 2011).
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Being a disaster services volunteer within the DRO was more intense and time
consuming than other volunteer positions, so the last class was necessary to explain the “reality
of the work” and gain a commitment from the volunteer before assigning them to a team (Jim
interview, Dec. 2010). A typical fire call was 3 hours, often at night or on weekends (Jim
interview, Dec. 2010). When a volunteer was sent in the field to do disaster response, such as
sheltering or distributing food and water at a disaster site, they were on assignment for 12-14
hours a day for up to 2 weeks (SART mtg., Nov. 2010). The DRO does not accept “spontaneous
volunteers”, people who showed up at a disaster shelter wanting to help, without at least
completing a volunteer application, going through a background check, and receiving an
abbreviated training (SART mtg., Nov. 2010) by the organization. Even in these cases, they
would be paired up with a regular DRO volunteer or member. After they completed training, the
“spontaneous volunteer” would be assigned to a disaster response team and given a DRO vest,
hat and ID to identify them as a member of the organization until the disaster response was
finished (Jim interview, Dec. 2010).
Once DRO volunteers completed basic training, they were still encouraged to take
optional training classes to learn new skills. Typically, organizations only emphasize
professional development for members. Therefore, this communication reinforced DRO’s culture
of valuing volunteers as members. For example, at the quarterly volunteer meeting in February,
Mario, a staff member who specialized in sheltering and training, talked about upcoming training
opportunities for volunteers such as CPR/First Aid, driving and using the Emergency Response
Vehicle (ERV) (a mobile feeding vehicle), and disaster response and people with mobility issues
(2011). Mario also suggested volunteers should take online FEMA courses on Incident
Command System (ICS) or National Incident Management System (NIMS) because they work a
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lot with FEMA with shelters and other disaster response. Demonstrating commitment to
professional development, other volunteers suggested training courses for volunteers to take and
suggested the DRO develop additional courses, such as Wilderness CPR/First Aid and Managing
Spontaneous Volunteers. Volunteers also inquired about courses through the State Training
Institute (STI), a week-long event held annually that was run by the state chapter of the DRO.
Mario informed them that “because of budget constraints, there is no STI this year” (Feb. 2011).
When the volunteers voiced their disappointment at this, Mario agreed but offered other online
training opportunities, such as the FEMA training, and offered to hear any suggestions of what
classes they should add locally.
Some training was also incorporated into the quarterly volunteer meetings to make sure
they have the same knowledge as members. At the February meeting, volunteers received
training on how to use the new 800 MHz radio systems installed in DRO response vehicles and
do’s and don’ts on how to communicate using the system. Volunteers also received training on
how to correct mistakes in completing client casework forms. The emphasis on these training
sessions and encouraging other training opportunities reflected a culture where volunteers were
encouraged and committed to being as well-trained disaster responders as members were.
On the surface, volunteer training helped give volunteers the skills they need to be able to
respond to the disasters and emergencies required of them by the organization chapter. But the
trainings were also purposefully designed to learn what it meant to be a committed member of
the National DRO and to follow the rules. For example, the online orientation had one module
titled, “Our Commitments” that “describes how [DRO] employees and volunteers apply our
values, practice total diversity and act within ethical standards to uphold the public trust” (DRO
national website, Feb. 2011). The required initial courses for volunteers were also carefully
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designed and controlled by the National DRO. All training sessions were either completed online
though the national website or the curriculum was sent to the DRO by national headquarters to
use for classroom-style courses (Ken interview, Feb. 2011). This control of training by National
DRO seemed to expand to other training opportunities as evidenced by the cutting of funding for
the State Training Institute (quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb. 2011), the incorporation of some ICS
into DRO training courses (Ken interview, Feb. 2011), and the mention by another staff member
to volunteers that “there are a lot of big changes taking place and it will be big news when the
chapter COO (Chief Operating Officer) comes back from National,” (quarterly volunteer mtg.,
Feb. 2011). Even the time spent in the quarterly meeting to correctly complete the casework
form was explained because they need more standardization to make the DRO staffs’ job easier
when the input the information into the national database system (quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb.
2011). By controlling and designing training for all DRO employees and volunteers, the National
DRO ensured consistency across all chapters as well as emphasized commitment by members to
values, rules, and policies of the national organization over the regional chapter.
Besides individual trainings, interorganizational crisis response trainings and exercises
helped the regional DRO plan and prepare for disasters and their role in localized response.
These preparedness meetings and exercises were a large part a DRO staff member’s job. As
DRO staff member Ken said that “if we’re not responding to a disaster now, we’re
planning…planning is probably70 percent of my job” (interview, Feb. 2011). For the DRO, these
consisted specifically of 1) table-top simulations, where representatives from various
organizations talk through a crisis response scenario, 3) functional exercises where
representatives role play communications they would do for a real event, and 4) full-scale
exercises where a controlled disaster event is simulated in the field and various organizations
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practice how they would respond and work together (Ken interview, Feb. 2011). The DRO was
involved in approximately 13-15 of these a year (Des interview, Oct. 2010). DRO staff members
attended various meetings and exercises, although Des and Ken as the DRO managers attended
the majority of the exercise orientations and planning meetings. Some long term volunteers did
attend smaller scale meetings and exercises, such as those with other non-profit disaster relief
organizations like the animal sheltering meeting and simulation the researcher attended (Nov.,
2010). However, all DRO volunteers were encouraged to participate as “victims” in full-scale
exercises because, “sometimes it’s good to see things from the other side” (Jim, quarterly mtg.,
Feb. 2011). Participating in these disaster trainings and exercises were rituals because they
occurred regularly (mostly because of government regulation) and are an important part of the
culture of crisis response organizations.
Engaging in these exercises and planning meetings also reinforced the service culture of
the organization as one willing to be a part of a team and work with partners in crisis response.
For example, the researcher attended a co-sheltering workshop hosted by the state animal
response team (SART), which rescues and cares for animals during a crisis event (SART mtg.,
Nov. 2010). The DRO was represented by a staff member and two volunteers. SART was excited
that DRO was willing to discuss pet owner co-sheltering and potential partnerships. Privately,
DRO members told me they didn’t know how feasibly co-sheltering would work, however they
were willing to hear what ideas SART had. During the meeting DRO members acknowledged
that pet issues effected people’s evacuation decisions and freely shared their ideas and
experiences about sheltering with those groups in attendance. This conveyed to those attending
the workshop that DRO valued the issues of the public that they served and showed their
willingness to engage in new partners in crisis response.
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Disaster relief fundraising. A final ritual that the DRO participated in is fundraising
after a disaster has occurred. Fundraising communication and events are unique to non-profit
disaster relief organizations such as the DRO. In an age of 24-hour news reporting and where
citizens share stories, information, and images through social media, disasters create a sense of
helplessness or cognitive dissonance in people. People often turn to making a donation to nonprofit organizations to help disaster victims because it relieves that cognitive dissonance (Waters,
2009).

Because the DRO is a prominent disaster relief organization, it engaged in these

fundraising activities through the mass media and electronically through its website and social
media.
In the past this helped the DRO fund its local disaster relief efforts and promote the
activities and positive image of the organization to the local community. Over the years, the
National DRO developed a sophisticated communication and fundraising plan, which restricted
any funds raised locally from going to the DRO chapter during a national disaster response.
If it’s a national or international disaster, we [regional chapter of DRO] are in more of a
fundraising mode and communication mode. For example, Channel 7 [TV station] loves
to do a telethon if there is disaster. Because the chapter is part of the national
organization, there are lots of rules on what communication to the public needs to be so it
is coordinated with national. We can communicate how the [DRO] is responding and
what type of help is needed from the public. Rules are we cannot reach out for individual
help unless the disaster reaches certain level - like the [county] tornadoes. There are
levels of disasters and lots of rules, lots of things have changed. (Michelle interview,
DRO marketing coordinator, Dec. 2010)
First, the fundraising communication rules and policies for local chapter DROs to use for
large-scale or “non-recurrent disasters” were clearly defined through the National DRO’s
disaster fund raising action plan. “In the case of non-recurrent disasters that affect areas beyond
the jurisdiction of the chapter, the chapter will engage in cooperative fundraising efforts with
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other impacted chapters, in coordination with the service area, as prescribed in the disaster fund
raising action plan” (DRO Chapter Response Plan, 2009, p. 16).
Second, the local chapter used its website, blog, Facebook, and Twitter accounts to
communicate what the National DRO was doing and how people could donate to National
DRO’s disaster relief efforts. These messages seemed to follow the recommendations of public
relations scholars to have DRO’s response efforts publicized in (social) media outlets, use
testimonials and images from the disaster and response, and use factual information and statistics
to state the needs of the organization (Bennett and Daniel, 2002; Bennett and Kottasz, 2000).
During this study, the Japan tsunami and nuclear disaster occurred, soon followed by a
tornado outbreak in the United States across several states. Although the local DRO was not
directly affected by these disasters, they engaged in the ritual of disaster fundraising for the
national organization. Most of these messages were created by the National DRO in a press
release format. The messages varied from testimonies and images from the disaster (often
including an image of a person wearing a DRO vest or other identification) to updating the
public on its fundraising efforts for a particular disaster and how it had used those funds. This
information was then posted on the local chapter’s DROs website and social media (with links to
the larger article).
If there was a local response to the disaster, such as sending disaster volunteers to help in
relief efforts, then a short paragraph by the local DRO was posted at the beginning followed by a
press release from the National DRO concerning the same disaster (DRO chapter website, April
2011). In all communications, the mission of the national organization and its reliance on the
public for assistance was made clear.
The [DRO] shelters, feeds and provides emotional support to victims of
disasters…provides international humanitarian aid; and supports military members and
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their families. The [DRO] is a charitable organization - not a government agency - and
depends on volunteers and the generosity of the American public to perform its mission.
For more information, please visit [national DRO website link] or join our blog at
[national DRO blog link]. (DRO chapter blog, April 2011)
This, however, made it more difficult for the regional DRO chapter to reach out to the
community during a time of heightened interest to present their ongoing need for regional
community emergency and disaster funding.
The clear communication and fundraising plan and communication materials the National
DRO provided helped the local chapter DRO provide timely information about current disaster
relief and fundraising efforts. But it also restricted the local DRO from creating connections and
long-term fundraising relationships with the community at a time in which they were most likely
to donate to their organization. DRO chapters were expected to use their staff and volunteers to
answer phones during local telethons and post timely updates to its websites and social media
communications as part of cooperative fundraising efforts. But the donation links and telephone
and text numbers listed in communication messages were to the National DRO. For example,
when one clicked on a link on the local DRO website to donate to the Japan Disaster Relief, the
link actually took one to the National DRO donation page (DRO chapter website, April 2011).
On that page, the choice to donate to the regional DRO chapter was listed as the fourth of five
options: “Where the need is greatest, Disaster relief for countless crises, Help for Military
members and their families, Your local [DRO] Chapter, and Japan Earthquake and Pacific
Tsunami”. Also, if one clicked on the general “Donate Now” button located on the local DRO
website, donating funds to that chapter was still one of four options for donors (DRO chapter
website, April 2011). This resulted in many DRO members communicating their frustration with
National DRO in meetings over lack of funding and in turn recognition for their role in local
disaster response discussed earlier.
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Given these restrictions from the National DRO, the regional DRO has been more
creative in engaging in other community fundraising rituals to raise money for its daily
emergency services operations or for local level disasters. They hosted 5K run/walks and
motorcycle rides and had a DRO tent at sporting events and summer festivals to increase
visibility and communicate their needs (quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb. 2011). DRO volunteers
were strongly encouraged to assist with these events and wear their organizational gear to
identify themselves with the organization, and in exchange the organization got them free
entrance to the event. These local fundraising events were also communicated through the local
DRO’s website and social media. In addition, they used their social media to publically thank
their local corporate and foundation donors for their generosity.
In honor of [DRO] month, we would like to recognize our supporters. Today, we would
like to recognize, Lamar Advertising. The Lamar Advertising Corporation has made it
possible for the [DRO, regional chapter] to broadcast our message to the public via
billboards around the [location removed] area. It is because of the generosity of Lamar
Advertising that we are able to get the word out and let the public know what we do.
(DRO chapter Facebook page, April 2011)
The local DRO also used more subtle means of communicating their reliance on the
public’s generosity of donating funds in other written materials handed out to various audiences.
For example, on the cover of the Recovery Information booklet handed out to all clients serviced
by the DRO during a fire, it says, “[DRO] assistance is an outright gift made possible by the
generous contributions of the American people” (Recovery Information booklet, n.d., p.1). The
“Little Red Book” reference guide that describes the services the regional DRO provides lists the
services provided for disaster relief, “with the help of people who donate time and money,”
(Little Red Book, n.d., p.11). One Twitter message simply stated, “Your support of the [local
DRO] allows us to send volunteers and staff to NC & TX to help after storms and fires” (DRO
chapter Twitter site, April 2011). Instead of direct solicitations of donations, these messages
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were more subtle in communicating the need for donations to do local disaster relief work as
well as communicating appreciation to the public for supporting them. These more subtle forms
of communication also helped the regional DRO get around the fundraising barriers the National
DRO placed on them. Although it hasn’t lessened their frustration with National DRO’s
restrictions, it has helped them maintain their presence as a valued disaster relief organization in
their local community.
Rites and rituals in the DRO chapter helped volunteers commit to the values and norms
of the organization and in turn valued them as full members of the organization. Whether it was
quarterly meetings, rites of integration such as social and recognition events, crisis trainings and
exercises, or crisis fundraising, the service mission was made clear to members and volunteers.
They were expected to do their part as valued members to help the organization beyond typical
volunteer duties. Volunteers were expected to know their role through training and commit to
being ambassadors of the organization, but were also encouraged to engage in helping to solve
the challenges of the organization. Rituals, such as attending crisis trainings and exercises on an
organizational level, also reinforced the service culture of the organization. Disaster relief
fundraising rituals reinforced the service mission of the organization and its reliance on
donations for the public to provide those services. Although some rites and rituals were carefully
controlled by the National DRO to generate national level loyalty and commitment from
members and the public, the regional DRO used meetings and events with volunteers and local
fundraising efforts as well as messages through its website and social media to the public to
create a local connection and commitment to the regional organization chapter.
The next cultural construct discussed are the stories told by members. These stories
encode, transmit and reinforce the organizational culture of the regional DRO.
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Stories
As described in chapter one stories are an important way members share organizational
experiences with other members and those outside the organization (Trice & Beyer, 1984, p.
655). Telling stories is also an important way members’ share and reinforce organizational
culture because stories “typify certain experiences as being, in principle, worthy of emulation
(when the story glorifies success) or deserving of caution (when the story accentuates failure)”
(Pacanowsky & O’Donnell-Trujillo, 1982, p. 139). Stories appeared in conversations, interviews,
and informal discussions and ranged from an account of something that happened in the past or
as examples of particular points (Schwartzman, 1993). The stories that were told by DRO
members reinforced the organizational culture by emphasizing the service mission of the DRO,
helping them cope with tragedy, warnings about safety in responding to emergencies, and not to
let clients “take advantage of the system”.
As a perceived newcomer to the organization, the researcher was told stories by members
as a way to socialize her to the cultural values and rules of the organization that members adhere
to (Driskill & Brenton, 2005, p.44). Because the DRO culture had established stable yet
permeable boundaries (Stohl & Putnam, 1994), members freely shared stories with the researcher
and other non-members. The researcher was even told by volunteer leader Jim that one of their
goals in the beginning of the project was to recruit her to become a DRO volunteer as a result of
her research on the organization (quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb. 2011).
Service stories. The first kind of story told by members reinforced the non-profit
humanitarian mission of the organization and explained how the members were there to
compassionately serve the community in their time of need. One type of story was the “sincere
helping story” that reflected how members felt they were making a difference in the work they
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did. These stories were general or specific in nature. For example, Des, the DRO director, when
discussing the low salary of DRO staff members, talked about how DRO members were often
serving the most vulnerable members of the community in their time of need.
When I help kids, those are the best days. When disasters trickle down it is really bad for
kids. Stress sometimes causes parents to take out things on the kids. But if I give food or
comfort to them for night, I feel good. I know that night that they have
something…People are proud, they used to work but now they are unemployed and also
lost their house [in a fire]. So I worry about kids and senior citizens. (Des interview, Feb.
2011)
So Des reinforced in the story that the regional DRO provided a valuable service to the
community.
In another instance, during the quarterly meeting, Jim, a volunteer leader, talked to the
volunteers about how taking time to be with clients in their time of need was an important part of
their job. A volunteer then supported and reinforced this organizational value by sharing a short
example of taking time with clients was important.
Jim: We want to spend extra 5-10 minutes to comfort them [clients] and give them ideas
on things they can do to help themselves. That part of job is just as important as things
we give them. Try to dry their tears, maybe try to get them to laugh. We don’t want to
be on a race course. Five minutes is not going to change our life but may change theirs.
These small things give credence to the [DRO] and shows that we have heart.
DAT Volunteer: Once I helped two brothers. One brother felt overwhelmed and was
glad to get information from me and the [DRO] to help empower him to take care of his
family. (quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb. 2011)
The researcher looked around during this exchange and saw many volunteers nodding
their heads in agreement, which indicated supporting this organizational practice.
Sincere stories of service also conveyed how the volunteers went above and beyond the
job to be there for the people affected by a fire. During one interview about what DRO
volunteers do, Jim, offered the following story. “There was a fire where a 13 year old autistic
boy was the fatality. We talked to family and neighbors and learned that the autistic boy started
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the fire. I remember talking to the family. Later, I went to the funeral and was only white guy
there, but the family was so thankful and touched that I came” (Jim interview, Dec. 2010). These
types of stories were effective ways to promote an expectation and commitment from volunteers
to do their job on nights, weekends, and holidays because they were providing valuable services
to people in their time of need and also emotional support and compassion to people who may
have lost everything.
These stories also reflected the service culture of the organization and were told to
outsiders by members or disseminated through electronic communications to encourage others in
the community to volunteer or donate money to the organization. For example, after the Joplin
tornado destroyed much of the town in May 2011, Des and a DRO volunteer spent two weeks
providing services on behalf of the National DRO. The chapter DRO blog told their story as well
as posted the pictures that Des took. The pictures showed the devastation from the tornado but
also included several pictures of Des and the DRO volunteer wearing their gear and handing out
supplies or giving a young girl a teddy bear (DRO chapter blog, June, 2011). These verbal and
visual stories told a story to the public how the DRO was serving people in time of need and how
the organization relied on volunteers and donations from the public to fulfill their service
mission.
Coping and safety stories. A second kind of story told by members helped members
cope with the tragic situations and sometimes gruesome images of death and destruction that
they came in contact with. These stories were often told at social occasions or during down time
when volunteer teams members were traveling from call to call. These stories often highlighted
extreme cases and were told in a humorous light, similar to “war stories” often told between
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soldiers. For example, when the researcher was at the volunteer Christmas party, she sat with the
team she would be going on calls with the following week.
During dinner I sit and listen as the DRO team starts to trade stories of their experiences
on fire calls. I hear stories of people showing prison ID as their only form of
identification, a blind woman suddenly not blind when she needs to walk out of the
house, and people who set fires deliberately. They then talk about animals in fires - cats
burned or dying from smoke inhalation, pit bulls in yards, mice in a house sitting on a
burned out stove staring at them. These stories are often told in a jolly tone and people
around laugh. Jim says that fire trucks now carry masks to revive cats, dogs, and now
snakes. The others at the table laugh and say that he must be joking.
Tom tells a story that there was a guy whose house burned and the house was in the
family for 3 generations. The front brick façade was there but as soon as they walked
through the front door, everything was charcoal and they could see nothing but sky. The
guy was really mad - they told him that if he didn’t calm down, they were going to leave.
They guy replied, “I’ve been drinking and smoking pot since this happened trying to
calm down.” Much laughter followed the story.
At one point, Jim looks at me [the researcher] and says that he must think we are
insensitive because we talk about clients like that. Bob says it is a way to debrief and
stay sane, but they only do it in the van away from the client. Tom then adds, “Then we
must be the sanest van around,” to much laughter. (Christmas party, Dec. 2010)
As in this case, these stories were often very tragic - homes are destroyed and pets die. But the
stories were told in a humorous way and helped bond the team together because they had gone
through similar experiences. They also gave members a way to cope by providing context.
The researcher also observed, when accompanying a volunteer team on fire calls, how
these fire stories as well as sharing personal information with each other created a bond between
volunteer team members. In the down times in the van between calls, the volunteer team often
shared personal stories with other members such as asking about how family is doing, how their
jobs or classes are going, and what the food is like at a restaurant they drive by. The stories were
a combination of sincerity and joking with each other and the team included the researcher in
many of the conversations. The team also took time to share fire stories with the researcher like
the following.
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The three of them then start telling stories about some houses that have been firebombed
in the past or deliberately set by others. Sue says that sometimes people will claim that
they don’t know how the fire started when clearly it was arson. Tom then tells a story
about a time when they were asking a client how a fire started and the person said they
didn’t know but on the wall behind them was spray painted, “That is what happens when
you sleep with someone’s husband.” They all laugh at this story. (DRO volunteer team
fire call, Dec. 2010)
This story was meant to reassure the researcher that although they sometimes went into
dangerous situations, DRO volunteers had not been hurt because the public knew the role of the
organization was to help them. Sharing this story bonded the team together and helped them cope
with dangerous situations by reminding themselves that people don’t harm DRO volunteers. It
also helped allay the concerns of the newcomer about personal safety since they were traveling
to a recently firebombed home.
In addition, stories helped newcomers learn how to stay safe on a fire call. During the
Christmas party, the researcher was told by DRO volunteer Sue what she needed to wear when
going out on calls. They included wearing warm clothes that I don’t mind getting smoky, a hat
and gloves (because it’s December and very cold out), and hard toed and soled shoes because
there is a lot of broken glass and nails on the ground (Sue, Dec. 2010). Proper clothing was
subtly reinforced through a story later shared by Tom over dinner.
I thought people used to not keep their house well because there are piles of stuff
everywhere as we examine a house. But then I learned that firefighters cause most of the
damage because they are throwing stuff out of closets, turning over furniture, breaking
windows and putting holes in the roof just to get to the fire and put it out. (Tom, Dec.
2010)
This story and a previous story about stressed and potentially dangerous animals that were left at
houses after a fire were recalled by the researcher as she went out on her first fire call.
We then decide to get out of the van and do a walk around the house to see what we can
determine. Tom and Dwayne go to the front of the house, while Susan and I walk around
to the side. Susan points up with her flashlight to show that the window at the top of the
house is broken out, but the first floor windows and door look normal. We then go
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around to the back and walk up onto a back deck. I see a cage that looks big enough for a
dog and start to get a little nervous after hearing the stories from them about frightened
and therefore sometimes violent animals. But there is no dog in sight so I relax and go
back to the task at hand….Tom and Dwayne then join us on the back porch and I caution
them about being careful on the deck because there are several floorboards missing.
(DRO volunteer team fire call, Dec. 2010)
The previous stories socialized the researcher to what dangers to expect at a fire call and made
her more aware of keeping herself and the other team members safe.
Client scam stories. Finally, stories showed how the DRO had policies in place to ensure
the safety of its volunteers and protect members and donors’ money from being swindled. Ken
shared with the researcher in one interview that if they get a call about a fire, they will call the
fire station within that jurisdiction to verify that a fire recently did take place.
There’s a safety issue here to, because occasionally…once in a while we will get a call
that can be bogus, and we [call to] verify the fire and we find, “Oh there was no fire, fire
department doesn’t have anything. “And the fire department will go back two, three
weeks and say, “We don’t have anything at this address,” we’re not gonna send anyone
out in harm’s way. ‘Cause some people, some, it’s not often, will try to be creative and if
there’s a vacant house or if a house fire, how do I put this, it’s a vacant house that was
recently on fire and some have tried to say they live there at the vacant house. So that’s
why we verify. (Ken interview, March 2011)
This need for verification that a fire took place and that the clients do live at that address was a
recurring type of “client scam” story that was told to the researcher. These stories often
juxtaposed the desire to help people who are in need, but also be aware of those who may try to
deceive you to get services. In discussing what DRO volunteer teams do on a fire call, Jim, a
volunteer leader, made the following observation.
DRO teams go to the client and do a damage assessment of house to determine needs of
family. The team gets information from the chapter dispatcher - family name, address,
contact number, crossroads of where house located, how many people living in house.
Our job is to disseminate information and see if what they (DRO teams) are seeing
matches what was told to the chapter. We require ID that confirms that head of house
lives at residence. We want to give [services] to people who deserve it – they really live
in the house and really have 5 children. For example, if it’s reported there are 3-4
children in house then we count mattresses and determine who sleeps where. Remember
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when the person calls in they are traumatized so we do keep that in mind. A number of
times we have to go to the hospital to interview people. The job is distressing/disturbing
– We see dead animals and hurt children. Our job is to make sure the money we’re
spending, donated by individuals and companies, we need to make sure we are spending
it properly. Generally you can watch reactions and body language to tell good info and
fabricated info. 75% of fires [we respond to] are in [city]. Lots of people that we work
with have grown up without a lot. They are dependent on non-profits and the city and
know how things work and how to use it to their advantage. Our job is to make sure to
provide emergency services - put up people for maximum of 3 days, but normally 1-2
days. (Jim interview, Dec. 2010)
Another story told by Des, the DRO director, further highlighted this juxtaposition that
DRO members have to deal with.
If they were to take this [the DRO] out of the community - what a void. They get debit
cards and carry them around as a status symbol. Police have sometimes found cards
because they were used to cut up cocaine. We monitor the cards – You can use for 7 days
then they’re cut off. Each time you use a card it costs me $2. Cards are a status symbol.
(Des interview, Feb. 2011)
These stories seemed to serve two purposes. First, they reinforced the strict funding limits
that the National DRO had put in place for serving clients by the DRO members. There were
levels of services that could be given to clients depending on how damaged was the
house/apartment, how many people were living there (adults and children) and what time of
day/year the fire occurred. This information was on a laminated sheet and frequently referred to
by DRO members as they talked to the client during a fire call. Second, these stories highlighted
the funding issues the regional DRO chapter was having and reminded members how they
needed to be cautious about giving money to people who may want to take advantage of the
services the organization provides. As a result, DRO team members were seen giving rules and
advice to clients on how they can and cannot spend the money. This was observed during a fire
call when the DRO team explained to a client how the debit cards worked.
Sue tells the owner that she is giving them $____ for food. She then tells him the same
thing she told the family the previous night about getting the most out of their money by
going to McDonalds rather than buying steaks. When she tells him that he cannot use the
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money for cigarettes, alcohol or firearms, the owner replies that he hasn’t had a drink for
over a year. Dwayne congratulates him. Dwayne then says that he shouldn’t let tonight
tempt him to drink either. The guy says that he won’t drink tonight…Sue then puts the
card into an envelope and writes the amount of money on the back top of the
envelope…Tom then says he is also putting the voucher for the hotel in the envelope and
tells him that he needs to give it to the front desk when they arrive and the [DRO] will get
charged for the hotel room instead of them. He also says that the voucher is only for the
cost of the room and nothing else. Susan hands the envelope to the owner who thanks her
and then takes out the credit card to put into his wallet. (DRO volunteer team fire call,
Dec. 2010)
This advice by DRO volunteers reinforced the funding policies of the National DRO, by warning
their clients to make wise choices in spending the money.
This tension between fulfilling DRO’s mission by serving the clients and being good
stewards of the organization’s money may have caused confusion and frustration for some
members. The regional DRO staff addressed this issue by telling stories that upheld that the
need to serve the clients should always be the deciding factor between the two. For example, Des
related how during a series of fires during a windstorm, the DRO “helped the homeless as well
because we are a neutral agency” (Des interview, Oct. 2010). At the quarterly volunteer meeting,
Jim instructed the group on how to complete the paperwork correctly so the staff doesn’t have to
reconcile missing paperwork with what they need to enter into the national CAS database (Feb.
2011). Jim also told members that they should err on the side of helping people. “If they need it,
we owe them seasonal garments and we should provide it” (quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb. 2011).
This indicated that the local chapter DRO chose to reinforce their chapter’s service culture.
However this choice may be more difficult in the future if tension continues between National
DRO’s policies and local chapter’s DRO culture. This will be discussed further in chapter five.
Organizational stories told by DRO members socialized newcomers as well as constituted
values or morals that members should adhere to or avoid. The stories told by DRO members
reinforced the organizational culture by emphasizing the service mission of the DRO, as well as
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helped them cope with tragedy, warned them how to safely respond to emergencies, and not to
let clients “take advantage of the system”. While most of these stories helped members learn how
to become a committed member of the organization and deal with the unique challenges of the
job, they also reflected policies and expectations of National DRO to spend money wisely and
not let the public take advantage of their kindness. While the later stories took some of the
idealism out of the service and humanitarian culture of the organization, the leadership of the
DRO emphasized that members should choose helping others over saving money.
The final construct that helped reveal the organizational culture of the DRO was symbols,
which is discussed next.
Symbols
Symbols are physical objects or non-verbal acts that “serve as a vehicle for conveying
meaning, usually by representing another thing” (Trice & Beyer, 1984, p. 655). Symbols help
reinforce norms, values, and meanings by organizational members and may get carried into
interactions with outsiders where members may assume that others understand their meaning.
For the regional DRO, the organization’s logo, member dress, and office bulletin boards served
as symbols that communicated the DRO’s service culture and values of the organization.
DRO logo. The DRO’s logo was ubiquitous throughout the local DRO chapter; and on a
national level has also become synonymous with humanitarian disaster relief by the public.
Historically, the DRO logo’s shape and colors were chosen to resemble the neutrality and
impartiality of a country during wartime (New Employee Guide, 2006). Therefore, their logo
reflected an organization that helped the wounded on the battlefield, regardless of nationality,
race, religion or political beliefs. Today, the logo is still seen as a powerful symbol of help and
humanitarianism to victims of fires and other disasters. When local elementary school children
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were asked to draw pictures of what the DRO’s services meant to them, every picture but one
included the logo and in one picture the DRO people were personified by the logo itself (Little
Red Book, n.d.).
The DRO knew the symbolic power of their logo and put it on everything it could to
promote this positive identity. Some examples included member clothing and gear,
communications such as the website, social media, and marketing and preparedness materials,
vehicles, tents and tablecloths where they work at festivals or fundraising events, and kits such as
disaster preparedness, comfort care, and first aid. They even had temporary logo tattoos that
were handed out by Des at a high school DRO club meeting as they were popular with younger
people (DRO club mtg., Jan. 2011). In addition, organizational pictures and videos almost
always included someone (volunteers or members) or something (vehicles, shelters, bags) with
the logo providing aid or compassion to disaster victims. For example, on a postcard the DRO
handed out, it explained what they do and how one can contact the regional DRO in three
languages (English, Spanish, and Arabic). The one picture included showed the logo 4 times –
once on a vehicle, on three hats, and on a comfort care kit being handed to a person wrapped in a
blanket (DRO postcard, n.d.).
The ubiquity of the logo helped promote the mission of the organization, but the logo also
served as a way to keep organizational members safe. DRO members were often asked to go
into disaster areas or dangerous neighborhoods where a fire occurred to serve clients. Members
felt that by wearing clothing or driving a vehicle with the logo, they didn’t have to worry about
people hurting them. As Jim, a volunteer leader, explained, “Volunteers wear DRO vest because
we want people to know we’re helping. It’s also a safety issue, but we’ve never had an incident
where a DRO volunteer was harmed. We go into bad areas, but people have respect for DRO and
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know we’re there to help” (Jim interview, Dec. 2010). During the quarterly volunteer meeting,
Jim also made a “PR and safety announcement” for volunteers to “always wear your vest and use
the 4-way flashers on the van. This brings attention to you and DRO and also identifies you”
(Feb. 2011). This feeling of helping and safety while being identified by the DRO logo has
become a part of the local chapter’s DRO culture. For example, while the researcher was
accompanying a DRO volunteer team to a fire call, Tom said to the researcher, “We go into
some bad areas in [city], but nothing has ever happened to a [DRO] volunteer while we are in
these neighborhoods because they know we are there to help” (DRO volunteer team fire call,
Dec. 2010). Thus, the DRO logo reinforced the humanitarian mission and service culture of the
organization, which was widely recognized and respected by members and people in the local
community. This in turn, kept DRO members safe when responding to fire calls in dangerous
neighborhoods.
Member dress. As previously stated, the DRO logo was often found on clothing and
gear that members and volunteers wore. This “uniform” worn by DRO members and volunteers
served two purposes. First, like many other crisis response organizations, the clothing and gear
served as a uniform to identify DRO members and gave them access to sites so they could
engage in emergency and disaster relief efforts. Once a volunteer completed the 3 month
training, they were assigned to a disaster response team and given a DRO vest, hat and
organizational ID card (Jim interview, Dec. 2010). This presentation of DRO clothing and ID
symbolized the volunteers becoming full members of the organization. Volunteers could also use
their ID card, which they wore attached to a DRO lanyard around their neck, to bypass the
security station at the entrance of the chapter headquarters and electronically open certain locked
doors in the building.
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In addition, their clothing and ID cards gave them access to fire scenes and DRO shelters.
For example, at the shelter meeting and simulation, Mario, a DRO staff member told the State
Animal Response Team (SART) members, “Each [DRO] volunteer at a shelter has a [DRO] hat,
vest, and ID on so you know who are the clients and who are staff” (SART mtg., Nov. 2010). In
another instance, the researcher asked DRO staff member Ken if there were certain credentials
that DRO members needed to gain access to emergency or disaster areas. He said they did for
large Level 3 disasters because that brought in the National DRO and federal agencies. But for
most emergencies or disaster that were Level 1 (home and small level apartment fires) or Level 2
(larger apartment fires and local disasters needing shelters), “Not really…no because they see the
DRO van and the vest. And they, the city, they want us there. I mean they called us, so they want
to get us in there as quickly as possible” (Ken interview, March 2011). The researcher was also
introduced to clients by the DRO volunteer team as a member of the DRO because she was
wearing a DRO vest given to her by the DRO manager (DRO volunteer team fire call, Dec.
2010). So the DRO clothing and ID cards served as a uniform signifying membership into the
organization as well as access privileges for members and volunteers to the chapter headquarters
and most fire and disaster sites.
Second, members often wore their DRO clothing and gear when not engaging in DRO
business. This symbolized their pride in being a member of the organization and commitment to
the organization and its role in the community. The researcher often observed DRO volunteers
and staff members wearing other DRO labeled clothing, pins, bags, and hats that weren’t part of
the uniform given to them when they joined. Jim explained that members bought shirts and other
goods themselves or were given as gifts by staff (interview, Dec. 2010). The DRO pins also
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served to identify years of service, disasters they worked, or people they had met from other
DRO chapters.
The DRO Chief Operating Officer gives Tom, a volunteer team leader, three DRO pins
that look fairly old. Tom seems touched by the gesture and thanks the guy. He then gives
me a pin to keep. He says that the pins that everyone is wearing get traded by volunteers
across the country at DRO workshops or seminars like Olympic pins. Some pins identify
certain chapters, while others identify certain disasters that they have worked. He says
that sometimes the volunteers get a little crazy trying to trade and collect pins at these
events. My pin says “Hurricane Season 2005” on the top and bottom in gold letters,
shows the southeast section of the US (gulf coast) and a hurricane symbol like you see on
the weather channel in the Gulf Coast. Next to the states in the Gulf of Mexico is the
DRO logo. This pin was obviously handed out to those volunteers who helped with
Katrina relief efforts in the Gulf Coast in 2005. (DRO Christmas Party, Dec. 2010)
At DRO social events or more casual events, such as the Christmas party, Recognition Dinner,
and Saturday morning quarterly volunteer meeting, almost all members were wearing a DRO
shirt, jacket, hat, bag, or lanyard with various DRO pins tacked on. If they weren’t wearing DRO
clothing, they typically chose to wear red clothing, one of the organization’s colors, or a DRO
pin on their lapel or tie. At the Saturday morning SART meeting and simulation, the researcher
hadn’t yet met any DRO staff, but she could easily identify DRO volunteers and staff by the
DRO gear they were wearing (Nov. 2011). Interestingly, none of the SART members
representing other organizations wore clothing that identified them with their organization.
In addition, during the quarterly volunteer meeting Des suggested that volunteers wear
their clothing in the community to help bring more recognition to the organization.
We are all we’ve got. If you can be seen, be seen. We don’t have an identity in the
community anymore even though we are a widely known brand. We do it so well and in
the middle of the night all the time so it is not news. You guys are it. Each one of you is
media and marketing person. As long as you are doing the right thing and wearing the
right clothes, we want you to be labeled. (Des, quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb. 2011)
In response to this, many volunteers verbally agreed with Des or nodded their heads in approval.
This willingness to purchase other DRO clothing and gear and wear it in the community and
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during more social and casual times, symbolized their commitment to and pride as a member of
the DRO.
Office bulletin boards. In another example of organizational symbols, most of the
emergency services office areas at the DRO chapter building were fairly non-descript (rows of
cubicles, meeting rooms, dispatch area) except for the bulletin boards. Upon closer inspection,
the bulletin boards were a reflection of the culture of the organization. Much of the space was
filled with pictures of staff members and volunteers serving at disaster sites, fundraising events,
or special recognition events. Other pictures showed DRO’s connection with organizational
partners. In one, the city mayor was shaking a DRO member’s hand, and in another the manager
of DRO emergency services had his arm around the director of emergency disaster services for
the local Salvation Army chapter. Also on the board were letters to the DRO, one personal and
one from a city official, thanking them for providing services to families affected by a particular
fire. Other things included newsletters or newspaper articles that highlighted a DRO volunteer
from the chapter, with a handwritten sticky note giving kudos to the volunteer. Finally there was
a paper that detailed the major disaster events the DRO responded to in the metropolitan area
from 1997 to 2009 and what actions were taken by the organization. These items on the bulletin
board supported the values of the organizational culture – serving the community by responding
to fires and other disasters, partner relationships with city officials, non-profit organizations, and
the community, and recognizing and valuing the contributions of staff and volunteers. Since this
bulletin board was not located in a public space, it was meant to reinforce these values to DRO
members and volunteers.
Although not all artifacts are symbols of organizational culture, the organization’s logo,
member dress, and office bulletin boards became symbols of the DRO’s culture because they
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were used by organizational members to emphasize the DRO’s service culture and values of the
organization. Now that the four cultural constructs of vocabulary, rites and rituals, stories, and
symbols have been described, the following section explores how these constructs contributed to
a more open and collaborative culture of crisis response among the DRO and its members.
Crisis Response as Collaboration
As described in chapter one, an individual organization cannot manage a crisis event
alone because it simply does not have the necessary resources (e.g., information, money,
personnel, equipment, etc.). Moreover, uncoordinated actions can create unanticipated problems
for other stakeholders and actually make the crisis worse (Gray, 1985, p. 912 & 914). Although
the terms crisis coordination and crisis collaboration are often used interchangeably, they are two
distinct worldviews of crisis response. As discussed in chapter one, crisis coordination implies a
minimal level of involvement between organizations to achieve crisis response and mitigation, or
“mutually agreed upon cooperation about how to carry out particular tasks” (Quarantelli, 1997a,
p. 48). In this sense, two independent organizations can coordinate crisis response activities but
have minimal interaction and association with each other during a crisis. Crisis collaboration
means that crisis response organizations create an alliance in which they value
interorganizational interdependence, equal input of participants, and shared decision-making
(Keyton & Stallworth, 2003) in order to reach their shared goal of effective crisis response and
mitigation, even under severe time and decision-making pressures. Crisis collaboration in this
sense connotes a deeper partnership between organizations where the crisis response mission,
decisions, and activities are jointly established and carried out.
Figure 3 illustrates the regional DRO’s crisis response relationships with organizations at
both the local community level and national level. This figure was created by the researcher
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based on members’ descriptions in formal and informal interviews, researcher observations of
organizational activities, and the chapter disaster response plan. The boundary surrounding DRO
is not a solid line to demonstrate the fact that it is stable yet permeable. VOAD and MEOC are
represented in bold and italics to indicate that it is a collaborative group with representatives of
the connected organizations. The arrows illustrate the primary flow of communication, whether
in one direction or flowing freely between the two. If the arrow is a solid line then it represents
more of a crisis coordination relationship; if it is dotted then it represents a crisis collaborative
relationship. The circles serve as a reminder that these organizations have interdependence with
context. Therefore, past crisis experiences, history, economy, and politics affect the DRO and
other

organizations

at

a

local

community

and

Figure 3: DRO's crisis response relationship with other organizations.

national

level.
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As explained in chapter one, an organization’s culture can affect whether its members see
crisis response as crisis coordination or crisis collaboration. The regional DRO viewed crisis
response as crisis collaboration because of its awareness of how lack of resources resulted in its
interdependence on the community and other organizations, willingness to partner with other
organizations, and lack of organization culture barriers to collaboration.
It was true that some aspects of DROs crisis response can be initially viewed as crisis
coordination activities (e.g., MOUs, “gentlemen’s agreement”, delegating of tasks, etc.).
However their open and service oriented organizational culture and stable yet permeable
organizational boundaries elevated its crisis response worldview to one of crisis collaboration.
DRO members viewed their paramount goal as helping the victims of crisis, and chose to do so
through an egalitarian and decentralized culture. Their organizational culture also valued
interorganizational interdependence, equal participation, and shared decision-making. Although
there was some tension felt by DRO members when resources were tighter (e.g. restrictions from
National DRO, lack of funding, or lack of identity in the community), DRO leadership worked
hard to maintain good relationships with the organization most viewed as direct competition and
diffuse any “us versus them” feeling by DRO members. This worldview of crisis collaboration
was born out of the organizational culture and is delineated below.
Lack of Resources and Recognition of Interdependence
The DRO did not have the necessary resources to manage crisis response alone and
needed the community, crisis response organizations, and non-profit and social service
organizations to fulfill its mission. As stated earlier, the DRO engaged in many fundraising rites
and rituals because it had to rely on the local community for volunteer employees and money to
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fund their response. Therefore it was interdependent with the community in order to successfully
engage in crisis response. For example, the Chapter Disaster Response Plan stated,
When a disaster occurs, the chapter will immediately inform the community that [DRO]
disaster services are being provided to people impacted by the disaster. The community
will also be informed that the [DRO] is dependent upon voluntary contributions to
provide such disaster services and that all [DRO] disaster assistance is free. (2009, p.19)
This dependence on the community was communicated in its many fundraising and marketing
activities, such as tables at community events, website and social media updates during a local,
regional or national disaster response, and any marketing or disaster response communication
materials it distributed. The DRO was also dependent on the media to cover their response
activities, such as fire calls because that gave them recognition with the community. “Jim’s
probably the most outspoken person about the media, about us not having a lot of media ‘cause it
brings in money. You know, if a person sees it/ unfortunately people are/ sometimes people are
generally motivated to give money” (Ken interview, Feb. 2011).
The DRO also saw interdependence with other organizations as critical because they
simply did not have the personnel, shelter space, or money for all the services necessary for crisis
response. They needed the fire department to give them access to fire scenes so they could talk to
victims. Their close relationship with city fire departments often resulted in the fire department
giving victims at a fire scene the DRO’s 1-800 number, or the DRO would call the fire
department to verify a fire took place and there were people needing assistance before they
dispatched a volunteer team to the site (Jim, Dec. 2010). The DRO also had memorandums of
operation (MOUs) with cities in their jurisdiction to provide schools and recreation centers as
shelters. In addition, they relied on local churches and the Salvation Army to help supply food at
shelters. Finally, they worked with and wrote referrals to other volunteer agencies, such as food
pantries and other non-profit organizations to provide food, furniture, household items or other
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longer term care needs to their clients, who were often poor, underserved, and uninsured
members of the community. As Des stated, “Relationships with other agencies is key because my
budget is only 1 million - 2 million dollars per year for house fires, community disaster relief or
disaster relief response” (Des interview, Oct. 2010).
Some of this resource sharing among organizations did reflect more crisis coordination
activities, especially when organizations were providing services in their “expert” area of crisis
response. But there were many examples of the DRO recognizing and accepting its
interdependence with the community, the media, and other organizations so they could provide
the resources necessary for successful crisis response. The outcome of sharing of resources and
tasks was necessary in order to provide the most comprehensive services and assistance to fire
and disaster victims. This interdependence also helped the DRO view its relationships with those
organizations as partnerships rather than independent crisis response organizations working in
conjunction with one another.
Crisis Response as Partnerships
The DRO saw its relationship with other crisis response organizations as valuable
partners in what they do. The DRO used words and phrases like “partner”, “team”, and “we’re
there together” to convey a reciprocal crisis collaboration relationship of interdependence and
support among other organizations it interacted with for daily fire response and larger disasters
response. This relationship was reinforced when communicated in meetings to volunteer
members, on their website and social media, and in regular meetings with those organizations.
First, the DRO had a close relationship with other Volunteer Organizations Active in
Disasters (VOAD) in the region because they had a similar service mission in disaster relief. This
umbrella organization was started in the region in the late 1990s after a deadly tornado outbreak
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and the two organizations met quarterly. The DRO also met with other non-profit organizations
to explore partnership opportunities in disaster relief. In November 2010, for example, several
DRO members and the researcher attended a one-day meeting with a state animal response team
(SART) to discuss the possibility of co-sheltering of pets and their owners during a disaster.
Throughout the day DRO and SART members discussed their roles in sheltering humans and
pets and potential issues of health, safety, and managing volunteers if they were to set-up a coshelter.
There was one organization DRO managers described as their “largest partner” because
they often responded to the same fire calls and larger disasters. This organization was the
Salvation Army. These two organizations are the largest of the VOAD organizations and trade
off leadership of the VOAD every year. Though VOAD and their regular interactions, they have
developed a close working relationship. For example, if one organization arrived at a fire scene
and the other organization isn’t there yet, then they would give the other a call and pass along the
information (Ken, March 2011). If the DRO opened a shelter, the Salvation Army often provided
the food (Ken, March 2011). The researcher was able to observe this partnership when they
decided to open a joint service center at a local Salvation Army church to assist 25 families that
were involved in an apartment fire (Feb. 2011). This partnership and high degree of coordination
was maintained through regularly meetings with the leadership of the DRO and Salvation Army
who have developed a “gentlemen’s agreement” as to who does what in disaster relief.
The Salvation Army knows/we have a good relationship, Des, with the [Salvation Army]
director. So our agreement, our gentlemen’s agreement, Salvation Army will do the
feeding during the apartment fire, while we will do the case work assistance. So working
with partners, there’s different levels that we work with partners. So in the field at 2am,
it’s the Salvation Army; we’re there together. (Ken interview, March 2011)
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What elevated this partnership beyond one of crisis coordination to crisis collaboration
was its similar disaster relief mission and commitment by leadership from both organizations to
maintain a strong collaborative relationship rather than competitive one. Tacked on the bulletin
board in the DRO disaster services area is a picture of the DRO and Salvation Army leaders
smiling with their arms around each other’s shoulders. In another example, one of the
researcher’s interviews was terminated early because Ken and Des had to go to a meeting with
the Salvation Army. Des mentioned that they had to leave because there was some feuding going
on between some people in the two organizations. Des said before leaving, “We’re on the same
team so were gonna get that worked out” (Ken interview, Feb. 2011). Therefore, the crisis
response partnership between the organizations was a collaborative one.
When it came to larger disasters that required more sustained comprehensive
coordination, the DRO saw local emergency management agencies and the Federal Emergency
Response Agency (FEMA) as partners in disaster relief. The national headquarters of DRO had a
history of working closely with FEMA in major disasters and in 2010 signed a five-year
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) detailing their partnership. As Des explained, the MOA
“clearly states the [DRO] as lead response for Emergency Services 6 with FEMA. It lays out
what the [DRO] does, what FEMA does and what we do together. [For example] we will partner
with FEMA to do money and resources assessment” (Feb. 2011). FEMA also provided trainings
that the DRO recommended its staff and volunteers take (quarterly volunteer mtg., Feb. 2011)
and managed the National Shelter database that the DRO used. The DRO’s social media
websites also “followed” FEMA and frequently re-posted information on their social media sites
they think is valuable to their followers. At the local level, the DRO partnered with city
emergency management agencies when coordination of disaster services was needed. The city
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owned many of the properties that the DRO used and must unlock them so the DRO could set up
shelters. “And the reality is when we’re responding to a big disaster we can’t do anything
without the government partners, the emergency management. If we need a shelter open, we go
through them. So it always has to be a partnership ‘cause they’re the ones typically who call us,
emergency management” (Ken interview, Feb. 2011).
While the DRO is defined by the public during a crisis as the “shelter people” or experts
in providing food and shelter services, the regional DRO members recognize that all of their
crisis activities and capabilities cannot be done without the support and partnership of other
organizations (food, shelter locations, shelter database, training) and the community (volunteers,
funding). This is different from a coordination relationship that assumes that the organization can
provide most expected services on its own and coordinates activities to reduce redundancies with
similar service organizations. This distinction will be made clearer in chapter five when the
regional DRO organization is compared to the EMU MPD organization.
In addition, the DRO engaged in local disaster planning and exercises with these
organizations to enhance these partnerships. The role of the DRO in disaster response was
defined by DRO director Des as, “We are known as the shelter people” (interview, Dec. 2010).
Therefore, DRO’s role in local disaster planning and exercises was to make sure that their
organization members and volunteers had the proper training and knew their roles, that they were
organized, and that they had the supplies they need to set up a shelter (Ken interview, Feb.
2011). Ken also saw disaster exercises as a way to help other organizations understand what the
DRO does and doesn’t do in a response.
…we discover the challenges while we’re exercising. ‘Cause that’s when we say, “Oh,
no. We don’t do that.” We’ll be at the practice Emergency Operations Center role
playing…and someone from this particular city/we’re role playing with the city of Bravo,
the director of recreation, they’ll raise their hand and say, “Oh well the [DRO], you have
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3000 cots, you’re already gonna be at the community center.” And we’ll say, “No, we
won’t.” I’ll look at the director and say, “No, you’ll have to call us in advance and you
tell us where to park the trailer.” So the misconceptions but those aren’t so much
challenges. We’re learning about each other before the event. (Ken interview, Feb. 2011)
Participating in these disaster trainings and exercises were crisis response rituals because
they occurred regularly (mostly because of government regulation) and were an important part of
the overall culture of crisis response organizations. The DRO managers preferred these rituals to
just planning because, “a plan goes on a shelf until something gets going. What it takes is
exercises and remembering things from them, not pulling a plan off a shelf” (Des interview, Feb.
2011). The DRO felt these training activities and exercises create a shared understanding of what
each organizations role is in a local response and reinforced the idea that working together to
prepare for disasters lead to better overall crisis response effort.
I can’t promote exercises enough. That’s/if we’re going to one exercise a week, that’s
great ‘cause we’re learning about each other. And we have good relationships/there’s not
a whole lotta organizations that are responding to the big disasters…it’s all about predisaster to working together….Just networking and knowing…the cell phone numbers
and how to reach people at 2am. (Ken interview, Feb. 2011)
Again, this partnership with FEMA and emergency management agencies might at first
seem more like crisis coordination than crisis collaboration. However, as described previously in
this chapter, the DRO was willing to adopt the more paramilitaristic language and ICS training
used by emergency management agencies, first responder organizations (e.g. fire, police, EMS),
FEMA and DHS. The DRO leaders understood that by learning and using the emergency
management vocabulary and crisis response structures, they could more easily understand other
agencies and effectively communicate and share information with them during a crisis. The DRO
was willing to change parts of its organizational culture in order to better serve their
superordinate mission of providing relief to disaster victims. Therefore, this more closely aligns
the DRO with viewing crisis response as collaboration rather than coordination.
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The collaborative relationship between the DRO and these organizations can also be
explained because the DRO had three boundary spanning concepts that facilitated this
relationship (Batteau, Brandenburg, Seeger, and Eaton 2007). First, as discussed previously, the
DRO had boundary permeability because it was fluid it its membership and relied mostly on
volunteers. Second, it had institutional familiarity with these organizations because it regularly
participated with them in daily emergency response or crisis planning or exercises. Third, the
DRO had cultural similarity with VOAD and other non-profit organizations because of their
similar cultural values and structures. These boundary spanning concepts along with the lack of
barriers to crisis collaboration, assisted the DRO in having a culture of crisis collaboration. Next,
the DROs lack of barriers to crisis collaboration will be discussed.
Lack of Crisis Collaboration Barriers
Chapter one described how members from different organizations must overcome three
cultural barriers to enhance interorganizational collaboration in disaster response. The first
barrier, organizational expertise, is the “belief that only the membership possesses the proper
knowledge, skills, and orientations necessary to make decisions as to how the work is to be
performed and evaluated” (Van Maanen & Bradley, 1984). The DRO does claim expertise in
disaster relief; as Des stated, they are known as the “shelter people” (Des interview, Dec. 2010).
However, as stated previously, it readily accepted others’ assistance in the role of sheltering
people, particularly since they, the DRO, didn’t have the resources to do so. Salvation Army and
religious organizations provided food. City emergency management agencies and city officials
provided schools and recreation centers as the physical location for shelters. Social service
agencies sometimes located personnel at shelters to provide mental health, counseling, and other
social services. Police departments added shelters to their patrol unit routes to give people and
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workers a sense of safety and security. SART may work with the DRO to help owners co-shelter
their pets. Finally, the DRO developed a process for managing spontaneous volunteers from the
community who wanted to help disaster victims at shelters. The DRO took leadership and
primary management responsibility of running the shelters, but did not assume they needed to be
the sole provider of all services in the shelter
The DRO also was willing to participate in any local crisis planning and response
exercises, even if it was just providing volunteers to be victims in an active shooter exercise,
because, “It is sometimes good to see things from the other side” (Jim, quarterly volunteer mtg.,
Feb. 2011). This helped DRO members better understand what victims experienced while also
helping those organizations more effectively practice their crisis response plans.
A second barrier to crisis collaboration, competition between organizations, results when
organizations having to vie against each other for public attention in order to secure the same
pool of limited resources or funding available (Isbell & Goldstein, 2006; Granot, 1997). The
members of the DRO did feel competition, most regularly with the Salvation Army, because they
had similar missions of providing disaster relief to victims. This tension got amplified as a result
of two circumstances. First, the DRO’s national headquarters changed its policy to funnel local
funds raised during a national disaster to the national headquarters. Then, the current economic
recession resulted in fewer donations by the community to local non-profit organizations.
Combined, the local DRO acutely felt pressure to get more recognition from local media and the
community for its disaster relief operations so it could raise the funds necessary to complete its
mission. Therefore, when the Salvation Army and the DRO responded to the same apartment fire
and only the Salvation Army was initially mentioned by media covering the event, DRO
members were upset (volunteer quarterly mtg., Feb. 2011). Members also spoke to the researcher
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at times about how the Salvation Army didn’t have as much bureaucracy as did the DRO. They
felt this made it easier for that organization to respond quickly to fires and disasters. “The
Salvation Army just responds and the [DRO] is all about paperwork. Even today the [DRO] is so
into documentation, the numbers and mechanics of it” (Des interview, Feb. 2011).
This scarcity of resources could have resulted in a sense of competition and mistrust
between the organizations. However, the DRO and Salvation Army leadership observed how in
1997 after a terrible tornado outbreak in the region, competition between the two organizations
resulted in a “horrible response” where the organizations were “fighting over victims” (Des
informal interview, Feb. 2011). The organizations’ leadership then decided to form a local
VOAD group and have a more collaborative relationship. Therefore, when tensions arose
between the two groups, they met to “work it out” (Ken interview, Feb. 2011). In the quarterly
volunteer meeting, when members were upset at the Salvation Army getting recognition and not
the DRO, leadership focused on how the organization could better market itself to the
community. It also reinforced the collaborative relationship during that meeting by asking for
DRO volunteers to work a joint service center run by the two organizations out of a Salvation
Army office the following day. DRO maintained a crisis collaboration view of crisis response by
focusing on the superordinate goal of helping disaster victims rather than competing for
individual resources.
A third barrier to crisis collaboration is the unit diversity of organizations involved in
crisis response. Granot (1997) described this as the following.
Some organizations are highly disciplined, others disorderly; some with sharp
hierarchical structure, others informal and egalitarian; in some authoritarian decisionmaking prevails, while others tend towards democratic sharing…Organizations may
range from frank openness about their activities to-closed-mouth secrecy. (p. 306)
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In other words, DRO’s more open, volunteer based, and service-oriented culture may have
conflicted with a more authoritative, hierarchical, and closed organizational culture (such as the
MPD described in chapter four). What determines though whether the DRO was more
collaborative was how it dealt with these culture clashes. Again, the DRO chose to have more of
a crisis collaboration worldview of crisis response. It understood its interdependence with others’
for successful crisis response and therefore saw them as partners in the superordinate goal of
providing disaster relief to victims. It was willing to adopt some of the language, training, and
ICS command and control structure in order to be able to participate in larger crisis response
efforts. DRO volunteers also came from a wide variety of other crisis response organizations,
either as current employees or recently retired. DRO members were emergency managers, school
principals, nurses, fire fighters, business leaders, and social workers. This allowed members to
act as boundary spanners with other organizations as they had previous trusted relationships with
members and understood their unique organizational culture. This also facilitated boundary
permeability of the organization. This distinction will be discussed further in chapter five as it is
compared to the EMU MPD’s culture.
Summary
The local chapter of the Disaster Relief Organization (DRO) had an organizational
culture that was open and service-oriented, viewed volunteers as committed and valued members
of the organization, and recognized themselves and other crisis response organizations as
collaborative partners in providing successful crisis response to their local community. But over
the past ten years, historical, political, and economic factors at the national level of the DRO
have resulted in the implementation by National DRO of more structures, policies, and processes
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on local DRO chapters. These have been conflicting with the local DRO’s organizational culture
and resulted in frustration by organizational members towards the national level organization.
Organizational members believed in and were committed the service mission and values
of the DRO and this was reflected in their language, rites and rituals, stories, and symbols. The
humanitarian focus of the organization was reflected in its use of service language. Volunteers
were recognized for serving the DRO and the community publicly through their website and
social media and through rites of integration such as the annual Christmas party and Volunteer
Recognition dinner. Volunteer training rituals included an online orientation class that describes
the organization’s history of disaster relief services and organizational principles of humanity,
neutrality, and impartiality. Stories shared by organizational members reflected their compassion
and willingness to serve the community in their time of need, including vulnerable populations
of such as the homeless, children, elderly, and those of low socio-economic status. Artifacts such
as the DRO logo, member dress, and the DRO bulletin boards reinforced this service culture
recognized by both members and those outside of the organization.
The DRO’s organizational culture was more open than closed because they recognized
other crisis response organizations and persons as necessary collaborators to provide successful
disaster response services to their community. DRO members and volunteers often referred to
other organizations they worked with as partners. This relationship was reinforced when
communicated in meetings to volunteer members, on their website and social media, and in
regular meetings with those organizations. Disaster trainings and exercises were rituals that
created institutional familiarity and reinforced the idea that working together to prepare for
disasters lead to better overall crisis response effort.
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Over the past ten years, historical, political, and economic factors at the national level of
the DRO have tarnished its public image as a humanitarian disaster relief organization. These
factors have naturally resulted in the implementation of more structures, policies, and processes
on local DRO chapters justified under the motto “We are all one [DRO]”. The ritual of
fundraising and communicating need to the public after major disasters was now outlined by the
Disaster Fundraising Action Plan and telethon money was funneled to the national DRO. Client
casework detailing services provided after fires was entered into the national DRO’s “Client
Assistance System” database by regional DRO caseworkers. Volunteers were trained either
through the national DRO website or through curriculum provided by them to ensure that they
are learning and committing to the rules and values communicated by the national DRO.
The standardization and centralization of decision-making put in place by National DRO
have been conflicting with the regional DRO’s organizational service and local community
focused culture and resulted in frustration by organizational members towards the national
organization. Members had taken to calling national headquarters “National”. This term was
often said in a tone that conveyed frustration and a “Big Brother” feeling the headquarters’
bureaucratic policies and processes embodied. Some members also felt that these processes
prevent them from responding quickly to meet the needs of clients. These policies and constant
concerns for fundraising made it more difficult for the regional DRO to create long-term
fundraising relationships with the local community and made members more suspicious of
clients who might “take advantage of the system” to get money or services.
This was also a local versus national tension in terms of who has the right to make
decisions at the community level. There is a tension with the DRO because they felt National
was taking that control away. The regional DRO doesn’t have a choice but to accept the
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additional restrictions and bureaucratic processes of the national organization, especially since
most of the funding stream now trickles from national to regional/local chapters. This tension
mainly exists because it was now an organizational culture clash between the National and
regional DRO organization and a feeling that the regional DRO is losing its identity and place in
the local community.
To deal with this tension between the national DRO and the regional DRO chapter,
leaders tried to come up with creative community-based fundraising ideas and encouraged
members to always err on the side of serving the clients. This helped the regional DRO feel like
they were preserving their organizational culture of service and openness.
Finally, the DRO viewed crisis response as crisis collaboration because of its lack of
resources, willingness to partner with other organizations, and lack of organization culture
barriers to collaboration. It was true that some aspects of DROs crisis response were crisis
coordination activities (e.g. MOUs, “gentlemen’s agreement”, delegating of tasks, etc.).
However their open and service oriented organizational culture elevated its worldview to crisis
collaboration. DRO members viewed their ultimate goal as helping the victims of crisis, not to
gain credit as sole responders. Their organizational culture also valued interorganizational
interdependence, equal participation, and shared decision-making. Although there was some
tension felt by DRO members when resources were tighter (e.g. restrictions from National DRO,
lack of funding, or lack of identity in the local community), DRO leadership worked hard to
maintain good relationships with organizations and diffuse any “us versus them” feeling by DRO
members. However, lack of full-time staffing combined with this crisis collaboration worldview
may prevent the DRO from reaping the benefits of equal participation and shared decision-
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making, especially when other organizations do not share the same worldview or organizational
culture.
The next chapter describes the crisis related organizational cultural features of the
metropolitan police department (MPD) and its view of crisis response. The MPD is a different
kind of organization with a unique structure, culture, and view of interorganizational crisis
response.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS: METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT
Different crisis response organizations have distinct organizational cultures and
communication practices. Moreover, these differences may affect coordination or collaboration
when organizations are working together during a crisis response. The previous chapter
described the organizational culture and communication practices of a regional chapter of a
disaster relief organization (DRO). This chapter describes the crisis related organizational
cultural features of the Emergency Management Unit of the Metropolitan Police Department
(EMU MPD). It also examines how the organizational culture is enacted through communication
practices between members. The EMU MPD is a different kind of organization with a unique
culture, vocabulary and structure. Therefore, this chapter initially describes the EMU MPD’s
cultural constructs of vocabulary, rites and rituals, stories, and symbols and how together they
are communicated through members, documents, and policies. These combined to create an
organizational culture that was generally authoritarian, bureaucratic and closed to out-group
members or organizations.

The chapter then explores how EMU MPD’s organizational

communication culture influenced its view of interorganizational crisis response with other
organizations. Finally, this chapter will demonstrate how the EMU MPD was collaborative with
a larger macroculture of law enforcement and first responder organizations with similar crisis
response cultures, but bureaucratic in coordination with organizations with dissimilar crisis
response cultures that were not part of the macroculture.
Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)
As described in chapter two, The Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) not only
handled emergencies on a daily basis, but was often the “first line of response for public safety

140
and security” during a crisis, including “preserving life and protecting property” (FEMA, 2013).
The emergency management unit (EMU) of the MPD specifically handled crisis and emergency
response including bomb threats, hostage situations, and terrorist threats, among others.
Therefore, this unit of the MPD was the primary focus of this study.
The EMU MPD is part of a larger city government structure (see Figure 4). Along with
the MPD are other first responder units such as the fire department and EMS, city services such
as department of transportation (DOT) and public works (water, sewage), and Homeland
Security and Emergency Management (HSEM) (City government website, 2012).

HSEM

oversees the larger crisis response collaborating group, the Metropolitan Emergency Operations
Center (MEOC).

Figure 4: EMU MPD's organizational structure within the larger city government
structure.
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The emergency management unit of the MPD was created in 2002, after the events of
9/11 and because the city was situated along an active international border (Michael interview,
March 2011). Its mission was primarily “to protect the citizens of the city from acts of terrorism
or criminal activity” (Michael interview, March 2011). Officially, there are five people in the
unit, but they oversee other “special skills” response units, such as the bomb squad, special
response team (SRT aka SWAT), harbor patrol/dive team, Metropolitan Intelligence Operations
Center (MIOC), and K-9 (Sam interview, Nov. 2010). Unlike other MPD units, they are “on
call” 24 hours a day (5 days on, 2 days off) unless on vacation. Frequency of calls varies by unit
and time of year, however holidays are typically higher demand times for SRT and dive teams.
The bomb squad unit “gets the most calls”; approximately “1-4 times per week” (Sam interview,
Nov. 2010). The bomb squad and dive teams are regional teams as well that can respond if
requested by neighboring jurisdictions (Sam interview, Dec. 2010). The unit also provides crisis
security planning and specialized response support for major events in the city such as large
trade shows, protests/parades/holiday celebrations, and major professional events such as the
NFL Super Bowl and the MLB All-Star Game. During the time of the study, the EMU MPD was
involved in security planning for the annual Auto Show, which draws some 750,000 people to a
downtown convention center.
Organizational Culture
As described in chapter one, organizational culture frames how organizational members
subjectively create shared patterns of symbols and meanings through communication that
defines, guides, and sometimes constrains their everyday thoughts and behaviors in
organizational life. This is a continuous and dynamic process that centrally locates
communication as the process that helps organizational members create and maintain
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organizational culture and boundaries. To better understand the organizational culture of the
MPD, the four cultural constructs of vocabulary, rites and rituals, stories, and symbols are
described to create a “thick” description of how the organization views crisis response and its
role in it.
Vocabulary
Words are the essential way in which we communicate and, in the case of organizational
culture, are an important way members distinguish their organization from other organizations.
Words and word choice in essence signal membership. Words and language also encode culture
and through their use enact that culture. In this case, the vocabulary of the MPD is a product of
its paramilitaristic background and security-focused mission. This reinforced the authoritative
and bureaucratic structure of the organization to members and those outside the organization. In
addition, since this vocabulary was also shared by a larger macroculture that included other law
enforcement, and emergency management agencies, it allowed the MPD to more easily
communicate and coordinate with those related groups. Finally, this shared vocabulary allowed
the MPD to assert its authority and demonstrate expertise. This specialized vocabulary excluded
outsiders or forced out-group organizations to adapt to their vocabulary in order to participate in
crisis response efforts.
Paramilitaristic and hierarchical language. The MPD as a law-enforcement
organization can be considered a paramilitary organization. Although it is not a military arm of
the government, it is considered a paramilitary organization as it “resembles them [military] in
organization, equipment, training or mission” (“Military Terms”, 2011). Therefore, the MPD
often used a vocabulary that paralleled military organizations.
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The first set of terms defined the hierarchical levels of people in the MPD and other law
enforcement agencies. This was similar to the ranks or levels found in the military. The lowest
ranks of police officers were called “Uniforms” or “Patrol”. Specialized units that operated
during large events were often referred to as “plainclothes” or “P.I. Teams”. These units were
made up of local and state police detectives, members of EMU MPD, or officers from federal
agencies. Patrol or Uniforms were given more menial roles such as traffic control or general
perimeter security while “plainclothes” were given more decision-making authority or the
responsibility of spotting potential threats. This group was especially employed when they
wanted to maintain security at large events that they thought could be terrorist targets but not
make the public uncomfortable. “Don’t want them to think it is a police state…Okay for
uniforms to patrol corridors, but only plainclothes inside” (Bruce, MPD, Auto Show mtg., Nov.
2010).
Members of the MPD were also separated into “units” or “commands” with
“commanding officers”, “supervisors”, or the OIC (Officer in charge) giving orders “on scene”
of an emergency response.

“I have a meeting with all commanding officers and they

communicate to their troops. I don’t micromanage - I give direction and they carry out the
mission to the troops. I identify weaknesses and gaps and provide strategy to overcome
shortcomings” (Michael interview, March 2011). This gave the MPD a clear hierarchy or “chain
of command” during daily operations so they could better control the operations of any
emergency or crisis situation. This is similar to the military structure when engaging in
operations.
Besides word and language, command, unit, and troops, other military terms were used
regularly in the MPD. Sam, an EMU member of the MPD called their office, “base” (personal
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communication, Jan. 2011). An explosion that caused injuries was described as using “military
level munitions” and a person got “shrapnel wounds” (Sam interview, Dec. 2010). And Michael
said as the EMU supervisor, he had access to information that was “classified”, “unclassified”,
and “top secret” (March 2011).
In another example, Sam, outlined the following procedures for how they respond to a
bomb threat.
Patrols respond first and then activate Bomb Squad. Supervisors [Bomb Squad
supervisors and Sam] go on scene. Patrol does perimeter security. We handle the device
if found. Evacuation is handled by Patrol. Me or whoever is on scene will relay the
decision and steps to Patrol or Chief. If there is a device, once we take possession we
then take to a location to be detonated…Patrol is then relieved from scene. (Sam
interview, Dec. 2010)
This example also highlights the “protocols” or “procedures” that the MPD used in responding to
a bomb threat or any other emergency “incident”. These were very well defined plans that clearly
defined the roles of MPD members and the actions they should take in during an incident or
emergency response. The terms protocols and procedures also references military structure and
culture. When asked how decisions are made and communicated by MPD during a crisis
response, Michael did not hesitate in listing the proper protocol.
Usually a patrol officer responds. First, the dispatcher from 9-1-1 call center gets
communication and then communicates to an [MPD] officer depending on situation.
Officer will notify the supervisor. Supervisor will assess - they’ll call resources they
need - SRT, K-9, bomb squad, etc. then I’ll get a call from the supervisor. I’ll start
putting an overall assessment together on what is needed, what is not needed in terms of
resources, blockade. I’ll ask the supervisor questions on what has transpired so far. I will
then come over the radio telling them I’ve taken over as incident commander and call for
resources - fire, EMS, public works, [gas company] for gas. I’ll call resources or person
with me will call. I always have a person with me because I’m busy managing the scene.
They do a chronological log to make sure resources are met and do phone calls through
communication over radio to communicate to 911 dispatch and they will make calls.
(Michael interview, March 2011)
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This vocabulary and pattern of language use gave the members of the EMU and larger MPD a
clear sense of duties and responsibilities as it reflected the hierarchical structure of the
organization. It also signaled common membership and referenced a standard repertoire of
operation.
Threats, danger, and maintaining security. This clarity was also reflected in the EMU
MPD’s security-focused mission, “to protect the citizens of the city of [city name] from acts of
terrorism and criminal activity” (Michael interview, March 2011). When Sam was also asked
the mission of the unit, the answer was, “To provide further protection of the city of [city name]
against acts of terrorism, prepare and plan for national disasters, and mitigate vulnerabilities”
(March 2011). In both of these descriptions, protection against terrorism was at the forefront of
priorities. This assumed that terrorism was a very real and regular threat, the world was a
dangerous place, and the EMU MPD’s job was to protect the city’s citizens from this danger.
This worldview got reinforced through vocabulary communicated by members of the MPD.
First, all potential dangers were labeled “threats” that could lead to larger “incidents” if
not identified through “intelligence” and member vigilance to look for “suspicious activity”. The
best example of this was seen in the preparations for the Auto Show. The Auto Show is an
annual event that brought major car companies from around the world as well as 750,000 visitors
to the downtown convention center over a 10-day period (Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010). In
addition to the general public, attendees included media, car company executives, celebrities,
government officials, and protestors from around the world. This event was seen as very high
profile, therefore, the Auto Show Limited Liability Corporation (LLC) that managed the show
hired a security team to coordinate security for the event. These Auto Show security meetings
included local, state, and federal law enforcement, as well first responders and private security.

146
At these security meetings, participants often included talk about “intelligence/ongoing
threats and trends” (Auto Show mtg. agenda, Nov. 2010). Michael, the supervisor of the EMU of
MPD noted that his unit was considered lead for the event and led the following threat discussion
at one meeting.
Michael asks state police to give intelligence update. State police say that nothing is on
the radar right now in terms of threats, “but we’re monitoring for credible threats”. State
police person then asks other agencies, “please tell us information so we can look into it.
Any little thing could turn out to be very big.” Michael then explains big days are both
Saturdays, 15th, 17th, and 22nd so they “need lots of manpower” on those days. He says
there will also be listserv that will blast out messages. “You will be notified if you are on
the list. This is a good situational awareness management tool.” (Auto Show mtg., Nov.
2010)
The following month, a “threat assessment” document for the Auto Show was emailed to
all those who attended the planning meetings. “This assessment has been prepared to assist
security planners and law enforcement personnel in monitoring threat information and
maintaining a safe and secure event environment” (Auto Show threat assessment, Dec. 2010).
This information was shared with MPD members so they could maintain “situational awareness”
and look out for these threats as they worked the Auto Show. For example, the researcher walked
around the Auto Show one day with Sam and asked for the purpose of walking around the main
floor.
I walk around looking for suspicious behavior or activity. I ask him what he considers
suspicious activity. He says that they just know it when they see it…He then said that if
they have a specific person that may be a threat then they do keep an eye out for them.
For example, [a car company] said they had a disgruntled employee that they recently
fired and they were worried that the guy might try to do something at the Auto Show. So
his picture has been circulated and they are keeping an eye out for the guy. (Sam, Auto
Show walk through, Jan. 2011)
People who were the source of these threats were also labeled by law enforcement members
using dangerous sounding terms. During the study, the researcher heard these people called,
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“barricaded gunman”, “environmental extremist”, “lone offender”, “Rambo”, “self-radicalized
individuals”, “active shooter”, “bomber”, and most commonly “terrorist”.
This language of threats and dangerous people used by members then reinforced the
clarity of the unit’s mission. The EMU MPD needed to control those threats to protect the
citizens or restore control if an incident should occur. For example, the Auto Show head of
security stated that “if anything happens, we will manage the chaos” (Harry, Auto Show mtg.,
Dec. 2010). When asked how it was determined that a crisis is over, Sam responded, “This is
when all damages and hazards have been removed - into recovery and restoring order, for
example letting people back in building… Advise the principle [supervisor] that we’re all set and
cleared the scene and we’re turning it over to you” (Sam interview, Dec. 2010). Note the phrases,
“hazards have been removed”, “restoring order”, and “cleared the scene” all evoke the sense that
the EMU MPD’s role was to take control and restore order. This was also reinforced when
supervisor Michael described his role in responding to an incident. “I will then come over the
radio telling them I’ve taken over as incident commander and call for resources…I’m busy
managing the scene…When we have fully mitigated the situation. I get over the air and let them
know that the situation is over” (Michael interview, March 2011).
But it was not just operational control of an incident that fell under the responsibility of
the EMU MPD. It and other law enforcement agencies also felt that control of information was
critical to managing threats. Documents when shared were labeled by a combination of four
terms: classified, unclassified, official use, and unofficial use. Access to information clearly
followed membership patters. Only “members” could access certain information.
For example, since the researcher was not a first responder or a member of law
enforcement, part of that larger macroculture, she only received access to “unclassified”
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information but with the caveat “for official use only”. This was further clarified at the top of the
first page of the Auto Show threat assessment document.
This document is the property of the [state] Intelligence Operations Center for Homeland
Security and is prepared for the limited purpose of information sharing. This information
is designated UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (U//FOUO) and is shared
in confidence. Release to the media of any information in this document is prohibited.
(Auto Show threat assessment, Dec. 2010)
The top of each page was labeled “UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY” as well as
each paragraph of information had either a (U), or (U//FOUO) listed at the beginning so people
who received it were clear at what level the information was cleared or could be shared.
However, deciding to deny access of information to members of some crisis response
organizations, led to frustrations by those organizations who wanted more of a collaborative
information sharing environment. “Information sharing doesn’t happen. Law enforcement failed
to reach out to private sector. They reach out to [auto companies] but ignore hospitals and never
get info from them…Information sharing doesn’t happen on any level with hospital and law
enforcement” (John, Hospital A Security Chief, FLO training, Dec. 2010). This labeling of
information created closed membership boundaries that could result in lack of certain
information sharing between organizations. This may also result in the unintentional filtering of
information that is integral to the overall crisis response effort. Lack of access to locations
(credentialing) and information and its potential consequences are discussed in later sections in
this chapter and in chapter five.
In another example, emails which came from the state intelligence operations center
(IOC) were labeled with these terms as well as used the terms “sensitive” and “privileged” when
describing how the information in the email and subsequent attachment could and could not be
used.
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This e-mail transmission and any attachments may contain [state IOC] privileged and
sensitive information intended only for the use of the addressee. It contains information
that may be exempt from public release under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C.
552). Any dissemination, distribution, copying or action taken in reliance on the contents
of this e-mail by anyone other than the intended recipient is strictly prohibited. No
portion of this transmission should be furnished to the public or the media, either in
written or verbal form. ([state] IOC, personal communication, Jan. 3, 2011)
While the researcher was still confused to what exactly these terms meant (and didn’t ask for fear
of losing access to that information), the more general meaning was clear. The information was
intended for the larger macroculture of law enforcement and first responders, and authorized
non-first responders who had taken a course from the state IOC to identify and manage threats
and protect the public. However information was not to be shared with the public or the media
because it was considered, at minimum, sensitive information. Military tems.net defines
“sensitive” as “Requiring special protection from disclosure that could cause embarrassment,
compromise, or threat to the security of the sponsoring power. May be applied to an agency,
installation, person, position, document, material, or activity” (2011). However by labeling
information by these terms, MPD and the larger macroculture were reinforcing the “panic myth”
(Tierney, 2003); that knowing this information would cause fear among the public. In addition,
these groups were afraid that if the information was released publicly, then they could not control
the situation because the dangerous people would know their security procedures and circumvent
them. Therefore, the informational boundaries were rigorously maintained and defended by the
EMU MPD and the larger macroculture.
However, some in law enforcement did see the need to loosen information sharing
restrictions and declassify or deprivilege information, at least to private companies and
institutions that they felt needed the information to provide security to their people and property.
At the non-first responder fusion liaison officer (FLO) training session, state police officer Dan
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stated, “The [law enforcement] discipline needs to get off its high horse on sharing information.
We need to get away from ‘need to know’ to ‘duty to share’. “If we need to scrub something
down then need to do it and get info out to private sector” (FLO training, Dec. 2010). Later
when the director of the city’s Homeland Security and Emergency Management department was
introduced, he echoed Dan’s sentiments. “Ross [HSEM director] introduces himself to group
and says that things are still screwed up - not sharing information, still “stovepipe information”
and stamp things “law enforcement sensitive”. He says “there are big cultural changes that have
to take place” (FLO training, Dec. 2010). While this barrier to information sharing was
acknowledged by both Dan and Ross, their organizations still followed the proper protocol for
labeling information classified, unclassified, for official use, and sensitive in emails and other
information documents (Auto Show threat assessment, Dec. 2010; personal communication, Jan.
3, 2011). This reinforces how strong the law enforcement and paramilitary organizational
macroculture of maintaining security and following proper protocol and information control was
enacted. This enactment was the manifestation of a larger set of good intentions of maintaining
secrecy in order to protect the public, but resulted in unintentional effects of not sharing
potentially valuable information among crisis response organizations.
Shared emergency management and response language. Finally, the MPD vocabulary
shared many of the same terms and meanings of emergency management and response systems.
One reason was because, as stated by the ARC in chapter three, this language also used many
militaristic and paramilitaristic terms and is part of this larger macroculture. Members of the
MPD regularly used terms such as “events” (non-crises but have the potential to turn into
“incidents”), “incidents” (a critical situation that they had to respond to immediately), the need to
“mitigate” situations, and having “staging areas” to put resources when responding to a crisis.
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They also regularly referred to federal emergency management response systems, such as
Incident Command System (ICS) and National Incident Management System (NIMS) for both
crisis response and day to day emergency response.
We [EMU MPD] collect information on terrorist threats, do security surveys, barricaded
gunman, bomb squad, hazmat, basically any critical incident in the city. My office is
responsible for running Incident Command, establish a list of what has taken place, run
Incident Command System. The concept is to run smoother and faster. Know what we
don’t have is important and to get those resources. We set up a command post on scene
and staging area so personnel know where to come and role and responsibilities. (Who
responds?) Police, fire, EMS personnel depending on situation. Role of incident
commander could change. If fire, then police goes from primary to secondary command
and we are there in support for the other. (How similar or different to day to day?) Same
for day to day. It is designed to deal with any critical incident. We all use the ICS
system. Everyone is trained with ICS for unit. ICS is mandated by federal government for
all first responders. Fire, police, EMS all know ICS. (Michael interview, March 2011)
Using the same ICS system that the HSEM MEOC used for larger crisis and disaster response
gave EMU MPD members a level of comfort with the vocabulary used that other organizations
may not have.
The paramilitaristic vocabulary used and labeling of people and situations as “threats”
and “dangerous” gave the members of the MPD and other law enforcement agencies a sense of
clear mission, hierarchy and procedures. The EMU MPD saw their role as “To provide further
protection for the city of [city name] against acts of terrorism, prepare and plan for national
disasters and mitigate vulnerabilities” (Sam interview, March 2011). This translated into an
organizational culture that felt the need to protect others and control these potentially dangerous
people and situations that shouldn’t be questioned by others. However, this vocabulary also
served to separate the macroculture of law enforcement, first responders, and emergency
management members who use similar military and paramilitary language and structures from
private businesses, NGOs and the public who were not familiar with this language but that still
played a role in crisis response. This assigned people and organizations insider and outsider
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status. Outsiders could gain access to information, but only if they were given permission by the
insiders and took the initiative to learn and adapt their own language to using this vocabulary.
This separation and distinction will be discussed later under the crisis collaboration and
coordination section in this chapter and in chapter five.
The next section of this chapter describes how the second organization culture construct,
rites and rituals, in the MPD helped reinforce the bureaucratic and authoritative values and
norms of the organization. Rites and rituals were central to the construction of member identity
and in determining who was a member of the culture.
Rites and Rituals
As described in chapter one, rites and rituals are “collective activities that are technically
unnecessary to the achievement of desired ends, but that within a culture are considered socially
essential, keeping the individual bound within the norms of the collectivity” (Hofstede, 2001, p.
10). Rites and rituals can either be formal or informal, performed regularly or occasionally, but
are enacted collectively to provide the rules, norms, and values of organizational life for
members (Hofstede, 2001; Pacanowsky & O’Donnell-Trujillo, 1982). For crisis response
organizations like the Emergency Management Unit of the Metropolitan Police Department
(EMU MPD), some rites and rituals are common throughout the crisis cycle. The EMU MPD
has regular crisis trainings, drills, and exercises to prepare for crisis. These rites and rituals
helped define and reify how members framed crisis and crisis response.
The researcher observed the rites and rituals of the security planning meetings (aka crisis
planning meetings) for a large annual Auto Show. Through interviews with members and
examining artifacts, the researcher determined rites and rituals of other crisis training, exercises,
and responses. This also included how the ritual of following protocols reinforced the values and
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rules of the organization. These rites and rituals reinforced the MPD’s authoritative and
bureaucratic culture by showing need to protect others from dangerous people and situations,
showcase their expertise in this area, and control who has access to specific EMU MPD rites and
rituals.
Crisis Planning. As described earlier, the annual Auto Show is a large international
event and has been staged in this city for decades. As noted, the event creates significant risks
by drawing large numbers of domestic and international visitors, dignitaries, and media to the
city. (Auto Show threat assessment, Dec. 2010). Because of this, planners considered this a high
profile event needing ongoing security to protect people and property. Therefore, private security
(Auto Show LLC security, event site security, and auto companies security), law enforcement
(federal, state, and local), and other first responder organizations (fire departments, EMS) met
for several months prior to the show. Although the event planners were the Auto Show
organization, the EMU MPD was considered the lead agency planning security for the Auto
Show so the two often shared leading the meetings (Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010). The three
meetings attended by the researcher primarily discussed three topics, 1) protocol and procedures
for dealing with emergencies or threats, both unintentional (fire or weather) and intentional
(terrorism and protests), 2) sharing intelligence or threat information among organizations, and
3) event logistics and personnel support.
Harry, the Chief of Auto Show security through the LLC (and a former police officer)
often discussed proper protocol and procedures for the event in case of an emergency, such as a
fire or weather incident. He particularly emphasized at every meeting the new policy that
everyone working security for the event had to be on the same radio system and frequencies.
This is also known as interoperability of communication systems.
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Everyone will get a radio [from Auto Show security] because of the fire last year that
occurred on the third level cat walk. It took 12 extinguishers to put out. Last year we
couldn’t communicate with security inside and it made it more difficult to evacuate the
20-28,000 people. But we did it in 10 minutes and also had the fire out, hall cleaned and
people back in the show 4-5 hours after because of the cooperation of everyone in here.
People will be on radios the first day of the show but they need to notify me and my team
ahead of time how many they will need. (Harry, Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010)
Other emergency procedures were discussed such as not parking in the fire lanes around the
convention center, medical response, and evacuations.
We’re working on emergency evacuation plan for [convention center]. [Plaza] will be the
initial evacuation place with buses waiting there. If there is a longer evacuation, such as
a toxic chemical spill, then we will evacuate to [nearby sporting venues]. We will work
with [city transportation department] to provide buses for evacuation. Last year we also
had [nearby college] as an indoor evacuation facility. If anything happens, we will
manage the chaos, but last year was a team effort. (Harry, Auto Show mtg., Dec. 2010)
In addition to unintentional emergencies, the security meetings discussed protocols and
procedures to prevent an intentional terrorist attack and how to handle protestors who either
wanted to disrupt the event or get media attention. Michael, the EMU MPD supervisor, said that
many law enforcement intelligence centers would be monitoring for threats before and during the
event (Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010). Radiation detection teams from the Army, K-9 units, and PI
[private investigation] teams made up of “state police, ATF, FBI and Air Marshalls for the
[public transportation system]” (Auto Show mtg., Nov. 2010) would also be walking the floor
(patrolling) of the Auto Show. In addition, the EMU MPD bomb squad unit trained the event
private security on how to identify a bomb (Auto Show mtg., Dec. 2010).
Michael also stated the proper procedures in place in case a person or group decided to
hold protests outside the event.
For law enforcement - my thing is not trying to stop them. If they are minding the law
then we are not going to do anything. For example, 800-900 people last year did a
funeral march for the U.S. We worked with them instead of against them. It allowed us
to keep our manpower where they needed to be. Not expecting that to happen this year.
The tea party and environmentalists have calmed down. There may be some challenges
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to passing out literature. The rule is they [protestors] can stand by doors and 2 people can
come inside. I tell you on our behalf we don’t care - let them do it. Why create an issue
when there’s not an issue as long as they’re not messing with folks? If it’s a criminal
nature then law enforcement will step in and handle accordingly. We are more concerned
with a terrorist or active shooter than person passing out leaflets. Security can escort out
if there is an issue unless it’s a criminal matter. (Auto Show mtg., Nov. 2010)
These security protocols and procedures for emergencies, terrorist threats, and protests were first
reinforced by the meeting handouts that contained information on evacuation routes, parking
locations, and security rules and reminders. A crisis response plan, primarily written by the EMU
MPD, was also distributed to the people who attended the security meetings.
We call them procedures, not emergency response plans. We have procedures for specific
scenarios that we use as guidelines. But these procedures are always up for debate and
are reviewed every time after an event. After every situation we sit down and talk about
what worked and what didn’t. It is always in a round table. (Sam interview, Nov. 2010)
The second topic discussed at all security meetings consisted of a round table discussion
where each organization at the meeting would share intelligence information on any security
threats or other security concerns for the Auto Show. Federal agencies and state police would
share intelligence on any potential terrorist threats or concerns, both international terrorists such
as Al Qaeda, and domestic terrorist groups. Information sharing, as seen in these meetings, can
be a critical component of interorganizational coordination. Several of the large auto companies
also had intelligence centers and would pass along any information related to disgruntled
employees (called “lone offenders”), union activists, or other groups who may want to disrupt
the event through protests or attacks inside the event. Sam from EMU MPD reinforced the
importance of this information sharing period of these security meetings. “We need help with
intelligence operations communication. Being ‘in’ and knowing everyone so we know the issues
or problems. For example, if I see a protest organization, I remember that I can get info that I
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can use in the situation knowing little bits of info from private sector and law enforcement” (Sam
interview, Dec. 2010).
Although there were not any direct threats made about the Auto Show, Michael and other
law enforcement officials emphasized the importance of sharing intelligence information before
and during the event for situational awareness.
Nothing on the radar right now in terms of threats - we’re monitoring for credible threats.
Other agencies, please tell us information so we can look into it. Any little thing could
turn out to be very big. Intelligence piece will be in the [state] IOC. Any intelligence
you have will be filtered through that center. Both Saturdays are critical because of
[sporting events]…There will be a listserv that will blast out messages. You will be
notified if you are on the list. This is a good situational awareness management
tool….Each year gets better and better – just fine tuning. We’re also reaching out to the
[Auto Company’s] global intelligence center so we are together and on the same page.
(Dan, state IOC, Auto Show mtg., Nov. 2010)
Two weeks before the Auto Show, an official threat assessment document was sent to all
attendees of the security meetings. The document again stated that there were no credible threats,
but re-emphasized the importance of situational awareness and informing the intelligence center
of any suspicious activity during the event, such as “individuals or groups making threatening
statements or declarations” or “suspicious persons or vehicles attempting to enter or linger near
egress points, loading docks, restricted areas or sites” (Auto Show threat assessment, Dec. 2010).
A final security measure of credentialing was heavily reinforced at every security
meeting as a way to address security threats. While the public gained access to the exhibit hall
floor by buying a ticket, those people working the event (law enforcement, private security, auto
company exhibit employees, first responders, and building/exhibit maintenance), VIP guests
(government officials, company executives and special guests, celebrities), and the media needed
special Auto Show credentials to access certain areas or gain after-hours access. The
credentialing process consisted of the proper group hosting that person completing an application
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with an accompanying picture ID. If the person provided all information required for that
particular credential (media, VIP, Auto Show workers, etc.), the security office would clear them
and proper credentials would be issued. At the October Auto Show meeting the following
explanation was given about credentials.
There will be a board posted at the security office of what credentials will be allowed in.
The credentials that we have this year are being passed around so everyone can become
familiar with them. If someone doesn’t have one, then they don’t gain access.
Wristbands are required for workers and press individuals. This shows you have been
identified at some time by your picture ID. Auto companies need to come to us directly
to get wristbands and credentials. After show hours we have special VIP guests. There
will be special passes for show floor but they still need to be cleared through the security
office. (Harry, Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010)
The importance of credentialing was also re-emphasized at the other meetings, in meeting
handouts, and the crisis response plan or Auto Show procedures.

Credentialing can be

understood as both a ritual and as an overt way of signaling membership. Credentials signal
membership and legitimacy by physically formalizing approval by the gatekeeping organization.
Therefore, the process of being sponsored and reviewed for credentials can be understood as
important ritual of membership in crisis planning and response. This is further discussed in the
Symbols section of this chapter.
Finally, all security meetings for the Auto Show discussed event logistics and personnel
support requirements. Information included dates and descriptions of special events (press days,
charity preview, education day), traffic or parking issues due to concurrent sporting or music
events in the area, floor plans and parking locations, and access and traffic flow to and from the
loading dock area. At the November security meeting, manpower and commitments by area law
enforcement agencies were discussed. Because of financial issues, the LLC had to reduce the
number of Auto Show private security they could hire (Auto Show mtg., Nov. 2010). Therefore
Michael from the MPD asked that surrounding local and state law enforcement agencies provide
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more personnel and even reserve officers to cover the Auto Show, especially on the higher
volume days such as special events and weekends (Auto Show mtg., Nov. 2010). Logistics and
personnel were important topics because attendees at these meetings needed to know this
information to do their job and provide the proper level of security deemed necessary for the
Auto Show.
To summarize, three topics were discussed at Auto Show security meetings: protocol and
procedures for emergencies or incidents, sharing intelligence about threats and credentialing to
deter threats, and event and personnel logistics. This reinforced the beliefs of the larger
macroculture that the EMU MPD and other security and law enforcement agencies needed to
control people or situations so that either a terrorist incident didn’t occur, or they could quickly
mitigate an emergency if it did occur. This also reinforced the EMU MPD organization’s cultural
belief that people and dangerous situations could be controlled and they were the experts that
were able control the information or situation.
EMU MPD crisis response training. Beyond the ritual of crisis planning, the ritual of
crisis response training helped the EMU MPD demonstrate and maintain what they saw as their
organizational expertise. There were two types of crisis response trainings that the EMU MPD
engaged in, regular trainings to develop and enhance skills in specialized emergency response
and joint interorganizational trainings with other crisis response organizations to respond to
larger crises or disasters.
The EMU MPD is a specialized response unit within the MPD and houses teams such as
bomb squad, special response team (SRT aka SWAT), harbor patrol/dive team, and K-9 (Sam
interview, Nov. 2010).The EMU MPD placed value in being the experts within the MPD to deal
with emergencies needing their unit to mitigate the emergency. Therefore, they engaged in
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regular training to maintain and enhance their specialized skills and to maintain their reputation
as experts in those areas. This included weekly training within each specialized team as well as
cross-training between teams to develop new skills.
I sit down weekly with staff from various commands and cross train. For example, I have
6 members on the bomb squad and a dive team. The dive team members are not experts
with bombs so I took two members of the bomb squad and trained and put them on the
dive team to deal with maritime operations that deal with water born IEDs…I identify
weaknesses and gaps and provide strategy to overcome shortcomings. (Michael
interview, March 2011)
The researcher also observed the bomb squad training in a fenced-in parking lot (Researcher
observations, Dec. 2010) and training schedules posted in the main office for SRT and bomb
squad teams (Researcher observations, Jan. 2011). In addition, EMU MPD members attended
regular training on terrorism or related Homeland Security issues and threats since that was one
of their critical functions. For example, the researcher was told by Sam that he attended two
Department of Homeland Security training sessions, one in November and one in March. (The
researcher was not told the subject of these sessions.) Sam also mentioned sending weekly
reports to Michael about what training the teams did (Researcher observations, March 2011).
As evident in the quote from Michael above, the organizational value of the unit being
well trained was set by the EMU MPD supervisor. “Training is paramount to me. I’m
responsible to make sure people trained but I have to train to lead” (Michael interview, March
2011). Michael reinforced this value by the two pictures he had on his office door, which the
researcher asked him about during an interview.
The top picture is me putting the guys to work on training. Underneath picture is written
“Poor performance promotes pain.” They were not doing what promotes professionalism
and being on point every time - no errors, no mistakes. I exercised their minds, getting
their minds right. Guys comment on the intensity on my face [in the picture]. I don’t play
any games with SRT. The lower picture is from my commanding officer. I am
demonstrating how to shoot one handed. I did that when I was really in shape [joking
tone]. (Michael interview, March 2011)
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The emphasis on regular training within the EMU MPD, reinforced by its supervisor, reflected
an organizational culture that prided itself on its expertise in specialized emergency response and
worked hard to maintain that standard of excellence.
In addition to specialized training, the EMU MPD attended interorganizational training
on how to coordinate with other organizations in a larger crisis or disaster response. The first
type of training they attended was Incident Command System (ICS) and National Incident
Management System (NIMS) trainings. These were part of the National Response Framework
(2013), which is the mandated federal operations response plan for coordinated response for
large crises or disasters. “Everyone in MPD, all levels, are required to be trained in ICS and
NIMS. We’re not required to train in all levels. We all have to take 300 and 400 level, but not
have to take 700 or 800. Executives [in MPD] and homeland security units including us are
trained on all levels (Sam, March 2011).”
Another type of training members attended involved using interoperable communications
equipment such as 800 MHz radios and ETEAM, which is a secured database system for
information sharing and coordinated response. Sam noted that this city was the first city in the
country to train personnel on 800 MHz radios (Sam interview, Dec. 2010). He also stated that
their unit and all other agencies/departments got updates and refresher training on 800 MHz
radios and ETEAM before any major events, such as the Auto Show (Sam interview, Dec. 2010).
The final type of interorganizational crisis response training the EMU MPD participated
in were regular tabletop exercises (talking through scenarios) or full-scale exercises (simulated
disaster event and response). Michael further describes the purpose and regularity of these types
of exercises.
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For tabletop exercises, various disciplines come that have a role and discuss what
agencies will do and what resources are available….Those are consistently exercised 3-4
times a year. The city puts on tabletops. Federal counterparts also have various exercises.
The county puts them on. We go and participate in them to know each other’s capabilities
and resources. We put on [full-scale] exercises if they are involving an active shooter,
barricaded gunman, or maritime operations. (Michael interview, March 2011)
Michael saw value in these types of coordinated exercises because they got to know other
organizations’ capabilities and resources. However, he had less tolerance for people who didn’t
seem to know what they were doing during exercises or those exercises that were seen as wasting
the EMU MPD’s time because they weren’t involved throughout the exercise.
[Most helpful in crisis training is] Knowing the people I deal with are fluent, skilled and
experienced in their respective areas. Have folks that know what the hell they’re doing. Don’t
give me someone who doesn’t know what they’re doing, who won’t panic in crisis type
situation…[Least helpful are] training scenarios that have no involvement or situation for
first responders. That is asinine training. In a tabletop, you need to think outside the box but
also need to make it realistic so that first responders will be able to be successful. Not a 10
minute exercise that uses up all resources and then call in the [National] Guard. This pisses
off officers. You’ve used up resources in 5 minutes and there’s nothing left to do for 6 hours.
(Michael interview, March 2011)
Michael, it appears, felt that interorganizational crisis response training sessions were important
only if they led to increasing his confidence in the expertise of other agencies role in crisis
response or if the exercise specifically involved the demonstration or enhancement of EMU
MPD’s skills and expertise in crisis response. If these two elements were not present in the
exercise, then he felt that interorganizational crisis response trainings were a waste of time. This
view reinforces a more coordinated view of crisis response by the EMU MPD and is further
explored in the collaboration versus coordination section later in this chapter.
Following protocols as an EMU MPD ritual. EMU MPD’s involvement in the rituals
of crisis planning meetings and training also played an important role in another ritual of crisis or
emergency response, protocols. These protocols were essentially rules and procedures introduced
in crisis response meetings and plans and reinforced through training. This resulted in a process
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of deep enculturation for following rules and procedures in order to effectively control and
mitigate a crisis or emergency. Protocols are part of the law enforcement culture, but protocols
are also a part of the law enforcement and first responder macroculture, military culture, and the
Incident Command System (ICS). Unlike processes and steps, protocols imply a strict adherence
to the rules and procedures described and not general guidelines that leave room for discussion
or exception.
When talking to Sam or Michael, the researcher often heard the protocols mentioned in
meetings or saw in plans echoed back to her when they described crisis response situations. For
example, Sam described how the EMU MPD recently handled a group of protesters at the Auto
Show in January.
He said that for Friday’s protest at the Charity Preview, the uniforms outside radioed in
that there were some people starting to congregate outside [convention center’s] main
entrance with signs…Sam says that whenever they get to a protest, they always ask who
is in charge so they can go talk to that person…. He says that they first ask the person in
charge if they have a permit to protest. About 80% of people say no and we don’t ask
them to leave but we now can tell them what to do. ..[At this protest] Michael then told
them that they cannot protest right outside [convention center] because if there were a fire
and they had to evacuate everyone, then they couldn’t because the protest is blocking the
main exit. Michael then asked them if they could move to the sidewalk in front of the
hotel across the street and said they would still be very visible but not blocking the
entrance or exits. They agreed because as Sam says, “They just want to be heard and get
their point across to the media and we aren’t preventing that.” (Sam, Auto Show walk
through, Jan. 2011)
This story of how the EMU MPD handled the protest situation echoed the procedures and
reasoning behind them that Michael laid down at the November Auto Show security meeting.
The 10th and 11th is when we are expecting protests because they want to see the
press….Last year saw the UAW, tea party; lots of different protestors. We gave them a
lot of ground and negotiated. For law enforcement - my thing is not trying to stop them.
If they are minding the law then we are not going to do anything…We worked with them
instead of against them. (Michael, Auto Show mtg., Nov. 2010)

163
In this example, the protocols served to identify the boundaries of what to do when the
public minded the law versus needing to intervene to maintain control of a situation.
This communication and enculturation of protocols into the actions of EMU MPD
members also reinforced the organizational values of being able to run smooth operations in
order quickly control and mitigate potentially dangerous situations. Michael reinforced this value
when he stated to the researcher the value of using the ICS system.
My office is responsible for running Incident Command, establish a list of what has taken
place, and run the Incident Command System. The concept is to run smoother and faster.
[Figure out] what we don’t have is important and get resources. Set up a command post
on scene and staging area so personnel know where to come and their role and
responsibilities. (Michael interview, March 2011)
This cultural value of using proper protocols and procedures is further reinforced through stories
described next in this chapter.
Researcher’s lack of access to daily EMU MPD rituals. Finally, the difficulty of
gaining access to some rites and rituals and lack of access to other daily rites reflected the
security and secrecy culture of the EMU MPD. Access also defined clear in-group and outgroup boundaries of the organization. As described in chapter two, the during the initial meeting
with Michael and Sam, they agreed to give the researcher initial access to “collect data using
observations of [EMU MPD] organization and its members as it plans for emergencies and crisis,
does crisis training, and responds to crises” (EMU MPD Research Information Sheet, Aug.
2010). The researcher was given access to Auto Show security planning meetings, but during the
study she was denied opportunities to observe daily life at the EMU MPD location or daily crisis
response activities. For example, on the day of the first Auto Show security meeting, there were
threats of dangerous windstorms and thunderstorms in the area (Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010).
The researcher stayed after the meeting to ask Michael, the EMU MPD supervisor, if he would
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call her so she could to observe what they did in their unit if they were asked to respond to this
situation. Michael listened to the researcher’s request but responded that I should get home to
avoid the bad weather and avoided responding to the request. The researcher was frustrated but
thought that the “no” could have been the result of lack of rapport with Michael since this was
his first time interacting with her without Sam there.
Another example of denial of access was the following. At her first meeting with Sam,
with whom the researcher had been primarily communicating, the researcher asked if it would be
possible for her to observe the daily operations of the unit.
I explained it would help me to better understand how their unit works. Sam replied that
he would have to run that by Michael [EMU MPD supervisor] to see if it would be
possible. He said that he wasn’t sure because undercover people sometimes come into
the office to discuss what they are doing and that is confidential. I said I understood and
that if I was in the office at that time and an undercover person came in, I could easily
leave the room if that was an issue. (Sam informal interview, Nov. 2010)
At the next Auto Show security meeting in November, Sam greeted the researcher and then
pulled her to the side of the room away from the chairs and other people talking.
He tells me that he talked to Michael and Michael determined that I cannot do any
observations or job shadowing in their unit office because it is a security issue. He said
that they have special agents that come in and out all the time to brief them and some of
them are undercover. They [the special agents] know it is a secure environment and can
talk freely. So Michael wouldn’t feel comfortable sitting me in the office to observe. “I
hope you’re not bummed,” Sam says to me. “But all Auto Show meetings will be open
to you to observe.” (Auto Show mtg., Nov. 2010)
As the quotes above explain, this lack of access to observe daily operations and potentially
important rites and rituals of the organization was denied because of perceived security and
confidentiality issues.
Throughout the study, the researcher had to continuously negotiate access with the EMU
MPD to information or observations because she was an outsider to the EMU MPD and the
larger trusted macroculture of the law enforcement and first responder community. Beyond
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access to Auto Show security planning meetings, the researcher had to initiate requests to attend
Fusion Liaison Officer (FLO) training, do an Auto Show walk through with Sam, see part of the
intelligence center (IOC), and review the Auto Show crisis response plan and procedures. Even
when access was negotiated and confidentiality of information was assured by the researcher,
further permissions by gatekeepers needed to be obtained. First, to attend the FLO training, the
researcher had to fill out paperwork and get her advisor to sign it, along with approval from the
state police trainer. However, she only was approved to attend the training for “non- law
enforcement and private sector counterparts” (personal communication, Dec. 1, 2010). She was
not allowed to attend the first responder FLO training even though her purpose was to observe
the same trainings that first responder organizations like the EMU MPD did.
The researcher also had to receive an Auto Show credential from Sam in order to gain
access to the Auto Show security command center and to walk the floor of the Auto Show with
him. However the researcher was denied access to the same security show command post later
that weekend when an incident occurred because she wasn’t wearing a uniform nor was she
properly credentialed that signaled membership and access. This was in spite of the fact she had
been in the command center on two previous occasions that week, had conversations with
several members in the command center, and had been asked to help perform crowd control with
other police officers at their request in response to the same incident (Auto Show visit 3, Jan.
2011). Finally, the researcher was only given access to review and take notes on the Auto Show
crisis response plan and procedures for a specific amount of time and only when Sam was
present in the room (Researcher observations, March 2011).
At each instance that access to crisis response rites and rituals was obstructed, it was
explained to the researcher that it was for security reasons, thus positioning the researcher as an
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outsider or out-group member. As described in chapters one and two, control of information is a
primary process whereby membership is signaled and maintained. By denying the researcher
access to some forms of information based on “security issues”, it served as an important
indicator of the EMU MPD’s culture the outsiders could not be trusted in the same way as
members. The researcher also wasn’t part of the larger macroculture as she was not a member of
a law enforcement agency or first responder nor did she have particular security clearances to be
allowed access to certain information. This indicated to the researcher that EMU MPD’s fear of
sensitive or secure information potentially reaching dangerous people was so greatly ingrained in
their culture that they found it easier to deny or restrict access to those who were not part of the
larger macroculture. This closed membership phenomenon and its impact is explored further in
the collaboration versus coordination section later in this chapter.
In summary, the EMU MPD had several rites and rituals that reinforced a closed
membership culture that was very authoritative and bureaucratic. Members saw crisis planning
meetings and crisis trainings as a way for other organizations to utilize their emergency
management and crisis response experience. Protocols were also a ritual that was emphasized in
planning and training and became infused into the organization as an orderly way to manage and
mitigate dangerous people and situations. However, if one was not deemed a member of the
organization, access was denied to daily rites and rituals of the organization for security reasons.
Even when access was granted by the organizational gatekeeper, the non-member had to be
escorted by a member and properly credentialed. Wider access was granted only if one was a
member of the EMU MPD or had a similar culture to the organization. In the next section on
organizational stories, this membership boundary drawn by EMU MPD members affected what
stories were told and how the organization was presented.
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Stories
Stories are an important way members share organizational experiences with other
members and with those outside the organization and socialize newcomers to the culture of the
organization (Trice & Beyer, 1984, p. 655). Stories were told by EMU MPD members during
interviews and others in the larger macroculture during Auto Show security planning meetings.
These stories reinforced an authoritative and bureaucratic organizational culture and elevated the
belief that their expertise was needed to protect the public. Stories accomplished this by
emphasizing how they dealt with dangerous people by controlling the situation and the
importance of following protocol in both typical emergency response and in larger disaster
response. In addition, they passed on cultural lessons, world views, and norms of operation.
Danger stories. Most stories offered by EMU MPD described dangerous people and
situations that needed the expertise of the EMU MPD to handle the emergency.
I came from SRT unit and I run all barricaded gunman situations. Multiple situations
happened this weekend. We were already at one so decided to handle that one and
continued with caution so we don’t lose troops. So we tell other situation to stand by and
hold because we had two barricaded gunman situations. Officers on [MPD] are trained to
set up perimeter and hold position, not to run in. In a hostage situation, the officer on
scene makes judgment call whether to go in. But we train them to hold position especially
if shots fired because they’re not trained and don’t have equipment or knowledge….I’ve
experienced so many [crises]-- Hazmat situation, air event situation, bomb squad
situation, barricaded gunman. A hostage rescue occurred few years back. A guy was
holding 3 people in a house. We had to go in and he released two shots as we were
making entry. We came in on top and he was holding a hostage with a gun to their head.
He shot himself in the head when we approached him. Good outcome for us ‘cause none
of hostages were hurt. (Michael interview, March 2011)
Michael reinforced in the story that police officers who are not EMU members are not supposed
to handle these situations because they do not have the expertise – training, equipment,
knowledge—needed to deal with barricaded gunmen. He also emphasized his expertise as a
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being a previous member of the SRT, so he knows how to lead the EMU in dealing with these
dangerous people. This is a normative lesson conveyed through story telling.
Similarly, Sam reinforced the expertise of his unit when he described what he did when
walking the floor of the Auto Show.
He then said that if they have a specific person that may be a threat then they do keep an
eye out for them. For example, [car company] said they had a disgruntled employee that
they recently fired and they were worried that the guy might try to do something at the
Auto Show. So his picture has been circulated and they are keeping an eye out for the
guy. He adds that just because the guy shows up at the Auto Show and even at [car
company’s display] still doesn’t mean that he is going to do something, so they will just
watch him but not approach him or prevent him from going anywhere. I ask Sam what is
considered suspicious behavior and he again says that it is just something they pick up on
and it is hard to say specifically. But he then does give an example that if they see a
person with a duffle bag walking around and then the person drops the duffle by a car and
walks away, then that is suspicious activity. (Auto Show walk through, Jan. 2011)
This story illustrated that Sam and other members of this organization felt confident to handle
this threat because they had “picked up” the expertise necessary to identify suspicious activity.
In another story, Michael conveyed how they always have to be on guard and look for
threats of terrorism by relating it to the September 11, 2001 World Trade Center attacks. “Now
right wing homegrown terrorists here in U.S. It keeps me up at night. Acts of terrorism in this
country has ties to [state] militia. 9/11 attacks were tied to [this state] through providing safe
houses or financial means; there was affiliation through the state.” (Michael interview, March
2011). These two stories together conveyed a world view and operating norm of risk awareness
for EMI MPD members because the world was a dangerous place and threats could manifest at
any time.
In another example, the danger of “these people” was reinforced in the terms EMU MPD
members used in stories. Members frequently used terms such as terrorist, suspicious person, and
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gunman. In another example, when the researcher asked for a crisis response example, Sam
shared the following story of “a female version of Rambo.”
For example, I’m trying to think of one [Michael] won’t mind me talking about. There
was this female version of Rambo - what happened was not reflective of the damage. For
example she says she bought fireworks but the reconstruction showed military level
munitions. We called her Rambo because she got shrapnel wounds when she blew up her
boyfriend’s car in front of his girlfriend’s house. Rambo went to CVS and steals
bandages and medical supplies, sews herself up and was living in abandoned parks for a
week. (Sam interview, Dec. 2010)
By using the name of a common pop culture security icon that used explosives to fight law
enforcement, EMU MPD members created a shortcut term that quickly labeled this woman as
dangerous to the community.
Even in a non-terrorism response or disaster response, EMU MPD this risk awareness
norm prevailed. For example, when the researcher asked him about his experience during the
2003 national power blackout that affected the city, Michael provided the following response.
SRT was responsible for maintaining downtown area headquarters and to respond to any
looting on the streets. We went to 13 hour shifts. There were no lines of communication
so we were living at base. Had to be ready to respond. Fortunately nothing
occurred….Gonna lose 37% [police] manpower ‘cause they want to be with families.
[Protecting the] city is no longer a primary concern for them. We had to learn to
compensate…We have something here for families. They can come to base and are in a
safe and clandestine place. We have food, water, radios, games. Not the most
comfortable, but we have cots and running water. (Michael interview, March 2011)
Even though this event was not caused by terrorists or “dangerous people,” the members of the
EMU MPD through this story are taught that dangerous things such as looting may take place
and the organization had a plan to protect their families from any danger that might happen
during a disaster. These stories of dangerous people and situations that needed the expertise of
the EMU MPD to resolve solidified for members their mission to “protect citizens of the
city…from acts of criminal activity and terrorism.” These stories also caused members to be
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hyper-aware of potential risks or threats around them and resulted in member defining clear
boundaries of “us” and “them”.
Proper protocol stories. The second type of story demonstrated the importance of using
proper protocol in emergency response and the negative consequences for not following
protocol. These critical incident stories encode beliefs, lessons, and values that “allow for
meaning and lessons to be transposed to current circumstances” (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer,
2003, p. 80) For example, fire response and evacuation procedures were heavily emphasized in
all three Auto Show security planning meetings given there was a fire the previous year. During
the Auto Show walk through with Sam, the researcher asked him if he worked the Auto Show
during last year’s fire, he said he did and told the following story.
As soon as we knew it was a fire we knew what to do and didn’t have to be told. We
went to the back of the Auto Show floor and split it down the middle so we were
directing half of the people to one hall exit and half of the people to the other hall
exit. …Because the fire wasn’t that big it was put out quickly and people were back
in the show in about 4-5 hours.” I ask where everyone was evacuated to and Sam
said that since the fire wasn’t big, they just were in the concourse. He also said there
were two big rooms opened up in case some people wanted to go and sit down. He
said that they had buses standing by so if it was bigger then they could evacuate to the
local community college nearby. He said the secondary location was [sporting
venue]. He said that he has a map of the evacuation route back at his office that he
could show me as well. (Sam, Auto Show walk through, Jan. 2011)
The framing of the critical incident in this story mirrored the procedures explained in the security
meetings. In knowing what to do in this situation, this story demonstrated the strict adherence of
members to protocols learned earlier and how it resulted in quick action. Another critical
incident story told by the security chief for the Auto Show reinforced humorously what happened
when a police officer didn’t follow proper protocol and wait for fire fighters to respond to the
fire and tried to put it out himself.
“Forgetting he’s a policeman” the guy used the extinguishers but also got shocked quite
badly because the catwalk was electrified because of the fire. [Everyone laughs good-
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naturedly at the story.] It was a third tier fire - 400-500 square feet on the catwalk. The
Auto Show was reopened in 4 hours after the fire. We need to just refine the system by
improving communication and working better with the [MPD] and [MFD – Metropolitan
Fire Department]. (Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010)
Although told in a humorous way, it underscored valuable lesson learned that members of
organizations needed to stay within their frame of expertise. In this case, if there was a fire this
year it is only the fire department should attempt to extinguish the fire. If a person were to stray
outside of their organizational expertise, negative consequences, such as getting a nasty shock
will occur.
Therefore, these two stories illustrated the importance of following protocol then
reflected a larger organizational culture of properly controlling dangerous people and situations.
They also highlighted a culture of bureaucratic interorganizational coordination by showing that
organizations best worked together in a crisis by staying within their area of expertise. This
bureaucratic coordination view of crisis response is discussed later in this chapter.
Selective storytelling. A theme that emerged in storytelling is that EMU MPD members
didn’t readily share stories with the researcher, and, even then, relatively few stories were told.
This seemed to counter previous research literature in which storytelling was an important
communicative action that conveyed organizational culture and membership (Trujillo &
Dionisopoulos, 1987; Van Maanen, 1973). Stories were also shared among members of the
larger macroculture during Auto Show planning meetings. Therefore, the researcher often had to
ask for specific examples of how their unit responded to emergencies or crises or about a specific
disaster response, such as the 2003 blackout event. In another instance, Sam seemed to selfcensor stories by telling the researcher, “I’m trying to think of one [Michael] won’t mind me
talking about…I’m trying to keep general so Michael doesn’t get pissed” (Sam interview, Dec.
2010). This explanation by Sam suggested that he couldn’t share too much or specific
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information with the researcher or else his supervisor might react negatively. In another
situation, both the chief of security for the Auto Show and Sam joked with other law
enforcement people that the researcher “was trouble”.
Harry the Chief of Security then walks in and Sam and he greet each other. Harry asks
me how things are going. I tell him well and thank him again for taking time to talk to
me on Saturday. He then turns to Sam and jokes with him that he knows that I am
nothing but trouble with my writing and publishing things. He jokes back that he
knows… Sam then jokes to the MEOC people that I am trouble and that I am like a postal
worker that could go off at any minute. (I laugh along with them, but part of me wonders
if there is truth behind their joking in terms of how they see me and my study as a threat
to them. I wasn’t getting any sinister undertones necessarily, but I also feel like they
were sharing a little bit of truth with each other behind their joking.) (Researcher
observations, Auto Show walk through, Jan. 2011)
One explanation for why storytelling did not naturally occur between the researcher and
members is because she wasn’t identified as a member of the organization or larger macroculture
law enforcement and first responders. As described earlier, the EMU MPD’s organizational
culture reinforced an “us” versus “them” or in-group versus out-group boundary of membership.
This boundary defining then limited how much information about their organization and
protocols they would share with non-members.
Therefore, some self-censorship may have occurred because telling too much information
would have violated cultural norms that kept information from non-members to protect the
security of the organization and operations. This is evidenced when Sam described the reason of
using secure cell phones and radios. “We have 800 megahertz radios. Patrol radios are not secure
because anyone can get radio receiver and programs book and they can listen in. What we do is
not communicate to patrol. We don’t want shithead barricaded in house to know that SWAT
[SRT] is going to break in the door” (Sam interview, Dec. 2010).
Some stories also may not have been shared because the researcher was not a member,
and therefore did not need to be socialized to the culture or taught important lessons of the
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organization. Stories often convey the informal lessons of the organization and its culture and
thus may not be as acceptable for the general public. For example, none of the stories shared by
EMU MPD members were organizational failure or organizational learning stories. Sharing
organizational failure stories to non-members would have violated the organization’s mission to
protect the people from terrorist threats and criminal activity. Since the EMU MPD wanted to
portray a culture of expertise against dangerous people and threats against the public, it could
have been seen as inappropriate for members to share these types of stories with non-members.
To summarize, stories, when shared with the researcher, reinforced the EMU MPD’s
culture that the world is full of dangerous people and situations that need to be controlled by
their organization. They always needed to be aware of the risks or threats around them and
follow proper protocol, training, and their specific expertise to control these dangerous
situations. This world view also clearly delineated membership boundaries or an “us” versus
“them” culture. Therefore members need to be careful with whom they shared stories and
information to protect themselves, others, and their operations. The final construct that helped
reveal the organizational culture of the EMU MPD was symbols, which is discussed next.
Symbols
Symbols are physical objects or non-verbal acts that “serve as a vehicle for conveying
meaning, usually by representing another thing” (Trice & Beyer, 1984, p. 655). Symbols help
reinforce norms, values, and meanings by organizational members and may get carried into
interactions with outsiders where members may assume that others understand their meaning.
For the EMU MPD, symbols of member dress and building and office structure and décor
reinforced clear in-group boundaries, lines of authority and expertise of these members to
collaborate to control dangerous people and situations. These symbols were made very visible
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when members wanted to reinforce control and authority but also hidden when they wanted to be
able to observe and gather information on dangerous people or protect themselves from
dangerous people.
Organizational member dress. The first type of symbol concerned organizational
member dress. Throughout the study, the researcher observed four general dress types or
costumes– formal uniform, specialized response uniform, professional dress, and plainclothes.
The choice of what costume to wear appeared to be very intentional and related to the situation
they were in or what level of authority they sought to convey. For example, during security
meetings for the Auto Show, Michael the MPD supervisor was in a suit most likely to convey
professionalism and that he and the EMU MPD were the lead for Auto Show security and
coordination (Auto Show mtgs., Oct.-Dec. 2010). Sam was either in professional dress or formal
uniform for these same meetings. This matched the dress of the other law enforcement members,
federal agencies, or security personnel that attended the meeting. If one wore professional dress
for the meeting, they were still easily identified by their agency ID hanging around their neck or
off their belt loop. Some also wore lapel pins that were logos for their agency. Between the
uniforms, IDs, and pins, the researcher and other people attending the meeting could identify
what organization a person belonged to in just a few seconds. Michael explained the
intentionality of his dress as such. “When I need to be very forceful I wear my uniform. When I
need to show power I wear a suit with a red tie. When dressed down I’m in a relaxed mode.
When wearing tactical uniforms it’s during a training that day or to let people know what my
skills are” (Michael interview, March 2011).
However, EMU MPD members wore “plainclothes” when they did police work out
among the public and wished to conceal their identity. This is so they could blend in and look
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like the rest of the public in order to monitor locations for “suspicious behavior or activity”
(Sam, Auto Show walk through, Jan. 2011) or observe suspicious behavior or dangerous persons.
This was most apparent during the Auto Show walk through the researcher did with Sam (Jan.
2011). He was dressed for the walk through of the floor of the Auto Show in a non-descript tshirt, jeans, and a light jacket. We also took an unmarked police car from their office to the
convention center. Once we arrived on the floor of the convention center where the Auto Show
was taking place, Sam described how they looked for suspicious activity and what he would do if
they saw such behavior and needed to take action.
At times when it is quieter like now [a day during the work week] where there aren’t as
many people, we have 20 people on the floor. We will increase it up to 60 people on
weekends, during the evening, and during special events like Charity Preview or
Education Day where there are a lot of kids on the floor.” He clarifies that each person
is assigned to a company display like Ford or Mazda, etc. I ask if they are all in
plainclothes like he is right now and he says that each person stationed at a company
display is in uniform, but the PI teams are in plainclothes and walk the entire floor. He
then says that if some suspicious activity happens and a person needs to be taken into
custody, then the plainclothes will never make the arrest, it will always be the uniform
who is radioed the information from the plainclothes person. The uniform then takes the
person to the nearest facility to be processed. (Sam, Auto Show walk through, Jan. 2011)
From this observation, the researcher concluded that dress was a function of the role
particular security personnel played during the Auto Show. Only law enforcement members with
specialized skills or from specialized agencies/departments (e.g., PI teams made up of EMU
MPD, state police, ATF, FBI and Air Marshalls) were allowed to wear plainclothes while on
duty. They were tasked with looking for dangerous people who might do harm on a larger scale
at the event, such as the disgruntled employee mentioned in the previous section. For EMU MPD
members, to do this job meant concealing their identity from the public. But patrol or basic
police officers always had to wear their formal uniform while on duty and private security wore
their professional jacket and ID. This group of security personnel were to provide a deterrent for
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more general criminal activity that occurred at large events such as theft, sexual misconduct,
missing persons (i.e., lost children), and fights. In the security reminders handed out at the Auto
Show security meeting, the following information was shared. “…please request your staff
deliver lost persons to…In the event items are lost or stolen, a report should be made to [Auto
Show] Security… Both a wristband and a credential are required for all individuals working the
show to gain admittance” (Auto Show mtg. handouts, Oct. 2010). Although this group was not
prohibited from monitoring and reporting suspicious activity, they were not given explicit
instructions or training during the security meetings or written documentation to perform that
role. Therefore, dress during the Auto Show event delineated clear lines of authority and
responsibilities of law enforcement and security personnel. By having EMU MPD members in
plainclothes, they felt they could also control any dangerous activity or a larger intentional crisis
or act of terrorism from occurring. This conclusion could also be applied to other large events
where the EMU MPD saw a threat of dangerous activity or terrorism.
Another important part of dress already mentioned was the credential or ID. The
importance of credentials for certain persons to gain access to the Auto Show floor without a
ticket or areas not accessible to the public was described earlier in the discussion of Rites and
Rituals. When the researcher participated in the Auto Show walk through with Sam, both wore
Auto Show credentials in order to gain access to the Auto Show security office and floor. The
researcher’s credentials were labeled “Family Pass” (Auto Show walk through, Jan. 2011).
Credentials were also important for the EMU MPD and law enforcement community to
quickly identify who was a member of that group and who got access to “unauthorized areas”. In
addition to the Auto Show floor, credentials were used to gain access to Auto Show security
meetings, Intelligence Operations Center (IOC), and the EMU MPD’s office or “base”. When the
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researcher did not have credentials, she had to show her driver’s license as a form of picture ID,
sign into certain locations and be escorted by an EMU MPD member.
The issue of stolen and use of fraudulent law enforcement or military IDs or Auto Show
credentials was also reinforced as a threat to security.
(U) [Unclassified] Terrorists or criminals may attempt to gain access to restricted areas
by impersonating government or military officials, or emergency personnel, but detecting
such individuals will pose an important security challenge prior to and during the 2011
[Auto Show]. However, a number of contractors, employees, vendors, and volunteers will
work in [convention center] in preparation, during and after the 2011 [Auto Show].
Employees can be used as cover by terrorists or criminals to gain access to facilities.
(Auto Show threat assessment, Dec. 2010)
Please contact the CIP [Critical Infrastructure Protection Desk with any information
pertaining to the following:…Any theft of, or missing official company identification
documents, uniforms, credentials or vehicles necessary for accessing CIKR [Critical
Infrastructure and Key Resources] facilities or sector-specific events. ([state]IOC CIPDesk brochure, Dec. 2011)
Both the Auto Show Threat Assessment document and non-first responder FLO training
(which the researcher received the CIP-Desk brochure) emphasized the danger of terrorists,
criminals, or environmental extremists. They were worried that they people would use fraudulent
credentials or IDs to try to impersonate law enforcement, military, or employees to access special
events or critical infrastructures such as energy plants, hospitals, or government buildings. Since
credentialing was an easy way to gain access or membership, tight controls and security were put
in place to prevent false identification and security threats.
Therefore, credentialing for the EMU MPD created important controls that signaled
organizational membership, belonging to a larger law enforcement community, and prevented
dangerous people from having unauthorized access by trying to be one of them. If one was
properly credentialed, then one could move freely within an event and be accepted as a part of
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the coordination team. However, if one did not have credentials, access was denied or one could
only gain access with a properly credentialed member to confirm that he could be there.
Credentials facilitate some forms of interaction and thus promote some forms of
coordination. They also serve to impede other forms of interaction and this limit some forms of
coordination. For example, tight controlling of who is credentialed to gain access to a crisis site
or EOC could prevent valuable information sharing and impede decision-making during crisis
response. In addition, levels of credentials may have the same negative effect if a person’s lower
credential automatically assigns them less authority to whatever useful information or ideas she
might have to aid in crisis response. This is further discussed in the next section and in chapter
five.
Building/Office structure and décor. The second type of symbol important to
understanding EMU MPD involved the building and office structure and décor. For example, the
“base” or building in which the EMU MPD office was located lacked any outside identification,
but did have noticeable security measures.
The building that their office is located in is not at an identified police station. The
building is not identified by any sign as being a police building. It is a one story small
building downtown that could easily be passed by without further notice. (The building
is also not identified on the police department’s website.) I would never have found it
unless I had the exact address from Sam. I park in the parking lot next to the building
and notice that there is a fenced in and gated area covered in black plastic further back in
the parking lot with an access card system at the gate. Since I see no police vehicles in
the open parking lot, I assume the gated area is where they park their vehicles. I get out
of my car and walk up a short wheelchair accessible ramp to the front door. Again, there
is no sign on the door, no instructions, just a speaker box with a white button. I press the
button and release it. After a few seconds, someone comes over the intercom and asks
me what my business is. I explain that I am there for a meeting with Sam of the EMU
MPD. I hear a buzzing sound and pull on the door to enter. Once in the door there is a
small entryway area with a couple of chairs totally closed off from the rest of the interior.
There is a large white sign with red all caps block lettering next to the door that says,
“PERSONS ENTERING ARE SUBJECT TO SEARCH. NO WEAPONS. NO
FIREARMS. (INCLUDES FINGERNAIL FILES, PEN KNIVES, POCKET KNIVES).”
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Soon a uniformed officer opens a door on the opposite side of the entrance and gestures
me in. (Researcher observations, Nov. 2010)
Whenever the researcher was inside the building to meet with Sam or Michael, she was always
escorted to the EMU MPD offices. She was also escorted to the locked conference room where
some of the meetings took place and to the restroom.
The Intelligence Operations Center (IOC) and High-Intensity Drug Trafficking Area
(HIDTA) center were in another location that the EMU MPD personnel used during daily
operations and the Auto Show. They were also located in a non-descript office building in the
city, again except for the high security measures needed to gain access.
We walk to a building entrance and Sam asks me if I have ID, I tell him I do. He says
that everyone who goes into the HIDTA has to have federal clearance and I don’t have it.
But since the IOC is in a conference room next to the HIDTA we can go in there. We go
to the front desk and sign in. Sam greets the security person and asks if we need to show
ID, but the person replies that we do not. As we get into the elevator, Sam comments that
the person should have checked our IDs. We get off of the floor where the IOC is and I
notice a keypad next to the door. Sam opens his phone and calls someone to let us in. As
we are waiting, he gestures to a door at the end of the hall and says that it is where the
HIDTA is. A guy meets us at the door and greets Sam. Sam introduces us and he holds
open the door for us. Sam reaches for the next door handle to pull it open and the guy
quickly pulls his hand away and tells Sam that he should know better than to touch the
door. (Weird, some sort of security measure?) I do notice that above the door handle is a
large grey knob that kind of looks like a combination lock thing but we go too quickly
through the door for me to examine it closer. (Researcher observations, Jan. 2011)
In addition, these two locations were not named on the MPD website, nor was any
contact information given for their offices (MPD website, March 2011). Sam revealed that the
non-identification of EMU MPD operational locations was intentional.
I asked if this [base] was considered a police station - Sam said it is not a station. ‘There
is no access to the public for security reasons. The same goes for Tac. Ops, [Tactical
Operations] which is located [near downtown landmark].” Tac. Ops. is next to them on
the org. chart and report to same person as [EM] Unit but not under [EMU MPD].
(Researcher observations, March 2011)
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Although specific “security reasons” was never fully explained, it was a term often used by EMU
MPD and other law enforcement personnel throughout the study to justify certain actions by the
EMU MPD or law enforcement and also the restriction or denial of access to information. In this
case, they used “security reasons” to justify obscuring their identity to the public, or more
importantly, to prevent dangerous people from targeting their location. This was justified
because of the sensitive and sometimes “classified” nature of their job and the fact that they did
not interact with the public on a daily basis. However, MPD police stations were clearly
identified so the public could call upon them when they needed assistance or to report a crime. In
fact, if a citizen wanted to report suspected terrorism, the city government and MPD websites
directed people to the city’s Homeland Security and Emergency Management website and
contact information. Therefore, this intentional concealment of location reinforced the secretive
culture of the EMU MPD.
Once inside these locations, the office décor and equipment reflected the security and
closed culture of the EMU MPD and similar law enforcement agencies. For example, the IOC
conference room set up for monitoring suspicious activity during the Auto Show reflected this
culture.
We walk down a hallway and turn in to a medium sized conference room. There is a
long conference room table in the middle and rows of computers on either side of the
table. Probably 14-16 desktops and a lap top as well. On top of each computer monitor
(or fallen down next to a computer) is a paper triangle placard stating the name of the
agency at that computer...On the whiteboard to the right as we walk in is a large taped up
schedule of when the IOC is open and all of the special Auto Show days listed (press
days, charity event, education day, etc.)…At the other end is another white board. On it
are two pictures and descriptions of two people. In front of that is a TV on a cart that is
tuned to some local TV station. Sam motions me down to one of the computers at the end
and gestures me to sit down next to him. He said that this was the EMU MPD station but
there are people here from DEA, [public transportation security], Air Marshals, FBI, etc.
He said that this is pretty much the operation here. The EMU MPD person also works in
the HIDTA when he’s not in here working the Auto Show). All of the computers have
the ETEAM software main login page on the screen. He tries to log into ETEAM but it
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won’t let him because he is still logged in back at the station…I point to the pictures on
the wall and ask him if one of those was the suspicious [auto company] person we were
talking about during the Auto Show walk through. He says yes and points him out. I told
him that I also saw that same flyer in their office earlier today. (Researcher observations,
Jan. 2011)
As this description illustrates, password protected computers with secure database
programs that coordinate and share information were accessible only by those law enforcement
personnel or agencies supporting security monitoring of suspicious persons, criminals or
terrorists. Information on suspicious persons was posted on the wall. The TV was there to
monitor and gather information on what the media said about an emergency were it to occur
during the Auto Show. Other than what was described above, the room is very plain with no
windows or other decorations or information that doesn’t pertain to the purpose of the IOC. The
room was devoid of any personalization or sense of identity or community one would see in
other organizations. This again reinforced the serious mission of the EMU MPD to protect the
citizens of the community from dangerous people and the measures they had in place to prevent
this from occurring. This room structure and equipment used also symbolized the collaborative
nature that the EMU MPD had with other law enforcement and security agencies. This will be
discussed further in the next section on EMU MPD collaboration and coordination.
The décor at the EMU MPD main office also reinforced that this space was primarily
meant for members of the EMU MPD and other law enforcement agencies that supported or
worked with them. The spaces also conveyed that it was not intended to facilitate interaction
with the public. In this space there were 3-4 chairs against the wall and a small coffee table with
magazines on it that resembled a makeshift waiting room in the large open room. However,
upon closer inspection, the magazines were all homeland security or law enforcement trade
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magazines (Researcher observations, Nov. 2010). These magazines symbolized that the only
guests the EMU MPD expected in the office were other law enforcement members.
Above the chairs was a row of pictures that included the city mayor and others in police
uniforms, including the EMU MPD supervisor. At the end of the row was a hand drawn picture
of a police officer with a name under it. These pictures were described by Sam; “ a line of
reporting chain from their office up to the Mayor…that every police station is supposed to have
posted for the public to see but not all of them do” (Researcher observations, Jan. 2011). When
asked about the hand drawn picture after the EMU MPD supervisor, Sam laughed and responded
that it was “an inside joke of the office” and provided no further explanation. These pictures then
reinforced the authoritative culture of the EMD by displaying the strict line of reporting authority
EMU MPD personnel were expected to follow. Even though Sam described the pictures as
required to be posted for the public, the fact that an inside joke hand-drawn picture was posted
next to them indicated that they did not intend the public to frequent the office.
In addition, the bulletin board in the EMU MPD office reflected the roles and
responsibilities of the unit.
I notice that there is a flat screen TV on the opposite side of the wall, turned on but no
one is in the room to watch it. I watch CNN for a minute, then turn my attention to the
bulletin board next to the TV. There are lots of pieces of paper tacked to the wall. Some
are police union and MPD meeting notices. Some are Excel Spreadsheet training
schedules for the various units under EMU MPD (bomb squad, SRT, etc.). I also see
some flyers or notices showing a few people’s faces and explanations of criminal activity
they are wanted for or suspicious persons for EMU MPD members to watch for. One of
them has “arrested” listed next to it and I see that on the paper the notification was sent
out by Michael, the EMU MPD Supervisor. (Researcher observations, Jan. 2011)
Besides general meeting notices one expects to find at offices, training notices, suspicious person
notices, and notices of criminal arrests by the EMU MPD posted on this bulletin board reinforced
the expertise of the EMU to control dangerous people and situations. Again, this information was
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only meant for law enforcement and EMU MPD members given it was located in a secure office
space in a building not identified as a police station.
In summary, the dress of members and design and décor of EMU MPD offices and
buildings symbolized a clear in-group and out-group membership distinction. Those considered
as part of the in-group for EMU MPD were those members of their unit or other law enforcement
personnel who collaborated with them in fulfilling their mission to protect citizens against
terrorists or other dangerous criminals. Costumes and credentials of the EMU MPD members
and other law enforcement organizations symbolized this in-group as well as revealed a level of
trust one could feel towards another in just in a few seconds of looking at another person. The
office décor also reflected this in-group status by the specialized type of information or
equipment made available to these members and not to out-group member or the public. Lack of
identification of locations of EMU MPD offices (“base” and IOC) and high security measures of
those locations symbolized and reinforced for members the “secure” nature of their work and
need to protect themselves and information from those dangerous people or non-law enforcement
people not authorized to have access. This in-group and out-group distinction also affected
whether the EMU MPD had a more collaborative or coordinating relationship with other crisis
response organizations. This will be explained further in the next section.
MPD’s Crisis Response as Collaboration for In-Groups and Coordination for Out-Groups
As described in chapter one, although the terms crisis coordination and crisis
coordination are often used interchangeably, they are two distinct worldviews of crisis response.
Crisis coordination implies a minimal level of involvement between organizations to achieve
crisis response and mitigation, or “mutually agreed upon cooperation about how to carry out
particular tasks” (Quarantelli, 1997a, p. 48). In crisis coordination two independent agencies can
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work in conjunction with one another but have minimal interaction and association during a
crisis response. In crisis collaboration, crisis response organizations create an alliance in which
they value inter-organizational interdependence, equal input of participants, and shared decisionmaking (Keyton & Stallworth, 2003) in order to reach their shared goal of effective crisis
response and mitigation, even under severe time and decision-making pressures. In other words,
crisis collaboration connotes a deeper partnership between organizations where the crisis
response mission, decisions, and activities are jointly established and carried out.
An organization’s culture can affect whether its members see crisis response as crisis
coordination or crisis collaboration. Members of the Emergency Management Unit of the
Metropolitan Police Department (EMU MPD) described themselves as having what the
researcher would define as a collaborative relationship with other groups in crisis response.
“Because [EMU MPD] done such a good job at developing relationships with other agencies,
there’s no problem communicating or getting response [during a crisis]” (Sam interview, Dec.
2010). Upon closer inspection, one finds that EMU MPD does indeed have a collaborative
relationship with in-group organizations that are part of a larger macroculture because these law
enforcement and first responder organizations share institutional familiarity and cultural
similarity. However, they have a more bureaucratic coordination relationship with those
organizations and members they deem outside their marcoculture’s organizational boundaries.
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Figure 5: EMU MPD's crisis response relationship with other organizations.

Figure 5 illustrates the relationships with organizations EMU MPD described. This figure
was created by the researcher based on members’ descriptions in formal and informal interviews,
researcher observations of Auto Show security planning meetings and Auto Show walk through,
and the non-first responder fusion liaison officer (FLO) training. The boundary surrounding
EMU MPD is a solid line to demonstrate it has rigid organizational boundaries due to its culture
of expertise and secrecy. Auto Show and MEOC are represented in bold and italics to indicate
that it is a collaborative group with representatives of the connected organizations. The arrows
illustrate the primary flow of communication, whether in one direction or flowing freely between
the two. If the arrow is a solid line then it represents more of a crisis coordination relationship; if
it is dotted then it represents a crisis collaborative relationship. The circle serves as a reminder
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that these organizations have interdependence with context (Stohl & Putnam, 1994). Therefore,
past crisis experiences, history, economy, and politics affect the EMU MPD and other
organizations at a local community and national level.
This lower level of coordinated response with out-groups could result in coordination and
communication issues when the EMU MPD engage in larger interorganizational response efforts
or work within the Metropolitan Emergency Response Center (MEOC). This is because the
MEOC’s membership extends beyond the macroculture’s in-group of the law enforcement and
first responder community. This worldview of crisis collaboration with in-groups and crisis
coordination with out-groups was a result of EMU MPD’s organizational culture and is detailed
next.
Crisis Collaboration with In-Group Organizations
Chapter one described how organizational members use culture to identify with their
organization and to also differentiate themselves, and therefore the organization as a whole, from
those they perceive as competitors. Creating identity through organizational culture also creates
and maintains organizational boundaries. Boundaries can be either rigid or more flexible through
the use of both physical (e.g., badges, uniforms, etc.) and informational means (e.g., stories,
jargon, etc.). Reflecting on Oakes, Haslam, and Turner’s (1994) work on in-group versus outgroup behavior, Abrams, O’Connor and Giles (2002) observed that organizational members
maintain rigid boundaries between in-group and out-group identities by developing different
ways of communicating within the organization and externally to others (p. 230). It is through
these communicative actions that “members display their belongingness to the organization as
well as their opposition to those outside the organization” (Trujillo & Dionisopoulos, 1987, p.
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199), as well as “constitute a system of common social meanings and shared interpretive schema
within an organization” (Trujillo & Dionisopoulos, 1987, p. 199).
This in-group versus out-group boundaries is not just limited to the organization itself.
These boundaries can also be drawn wider to include organizations that members of an
organization see as allies or partners in the work they do or part of a larger macroculture of
organizations with similar organizational cultures and missions. The EMU MPD appeared to
have more effective communication and crisis collaboration with other law enforcement and first
responder groups who were part of this larger macroculture because the organization illustrated
the boundary spanning concepts of institutional familiarity and cultural similarity with these
organizations (Batteau, Brandenburg, Seeger, and Eaton, 2007). This, in turn, facilitated crisis
collaboration features of information sharing among these organizations and a high level of
member trust and loyalty towards this larger in-group macroculture.
Boundary spanning. As described in chapter one, boundary spanning occurs when
organizational members reach across the boundaries of their group or organizational membership
in order to seek or share information (Leifer & Delbecq, 1976). Boundary spanning by members
of EMU MPD was facilitated by the concepts of institutional familiarity and cultural similarity.
First, institutional familiarity defines how well collaborating group members know of and
understands the other organizations they are working with. The easiest way to facilitate this is
by working with other organizations on a day-to-day basis. When asked which organizations the
EMU MPD works with on a daily basis, Michael, EMU MPD supervisor replied with the
following.
Federal, state and local. I work with everybody, everybody has a cell phone and I call
them. Federally I work with FBI, ATF, Secret Service, Coast Guard, US Customs,
Homeland Security investigators. I also work with various county agencies and law
enforcement agencies - local municipal police departments, fire departments, EMS. I
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have 4000 business cards and 2000 contacts on my cell phone. (Michael interview,
March 2011)
Besides daily interactions, institutional familiarity was also facilitated through
participation in past crisis response efforts or in pre-planning training and exercises. As
described earlier, the Auto Show was an annual event and security planning meetings for the
show had occurred for the past 10 years (Harry, Auto Show Security Chief, Jan. 2011). This
annual planning among law enforcement, security and first responders translated into a high level
of familiarity and trust among members that the researcher noticed during the security planning
meetings for the Auto Show.
As I [the researcher] was waiting, I noticed that a lot of people seemed to know one
another already - they addressed other people by name and there were lots of handshakes
and a few manly pats on the back… There were already some jokes being thrown around
by him [Harry] as he pointed out one DPD officer who entered the room late. It was the
kind of joking from people who were familiar with each other. (Auto Show mtg., Oct.
2010)
In addition, during these meetings, there were often remarks made by the Auto Show
Security Chief and EMU MPD about how well the organizations assembled worked together and
they frequently thanked other groups for their support. For example, Harry mentioned that a
reason for the success of the fire response at last year’s Auto Show was because they all worked
shows in the past and were able to work well as a team (Harry, Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010).
Later in the meeting Michael, EMU MPD supervisor, added his thanks by saying, “Thank you all
for your agencies’ support to the continued success of this event. We want to have another
successful event,” (Michael, Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010). In the December Auto Show meeting,
Michael again thanked law enforcement for their help. “I have to commend everyone because
you really helped us out to put out more manpower which works in our favor,” (Michael, Auto
Show mtg., Dec. 2010). The familiarity of working day-to-day with these organizations and
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years of planning Auto Show security resulted in a EMU MPD members having a high level of
trust, teamwork, and willingness to put forth extra effort to ensure that collaboration and
successful crisis response occurred.
Second, while Michael claimed in the earlier quote that the EMU MPD works with
“everybody”, the organizations he listed were those law enforcement and first responder
organizations that were culturally similar to his organization. Cultural similarity is how much
organizational cultural values, norms, and structures overlap with their own organizational
culture (Batteau, Brandenburg, Seeger, and Eaton, 2007).

Therefore, the EMU MPD

collaborated more easily with these organizations because they had similar missions, hierarchical
structures, and vocabulary.
For example, the mission of the EMU MPD was similar to other law enforcement
agencies - to protect and serve the public by preventing terrorism and criminal activity. It
therefore collaborated most often with federal, state and local agencies that performed the same
activities or provided information to the EMU MPD so they could complete their operations.
Sam often mentioned that they had a good relationship with these agencies because these groups
supported their efforts. “It isn’t like the movies, which always shows the FBI coming in and
taking over the investigation and pushing the local agency aside. The federal agencies mainly
play a support role to the local agencies unless the local agency requests help or unless there it is
a case that has federal jurisdiction” (Sam, Auto Show walk through, Jan. 2011).
The EMU MPD also shared a paramilitaristic culture with law enforcement and first
responder organizations by sharing similar vocabulary, symbols and organizational structures. As
stated in the vocabulary section of this chapter, in Auto Show meetings these organizations often
used terms such intelligence, incident, patrol, threats, tactical operations, classified and for
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official use only (Auto Show mtgs., Oct. 2010-Dec. 2010). When organizational members used
these terms, no one ever asked for clarification or further explanation of the meaning of a term.
Law enforcement and first responder organizations also had similar organizational
structures represented by member dress. At Auto Show meetings, uniformed members from
different organizations represented the lower level response staff and more specialized groups
within an organization and federal agencies wore suits. They also had a common understanding
that being in uniform meant reinforcing authoritative or official public presence in order to deter
criminal activity. In contrast, wearing plainclothes meant that obfuscating one’s identity was
necessary to blend into the environment and covertly monitor for potential threats.
The researcher then saw this dress reinforced at the Auto Show. The lower levels of the
police department or “patrol” and private security wore uniforms and were prominently stationed
at exhibits and outside the show floor. However, EMU MPD members were in plainclothes when
walking the floor of the show. Other state police officers and federal agents who made up the
more specialized PI teams were also seen in the security office in plainclothes (Auto Show visit
2, Jan. 2011).
A third cultural similarity was that these organizations followed the bureaucratic
approach of coordination as the appropriate method and structure of crisis response. This
“command and control” model favored top-down, hierarchical decision-making and
centralization of power in an attempt to control the chaos inherent in disasters (Auf der Heide,
1989; Drabek, 2003; Quarantelli, 1997a; Tierney, 2007). This bureaucratic approach was
reflected by member’s strict adherence to the Incident Command System (ICS) and response
protocols and procedures.
My office is responsible for running Incident Command, establish a list of what has taken
place, run Incident Command System. Concept is to run smoother and faster…We set up
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a command post on scene and staging area so personnel know where to come and role
and responsibilities. (Researcher: Who responds?) Police, fire, EMS personnel,
depending on the situation. Role of incident commander could change. If fire, then police
goes from primary to secondary command and we are there in support for the other.
(Researcher: How similar or different is this from to day to day?) Same for day to day. It
is designed to deal with any critical incident. We all use the ICS system. Everyone is
trained with ICS for unit. MPD is mandated by the federal government for all first
responders. Fire, police, EMS all know ICS. (Michael interview, March 2011)
ICS was used consistently by these culturally-similar groups in both day-to-day emergency
responses and in larger crisis response. Although mandated by the federal government and tied to
federal funding, ICS was easy for these groups to use because it was so similar to their
organizational cultures and structure of hierarchical decision-making, authority, and using
specific protocols for every response.
Also, in a bureaucratic approach to crisis response, every group has its own expertise and
distinct role to play. This approach was easily accepted and supported by these groups. For
example, during Auto Show meetings, each group reported an update on what they were doing to
prepare for the event and what role they would be playing. A story was also told multiple times
by the Auto Show Security Chief to reinforce not going outside one’s role. “The director told
story of a member of his staff who went up to catwalk to put out fire. ‘Forgetting he’s a
policeman’ the guy used the extinguishers but also got shocked quite badly because catwalk was
electrified because of fire” (Harry, Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010). This expertise and adhering to
roles is also supported in the bureaucratic ICS structure for crisis response.
If there is a fire, automatically fire is the lead agency, lead incident commander is MFD,
police takes direction from them. If bomb threat, then police is lead, fire assists and is on
standby in case something happens. Police will block off traffic, bomb squad goes inside.
But dependent upon type of crisis. EMS can be lead if mass casualty. Water dept. can be
lead as well, depends on situation. In incident management everyone has to know their
role. We’re not EMS, not fire. (Michael interview, March 2011)
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Therefore, cultural similarity was found among these law enforcement and first responder
organizations through their similar paramilitaristic culture and bureaucratic approach to
coordination through use of ICS during crisis response.
Crisis collaboration features as a result of boundary spanning. This boundary
spanning among law enforcement and other first responder organizations meant that they saw
each other as part of the larger in-group macroculture and therefore more easily collaborated
with each other in preparing for and responding to crises. This crisis collaboration was evident
through the features mentioned in chapter one: having a common crisis response goal, in-group
member trust and loyalty, and information sharing among members.
The EMU MPD collaborated well with these in-group organizations because they had a
common goal for crisis response: to prevent and control the chaos that crises created. For
example, the law enforcement, security and first responder organizations collaborated well with
each other in planning the annual Auto Show. This was because their common goal was to
prevent disruptions by terrorists during the Auto Show and keep the public safe from incidents or
emergencies.
Boundary spanning among in-group organizations also resulted in the crisis collaboration
feature of a high level of member trust and loyalty and seeing others in their in-group as partners.
For example, the EMU MPD often described the importance of having developed relationships
with members of these groups. [In one situation], “I arrived on scene and called Michael. He
then called the FBI, the person he knows. Michael has a relationship with federal and local
agencies so they are only a phone call away” (Sam interview, Dec. 2010). These relationships are
developed by boundary spanning of members in daily responses where they may work together,
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but also in crisis planning and trainings and working events like the Auto Show over several
years.
Personally we don’t have any [challenges] we’ve been doing it for so long. The
educational piece has been established and embedded in various disciplines [police, fire,
EMS] all coming together. There’s no testosterone in command post or staging area.
When we do have a situation, we’re not seeing each other for the first time, we know
each other. We’ve done practice, done scenarios so we have section bosses or lower level
officers know each other and then others in in the discipline relax [seeing this]. (Michael
interview, March 2011)
This level of familiarity and trust among members of these organizations was also
manifested during Auto Show meetings by social rituals they enacted through communication at
Auto Show planning meetings (Pacanowsky & O’Donnell-Trujillo, 1982). These social rituals
included friendly interpersonal interactions between members of different organizations before
and after meetings, the high level of joking among organizational members, and the appreciation
shown to other organizations during meetings. These are social rituals because they are not
needed to “get the job done” and may seem at odds with the serious task of planning for a
potential crisis. But they “perform the important function of identifying membership status in a
group” by displaying “oneness” (Pacanowsky & O’Donnell-Trujillo, 1982, p. 136-137).
For example, before and after Auto Show meetings, members from different groups were
engaged in conversations with one another. Body language was very relaxed – people were
standing closely, handshakes and back slaps occurred often, and laughter filled the room. Also at
Auto Show meetings, joking or teasing others from different organizations was done by the Auto
Show Security Director, EMU MPD Supervisor, fire department, and MPD tactical operations.
They often made jokes about others before introducing them, if someone came in late, or when
sharing information. These were met with plenty of congenial laughter from the entire room.
Finally, during Auto Show meetings members of one organization often thanked other
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organizations for their help and support. For example, when the fire department spokesperson
speaks about last year’s fire at one meeting, he thanks the MPD for their handling of the situation
last year. Immediately Michael from the MPD gives kudos back to the fire department for their
response (Auto Show mtg., Nov. 2010). Harry, at the first meeting also thanked every office for
their help as he introduces them to share their report (Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010).
Although none of these organizations use the word, “partner” or “partnership” this was
evident by the words and actions by members of these organizations towards others in this ingroup. Michael best summed up his high level of trust and loyalty with members of this in-group
when he said, “Everyone is familiar with each other and we come together” (Auto Show mtg.,
Oct. 2010).
Another feature of crisis collaboration illustrated by this in-group was how easily and
frequently these organizations shared information with each other. Auto Show meetings
facilitated some of this information sharing as each group was given a chance to discuss their
role and pass along important information for others to know. But access to various interoperable
communication tools and systems were the main mechanisms emphasized for interorganizational
information sharing. For example, possessing interoperable radios with the same frequency to
talk with one another during the Auto Show was a high priority for those coordinating security.
This year we are requiring all people that are hired as security…to have an interoperable
radio on them. As you all know, last year there was a fire during the Auto Show…DPD
and DFD did a good job, but they couldn’t communicate with some sites to tell them
about the evacuation because they didn’t have the same radio system. This is a strong
weakness. (Harry, Auto Show mtg., Oct. 2010)
Interoperable radio requirements were communicated at every meeting and Harry emphasized
that they had up to 500 available for those who needed them because “communication is a key
importance” (Auto Show mtg., Dec. 2010).
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A second communication mechanism used for information sharing was ETEAM. As
described earlier, ETEAM is a secured database system for information sharing and coordinated
response. During the Auto Show meetings, the use of ETEAM as a resource for sharing
information was mentioned several times. On one occasion Sam from EMU MPD showed her
how ETEAM worked.
Sam shows me all of the events that are in the system and that a new event is added each
time. I see events going back to 2006… He then clicks on the 2011 Auto Show and
shows me a screen where he explains that the files are separated by location. There are
files for information from the Auto Show Security Center, [Auto company] Center, IOC
at HIDTA, and the MEOC…He clicks on one of the file links and there are a lot of other
blue hyperlinks with a date, person who entered in info and then a brief title. He searches
and then clicks on one of them so I can see the information that was entered. Some were
just status updates such as “no new information to report”, a request to look up a name of
a person, or a short description of what occurred at a protest. He then tells me that the
best thing about ETEAM is that the messages then go directly to his phone and email so
he doesn’t even need to be at a computer in order to get the messages. I ask him if all the
messages inputted into ETEAM get sent out to people’s phones. He said no…only
messages deemed important or emergency information gets sent to everyone on the list.
He also points out to me that the event is in green which means that things are going
normally and are pretty quiet. (Auto Show walk through, Jan. 2011)
In this example, Sam mentioned another collaborative resource for these groups, fusion
centers. Fusion centers are the “Collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide
resources, expertise, and information to center with goal of maximizing ability to detect, prevent,
investigate and respond to criminal and terrorist activity” (Rick, [state]IOC, FLO Training, Dec.
2010). These fusion centers operated during special events but also throughout the year to share
information. The importance of these centers for information sharing was also emphasized at the
Auto Show meetings.
The intelligence piece will be in the [state] IOC. Any intelligence you have will be
filtered through that center.
Both Saturdays are critical because of [sporting
events]…There will be a listserv that will blast out messages. You will be notified if you
are on the list. This is a good situational awareness management tool….Each year gets
better and better – just fine tuning. We’re also reaching out to the [Auto Company’s]
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global intelligence center so we are together and on the same page. (Dan, [state] IOC,
Auto Show mtg., Nov. 2010)
Therefore, there were several collaborative communication mechanisms, interoperable
radios, ETEAM, and fusion centers, these organizations used to share information during the
Auto Show. These mechanisms were also used throughout the year for other crisis responses.
However, these mechanisms were only accessible to those members of law enforcement, security
or first responder organizations. Sam and others at the Auto Show meeting often commented
how one needed to be “on the list” in order to be notified. Dan also stated at the FLO training
that, “Member agencies of [state]IOC are mostly law enforcement- National Guard, Coast
Guard, ATF, TSA, FBI, DHS, State Police, Department of Corrections” (Dec. 2010).
In summary, several elements of crisis collaboration in daily emergency response and
larger crisis planning and response were evident in the EMU MPD and between similar law
enforcement, security, and first responder organizations. This in-group of organizations existed
because they had similar organizational cultures that resulted in a larger shared macroculture.
Cultural similarities included a mutual understanding that tasks and resources were best managed
by experts in their related fields and decisions during a response need to be made through the
Incident Command System. This allowed for boundary spanning among organizations. This
boundary spanning resulted in crisis collaboration features of sharing a common crisis response
goal, a willingness to share information with each other, and a high level of trust and loyalty
towards each other.
However, for those organizations that may be involved in crisis response but were not
considered part of this in-group, the EMU MPD had a rigid membership boundary and took a
more bureaucratic coordination approach to crisis response. This is discussed in the next section.
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Crisis Coordination with Out-Group Organizations
In the researcher’s observations and interviews with members of the EMU MPD,
organizations that were not part of the in-group were seldom mentioned in crisis response. These
organizations included the city Homeland Security and Emergency Management (HSEM)
agency, non-profit disaster relief organizations, city public works (water, utilities,
transportation), and hospitals. These organizations, along with the in-group organizations, made
up the Metropolitan Emergency Operations Center (MEOC) or the city’s crisis response
coordination group. When they were mentioned by the EMU MPD or inquired about by the
researcher, these out-group organizations were clearly labeled as support organizations to the
EMU MPD, and sometimes competition as the case of the city HSEM. This reflected a more
formal and rigid membership boundary and more bureaucratic approach of coordination between
EMU MPD and these organizations. This also led to frustration by some of these other
organization for being relegated to this support role and the lack of information sharing from the
EMU MPD.
When the EMU MPD was in-charge of an emergency response, it thought of these other
groups as providing a supportive role helping the EMU MPD fulfill their core mission. This
supportive role was reinforced by Michael calling these organizations “resources.”
“I’ll get call from supervisor. I’ll start putting overall assessment together on what is
needed, what is not needed in terms of resources, blockade…I will then come over the
radio telling them I’ve taken over as incident commander and call for resources - fire,
EMS, public works, [local utility] for gas. I’ll call resources or person with me will call.
(Michael interview, March 2011)
Non-profit disaster relief organizations were also seen in a supporting role of the EMU MPD
mission. The Salvation Army got “coffee and water for divers” and EMU MPD worked with the
“Red Cross during evacuations that require folks to be outside of their homes” (Michael

198
interview, March 2011). The public was also seen as a resource by providing information to the
EMU MPD so they could fulfill their mission of protecting the city from terrorism. “Information
sharing is vetting and getting information to law enforcement and community by doing programs
in the community and educate them on what to look for on what terrorists may or may not be”
(Michael interview, March 2011). The public more broadly was seen as the group needing
protection and as a source of threats.
Most telling was how they viewed the city HSEM which was the head of the MEOC
during larger crisis response. In the following quotes, one can see how members of the EMU
MPD differentiated themselves from the city HSEM by the claiming different expertise and
missions. They also relegated city HSEM to a support role when they were in charge of the
response.
While waiting for a tour, I ask Sam how EMU MPD is related to the city HSEM. He
says that HSEM is civilian homeland security. He also said that they don’t typically
work with them unless they need to get buses or something. (Auto Show mtg., Dec.
2010)
I ask Sam if they are involved in MEOC - he said they work side by side but not together.
We take input but in the end we make decisions. For example if we needed 5 buses we
would call them and request. Emergency response such as evacuation, we work hand in
hand, but a tactical situation such as gunman, we notify them only. (Sam interview, Dec.
2010)
(Researcher: What is the difference between your unit and the Homeland Security
Department under Director [Ross]?) We respond to the situation. They [city HSEM]
would respond if needed to support with additional resources. They handle grants, we do
law enforcement response…. (Researcher: How do you work with them in crisis
response?) We have them come in and do some coordination with other city entities or
outside city entities for consequence management. Under the Urban Area Security
Initiative (UASI) they’ll get additional resources from neighboring counties. Director
[Ross] helps facilitate to bring in additional emergency management, health, etc. They
also help by doing set up of the staging areas for families and tag people. (Michael
interview, March 2011)
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One can infer from these comments that the city HSEM was not seen as part of the earlier
in-group, even though they were part of the Auto Show planning group. In addition, several of its
members had military backgrounds and HSEM used the same paramilitaristic Incident Command
System and NIMS structure for crisis response. This distinction was made clear by EMU MPD
members’ use of the words “civilian” and “we do law enforcement”.
HSEM was also seen as a resource coordinator, not an equal expert in emergency
response. Even in a natural disaster response, when the city HSEM’s MEOC leads the response,
EMU MPD was clear that their role was only in providing their expertise, such as evacuating
people and nothing more. (Evacuating people fit under their mission of protecting people.)
National disaster planning we do with Director [Ross]’s people. But for snowstorms,
response is more non-police. Police are involved in national disasters only if “it” hits the
fan. We’re involved with evacuation routes; ensuring people get out and clear a path. We
are utilized to get them out. (Sam informal interview, March 2011)
By excluding HSEM from the law enforcement community and larger in-group and
changing their expertise to resource coordination, EMU MPD members removed any direct
competition to their expertise. This is because EMU MPD’s authoritative and expert culture
created strong membership identities that were threatened when another organization claimed a
similar mission and expertise. This choice for EMU MPD members to see HSEM as competition
rather than an interdependent collaborative partner will be discussed further in chapter five.
Seeing themselves as experts and delegating other organizations as support functions or
resources to manage was most in line with a crisis coordination worldview as discussed in
chapter one. EMU MPD members’ primary concern in crisis response was in meeting the
individual organizational goal of protecting others from terrorism and criminal activity. Members
focused on their expert area of crisis response and didn’t see themselves as part of a response if it
didn’t involve their expertise. EMU MPD members followed decision-making as top-down
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orders from themselves if they were the incident commander or took orders if another
organization was the incident commander. And although both EMU MPD and city HSEM both
had “emergency management” in their names, the EMU MPD saw the city HSEM as
competition for resources and recognition of expertise. This is why they clearly distinguished the
city HSEM as an outgroup organization, even though others might see them as more similar
organizations.
Finally, as noted earlier, EMU MPD was clearly reluctant to share information with the
researcher and other organizations not in the in-group. This seemed to be the biggest frustration
of other organizations that saw themselves as key participants and partners in crisis response. For
example, at the third Auto Show meeting, a representative from the Mayor’s office reminded the
other law enforcement and first responder groups that they wanted to be involved in the crisis
communication plan and work with other organizations if an event such as a fire occurred (Dec.
2010).
Hospital security chiefs were also frustrated with the relationship they had with law
enforcement organizations such as the EMU MPD.
Information sharing doesn’t happen. Law enforcement failed to reach out to private
sector. They reach out to [auto companies] but ignore hospitals and never get info from
them…Information sharing doesn’t happen on any level with hospital and law
enforcement. City HSEM does share info but law enforcement just shows up instead of
working with hospital security. It boils down to mutual respect. (John, Hospital A
Security Chief, FLO training, Dec. 2010)
Later, at that same training, John asked for a “seat at the table for a two-way exchange of
information.” Dan from state police agreed that law enforcement needed to move from a “need to
know” to a “duty to share”. However when Dan described the purpose of the FLO training
course, there was still a sense of separation between “first responders” and “non-first responders”
with information sharing mostly traveling in one direction to law enforcement.
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The purpose of course is to help the dissemination and collection of information…I want
to involve private corporations and those outside law enforcement to foster culture of
cooperation…This is the private sector one-day course. We have an Emergency Response
course for the next three days that includes police, fire, and EMS. For first responders,
we give them direct connectivity to intelligence operations center and the ability to
submit info and get notified if something goes down. (Dan, state police department, FLO
training, Dec. 2010)
A “culture of cooperation” that Dan mentioned is the lowest form of coordination and isn’t the
two-way collaboration that other organizations wanted. This quote also illustrated how first
responders received longer training sessions and had direct connectivity to the IOC whereas the
FLO training emphasized how non-first responders could be aware of and report suspicious
activity. As state police were part of the larger in-group described earlier, this reflected that
culture of loyalty to the in-group when it came to communication and information sharing.
EMU MPD members identified themselves as being collaborative with other
organizations in crisis response. However, this study showed that the organization only had a
crisis collaborative relationship with those organizations it considered part of its in-group. For
those organizations in the out-group that could have an important role or must be involved in
certain crisis responses, EMU MPD had a more coordinating relationship. This is because it saw
those organizations in a supporting role to their management of a crisis.
These member beliefs produced the cultural barriers of organizational expertise,
competition, and unit diversity to interorganizational crisis collaboration with these
organizations. As presented earlier, the EMU MPD viewed themselves as organizational experts
in preventing terrorism and controlling dangerous people and situations. They also saw their
organization in competition with the city HSEM to be seen as the emergency management
experts. Finally, the EMU MPD’s culture of crisis response as was different from those who
were not a part of the law enforcement, security, or first responder unit.
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This larger view of EMU MPD’s crisis response as crisis coordination rather than crisis
collaboration could have potential issues and negative ramifications when it must work within
the MEOC or with other out-group organizations for certain crisis responses. This problem
becomes magnified in more dynamic circumstances and larger events that stretch the resources.
These responses are going to required partnerships where individual mission and response
domain of the organization have to become part of a larger domain and mission to be effective.
This is especially relevant if EMU MPD members are not aware of the level of this distinction
between crisis coordination and crisis collaboration. This phenomenon and its implications are
further discussed in chapter five.
Summary
The Emergency Management Unit of the Metropolitan Police Department (EMU MPD)
has an organizational culture that was generally authoritarian, bureaucratic and closed to outgroup members or organizations. The paramilitaristic vocabulary used, and labeling of people
and situations as “threats” and “dangerous” gave the members of the EMU MPD a sense of clear
mission, hierarchy and procedures. This vocabulary also served to separate them from private
companies, NGOs and the public who were not familiar with this language. EMU MPD’s rites
and rituals helped reinforce the hierarchical and authoritative values and norms of the
organization. Rites enacted during Auto Show planning meetings, other crisis training and
exercises, and rituals of following protocols reinforced the EMU MPD’s security focused
culture. This manifested through communication by members demonstrating a need to protect
others from dangerous people and situations, illustrating their expertise in this area, and
controlling who had access to specific EMU MPD rites and rituals. Stories, when shared with the
researcher, reinforced that the world was full of dangerous people and situations that were
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necessary for them to control. Therefore, members needed to be careful with whom they shared
information to protect themselves, other members, and their operations. Stories also reinforced
following proper protocol and using their training and expertise to control these dangerous
situations. Symbols of member dress, and building/office structure and décor reinforced clear ingroup boundaries, lines of authority and expertise of these members. These symbols were made
very visible when members wanted to emphasize control and authority but also hidden when
they wanted to be able to covertly observe and gather information in public settings.
Finally, this organizational culture delineated for the EMU MPD an in-group of
organizations that they could collaborate in emergency and crisis planning and response, and an
out-group of organizations that they use to coordinate needed resources only when the crisis
situation determined that they needed assistance beyond the in-group’s expertise or resources.
The next chapter presents the results of the study with a discussion of how the organizational
cultural differences between the EMU MPD and DRO may influence the crisis collaboration
efforts of larger coordinating groups such as an MEOC.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
Summary of Main Findings
When a crisis affects a community (i.e., the Virginia Tech shooting), region (i.e.,
Hurricane Katrina), or sometimes an entire country (i.e., the 2010 earthquake in Haiti), the
response efforts must involve many different organizations “requir[ing] coordination of a variety
of resources, technical skill and response capacity” (Seeger, Sellnow, & Ulmer, 2003, p. 189).
Dozens and sometimes even hundreds of organizations, often with very different missions,
methods, technologies and cultures are called upon to coordinate in order to mitigate the crisis
and assist in the recovery efforts. Effective communication is a key component that often
determines the success of this interorganizational crisis coordination and collaboration.
Practitioners and researchers have focused on improvements in interoperability of
technology (i.e. 800 MHz radios) or creating a network of individuals who will communicate
information between organizations (i.e. Emergency Operations Centers). However, little effort
has specifically been directed toward examining the effect that different communication cultures
of crisis response organizations may have on interorganizational collaboration during a large
scale event. These conditions could create miscommunication and conflict between organizations
that are not familiar with each other’s different cultures or could increase situational awareness
of the crisis thereby improving crisis response. Previous discussions of interorganizational
coordination have also failed to distinguish between crisis coordination and crisis collaboration.
This becomes an issue if members of one crisis response organization are frustrated with others
because they are really looking for crisis collaboration, but only receiving a minimal level of
crisis coordination. This also becomes an issue when an organization doesn’t understand that for
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some crisis responses, a higher level of crisis collaboration between organizations will be
necessary to manage and mitigate the effects of more dynamic, complex and larger crises.
Thus the aim of this instrumental case study was to use qualitative methods to explore
and describe two crisis response organizational cultures and identify how their different
communication practices may influence crisis collaboration. This chapter will answer the
research questions posed for the study, discuss the implications for crisis communication and
interorganizational collaboration based on the findings, and conclude with thoughts on future
studies.
Research Question One: What are the primary crisis related organizational cultural
features of the regional chapter of a Disaster Response Organization (DRO) and the
Metropolitan Police Department (MPD)?
This investigation was framed by three research questions presented and discussed in
chapter one. At the start of this study, the first research question assumed that a regional chapter
of the DRO would have a different organizational culture than the MPD. This was confirmed by
examining the crisis related organizational cultural features of the two organizations.
As explored in the earlier discussion, people create part of their identity through their
group membership (Abrams, O’Connor, & Giles, 2002, p. 229). “Organizations tend to develop
internal myths, traditions, heroes, unique symbols and language, ceremonies and customs, all of
which set them off from other community bodies” (Granot, 1997, p. 306). Organizational
members then use culture to identify with their organization and to also differentiate themselves,
and therefore the organization as a whole, from others. While having a strong organizational
culture is beneficial for the organization itself, when organizations work together to respond to a
crisis it may lead to several potentially challenging issues such as closed membership boundaries
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that impedes the sharing of information. These issues can negatively affect the management and
mitigation of the crisis event. Therefore, it was important to identify two unique types of
organizations that are typically involved in large scale crisis response and their crisis related
organizational cultural features.
The emergency and disaster services unit of a regional chapter of the Disaster Relief
Organization (DRO) had an organizational culture that was open and service-oriented, viewed
volunteers as committed and valued members of the organization, and recognized themselves
and other crisis response organizations as collaborative partners in providing successful crisis
response to their community. But over the past ten years, historical, political, and economic
factors at the national level of the DRO have resulted in the implementation of more bureaucratic
and authoritative structures, policies, and processes on local DRO chapters. This change in the
national DRO culture has been conflicting with the regional DRO’s organizational culture and
resulted in frustration by organizational members towards the national organization. To deal with
this tension between the different cultures of the national DRO and the regional DRO chapter,
leaders tried to come up with creative community-based fundraising ideas and encouraged
members to always err on the side of serving the clients. This helped the regional DRO feel like
they were preserving their organizational culture while having to accept more bureaucratic
processes.
The regional DRO also had to deal with differences between its culture and the more
bureaucratic and authoritative culture of more paramilitaristic organizations such as the fire
department and the local emergency management agency (HSEM). The DRO was willing to
change parts of its organizational culture in order to better serve their superordinate mission of
providing relief to disaster victims. Because the local DRO viewed itself as partners and
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collaborators in crisis response, it has adopted some of the cultural features of these
organizations into its culture.

For example, the DRO was willing to adopt the more

paramilitaristic language and ICS training used by emergency management agencies, first
responder organizations (e.g. fire, police, EMS), FEMA and DHS. In addition, the DRO engaged
in local disaster planning and exercises with these organizations as they felt these training
activities and exercises created a shared understanding of what each organizations role is in a
local response and reinforced the idea that working together to prepare for disasters lead to better
overall crisis response effort. This has resulted in a greater ability for the DRO to gain access and
participate in larger crisis response efforts and the Metropolitan Emergency Operations Center
(MEOC).
In contrast, the organizational culture of Emergency Management Unit of the
Metropolitan Police Department (EMU MPD) was generally authoritative, bureaucratic and
closed to out-group members or organizations. Historical factors played a part in creating its
paramilitaristic culture. Several members have a military background and the emergency
management structure the EMU MPD used was initially developed based on military planning
and training. The structure of the organization reinforced this paramilitaristic culture by having
officers with similar ranks of the military and a strict authoritative chain of command for
communication and following orders and protocols for every situation. The traditional “protect
and serve” mission of the police department also gave members a strong sense that they were the
experts to be called upon to protect the public from dangerous people and threatening situations.
The EMU MPD’s expertise was also reinforced by housing several of the special response teams
for day-to-day emergencies, such as bomb squad, special response team (SRT aka SWAT),
harbor patrol/dive team, intelligence center, and K-9. In this respect, this organizational culture
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was similar to other police cultures described by researchers (Manning, 1982; Trujillo &
Dionisopoulos, 1987).
This general organizational culture translated to how the EMU MPD saw their role in
preventing and mitigating crises. Crises were primarily framed as preventing acts of terrorism.
Even in natural and non-intentional manmade disasters such as the 2003 power outage, they saw
their role as preventing looting and moving their families to a place where they would be safe.
This view reinforced their role as experts in protecting the public and the best ones able to
control the inevitable chaos that would ensue from a crisis. During crisis exercises, they saw
themselves as being the lead trainers in areas such as an active shooter situation where they
already had an expert team in their unit. The supervisor expressed that his unit was wasting its
time when larger crisis exercises or trainings did not give opportunities for them to demonstrate
their expertise or enhance their skills. Other agencies involved in the exercise also had to
demonstrate that they knew what they were doing and would not panic in a crisis. This focus on
individual mission and roles ignored the larger purpose of enhancing overall crisis response and
the important role of information sharing.
Finally, this authoritative and bureaucratic culture created very strong membership
identities which, in turn, affected how its members interacted with members of other
organizations. Members of the EMU MPD were more open and collegial with members from
similar organizations with similar cultures. This macroculture included first responder
organizations such as other police departments, fire departments and EMS, organizations with
similar security missions such as private security companies and federal agencies such as FBI
and ATF, and former members of the military or military organizations. However, relationships
with members from organizations with dissimilar organizational cultures were more closed and
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formal. Non-profit disaster relief organizations, the city Homeland Security and Emergency
Management Agency (HSEM), and the public were seen as a supporting role of the EMU MPD
mission. In fact, the researcher had to prompt members of the EMU MPD to discuss how they
interacted with DROs since these organizations were never mentioned in interviews or planning
sessions. Moreover, the public’s role was to provide information on potential dangerous people
or situations to the EMU MPD (i.e., the “See Something, Say Something” campaign) without
any reciprocal information sharing.
The EMU MPD members also distinguished themselves from the HSEM even though
both organizations were culturally similar in their shared vocabulary, structure, and protocols for
emergency and crisis response. For example, EMU MPD considered HSEM a “civilian”
organization even though several of its members had military backgrounds and the emergency
management response structure was paramilitaristic. This was reinforced as HSEM members
were classified for the FLO training as non-first responders. In addition, both were formed after
the 2001 terrorist attacks and had similar missions to prevent future attacks in order to save the
lives and protect the property of its citizens. This should have resulted in a natural collaborative
partnership like the EMU MPD had with other law enforcement organizations. However EMU
MPD members saw their organizations as too similar and felt competition in vying for similar
political resources, funding and attention as HSEM. The EMU MPD saw itself as the experts
and decision-makers in terrorism-related crisis situations and did not want the HSEM usurping
its expertise. So EMU MPD members redefined its relationship with HSEM as a more
supporting or coordinating role in crisis response, thus maintaining their expertise and separating
HSEM from the larger macroculture of law enforcement and first responders.
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Therefore, the crisis related organization cultures of the DRO and EMU MPD were
forged in their day-to-day structures and operations. Historical and political factors also helped
shape these cultures. Because these organizations also dealt with everyday emergency situations
that made crisis a relatively routine experience, their organizational cultures transferred to how
they saw their role in crisis response and their interaction with other organizations. These
distinct organizational cultures were strong because organizational and members’ identities were
developed and reinforced through communication practices between members.
Research Question Two: How are the crisis related organizational cultures of the
Metropolitan Police Department and the regional chapter of a Disaster Relief Organization
enacted through communication practices between members?
The second research question guiding this investigation explored the communicative
features of these organizational cultures. Specifically how organizational members subjectively
created shared patterns of symbols and meanings through communication that defined, guided,
and sometimes constrained their everyday thoughts and behaviors in organizational life. Using
the four communication constructs of vocabulary, rituals, stories, and symbols, explained in
chapter one, each organizational communication culture was examined through this interpretive
lens.
The communication activities of the regional chapter of the DRO reflected a tension
between the local service and humanitarian DRO culture and the more bureaucratic and
authoritative cultures of the national DRO and other paramilitaristic organizations (i.e. fire
departments and HSEM). The communication activities also reflected how the local DRO made
sense of the tension and adapted to parts of these cultures while also preserving their
organizational culture of service and openness.
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Written and spoken vocabulary reflected a humanitarian and service oriented culture that
demonstrated a respect for clients, a desire to help clients in a time of need, the organization as
providing an important service to the community, and the value of volunteers as equal members
in the organization. Their rites and rituals of crisis response meetings, trainings, and social events
helped volunteers commit to the values of the organization and be engaged problem-solvers and
decision-makers in the organization. They also reflected the organization’s elevated view of
volunteers as valued and active members and the organization as part of a team that partners with
other organizations in crisis response. The stories that were told by DRO members reinforced the
organizational culture by emphasizing the service mission of the DRO and serving members by
helping them cope with tragedy and remain safe in responding to emergencies. The DRO’s logo
was a powerful symbol of help and humanitarianism to members and the community and was
prominently displayed on member dress and on organizational materials. Members also
identified their commitment to organizational values and pride of membership by wearing DRO
clothing, pins, and IDs during organizational social times and in the community. Bulletin boards
in the local office also supported the values of the organizational culture – serving the
community by responding to fires and other disasters, positive relationships with city officials,
non-profit organizations, and the community, and recognizing and valuing the contributions of
staff and volunteers.
By calling the national headquarters, “National” they symbolized the national DRO as a
more hierarchical, bureaucratic and authoritative “Big Brother” culture. In meetings, members
discussed how “National’s” culture prevented them from responding quickly in a crisis to meet
the needs of the community and create long-term fundraising relationships with the community.
The ritual of training was now centralized by the national headquarters to ensure that they were
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learning and committing to the rules and values communicated by the national DRO. Stories now
included clients who “take advantage of the system” to get money or services, which made
members more suspicious of motives and took away from the service or humanitarian purpose of
the organization.
The DRO staff expressed that providing disaster relief is their main mission in helping
clients, but they also needed to partner with more paramilitaristic organizations such as fire
departments and other emergency management agencies in order to provide those services and
work together in response efforts. DRO members realized that their service culture was very
different from the authoritative and bureaucratic cultures of these organizations. Therefore, some
members of the DRO have adopted emergency management vocabulary to more effectively
communicate with these organizations. They also learned the processes and procedures necessary
to participate in the EOC by taking Incident Command System (ICS) and Professional
Emergency Management (PEM) trainings. In addition, they develop relationships with members
of these organizations by regularly participating in interorganizational disaster trainings and
exercises.
Even though the National DRO and the paramilitaristic organizations had similar
bureaucratic and organizational structures, the local DRO made sense of these organizations in
different ways. It resists the National DRO culture by reinforcing its local service culture through
discussions at meetings and creative fundraising activities. But it was more willing to adopt some
cultural features of fire departments and emergency management agencies because it sees it as
necessary steps to more successfully complete its humanitarian and service mission. This is
reflective of a realization of localization of crisis response and a need to maintain a cooperative
relationship with local organizations.
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The EMU MPD’s authoritative, bureaucratic and closed culture was also reflected in the
cultural features of vocabulary, rites and rituals, stories and symbols. These communication
practices defined and reified a sharply defined membership boundary, rigid organizational
structure and processes, and an organizational culture of “us” versus “them”.
The paramilitary vocabulary used by members labeled people and situations as “threats”
and “dangerous”. This gave them a shared sense of organizational mission to protect others and
control these potentially dangerous people and situations. The shared pattern of language use
also referenced a standard set of hierarchy and operations that shouldn’t be questioned by others.
Rites and rituals such as crisis planning meetings, trainings and exercises reinforced the values
and rules of the organization. For example, in crisis planning meetings for the auto show, co-led
by the EMU MPD supervisor, authorities regularly stated the importance for members to follow
proper protocols and procedures for emergencies, terrorist threats, and protests. These rites and
rituals reinforced the MPD’s security focused culture by showing need to protect others from
dangerous people and situations and showcase their expertise in this area during crisis trainings
and exercises. Most stories offered by members described dangerous people and situations that
needed the expertise of the EMU MPD to handle the emergency. These were normative lessons
that reinforced a threatening and dangerous worldview and using proper protocol was the best
way to prevent and mitigate harm. Symbols such as members’ different style of dress or
uniforms were carefully chosen to communicate authority or conceal their identity depending on
the situation. Uniforms and credentials also communicated clear lines of authority and
responsibility within the MPD and a shared culture with other first responders and security
organizations who wore similar dress.
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In addition, EMU MPD communicated an organizational culture closed to outsiders by
controlling access to information about that culture. Control of information is a primary process
whereby membership is signaled and maintained. Vocabulary served to separate law
enforcement, first responders, and MEOC members who use similar military and paramilitary
language and structures from private businesses, NGOs and the public who were not familiar
with this language. Also, terms such as “need to know”, “classified”, and “security reasons” were
often used by EMU MPD and other law enforcement personnel throughout the study to justify
certain actions by the EMU MPD or law enforcement and restricted or denied access to
information. The security and secrecy culture of the EMU MPD was also reinforced in the
researcher’s difficulty of gaining access to some rites and rituals and lack of access to other daily
rites. Stories weren’t readily shared by members and were sometimes self-censored by members
to protect the security of the organization and its operations. Sharing stories is often a rite of
integration or socialization. Therefore, sharing them freely to non-members may violate the
organization’s culture processes and values. Non-identification of offices and high-security
measures of locations that the EMU MPD used for its operations was intentional and reflected
the organization’s culture. The researcher also had to be escorted by a member to gain access to
these locations and information located within. This symbolized what members felt was the
secret and secure nature of their work to monitor suspicious activity and protect themselves from
dangerous people or threats.
The cultural constructs of vocabulary, rites and rituals, stories, and symbols were
communicated by members of these two distinct organizations to reinforce their organizational
culture and define boundaries of membership. However, there were times where the
organizational culture and membership also were defined or reinforced by members. The EMU
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MPD’s closed and bureaucratic organizational culture reinforced its clear boundaries of
membership. This was accomplished by member’s use of insider vocabulary and restricting
access to information to non-members. This in-group membership was only extended to those
members in its macroculture that shared a similar organizational culture, such as other law
enforcement and first responders. In contrast, the regional chapter of the DRO’s culture was
more open and service-oriented. This allowed members to more freely communicate and
negotiate meanings when confronted with conflicting organizational cultures of the National
DRO, fire department, and HSEM. This inflexible versus flexible organizational cultures also
influenced how they defined and practiced crisis collaboration, as explored in the third research
question.
Research Question Three: How do the differences in these two organizational
communication cultures influence their ability to practice crisis collaboration?
The third research question guiding this investigation explored the impact of
organizational cultural differences on collaboration. It was expected that this study would find
differences in organizational communication cultures for the two crisis-response agencies
examined. This is because these two organizations have different missions, skills and
experiences that define their roles and responsibilities during a crisis. Therefore, the scope and
time-sensitive aspect of crisis response necessitates the interactions of multiple organizations in
order to successfully manage and mitigate the effects of a crisis. This is typically accomplished
through larger collaboration groups such as the Metropolitan Emergency Operations Center
(MEOC), of which these two organizations are members. Whether an organization and its
members view working with other organizations to manage a crisis response as crisis
coordination or crisis collaboration is an important distinction. As described in chapter one, crisis
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coordination is a less integrated level of involvement between organizations and more focus on
individual organizational goals in crisis response and mitigation. Crisis collaboration connotes a
deeper partnership between organizations where the crisis response mission, decisions, and
activities are jointly established and carried out. If the individual organizational cultures define
these differently, then it might hinder how they interact and share information during a crisis
response.
In this study, the two organization’s communication cultures defined their crisis response
interactions differently. The DRO’s humanitarian and service-oriented organizational
communication culture defined their crisis response practices as crisis collaboration with all
organizations. In contrast, the EMU MPD’s bureaucratic and closed organizational
communication culture defined their crisis response as crisis collaboration within a macroculture
of similar organizations or in-group and bureaucratic crisis coordination with others in the outgroup. This lower level of coordinated response would also manifest when the EMU MPD
engage in larger interorganizational response efforts or work within the Metropolitan Emergency
Response Center (MEOC).

This is because the MEOC’s membership extends beyond the

macroculture’s in-group of the law enforcement and first responder community to include
organizations such as hospitals, public works, and non-profit disaster relief organizations.
Therefore this identification of EMU MPD as bureaucratic crisis coordination within the context
of an MEOC is important to distinguish further.
These differences in worldviews of crisis response by the DRO and EMU MPD also
paralleled the crisis response differences between the crisis response features of crisis
coordination and crisis collaboration outlined in chapter one and revisited below (See Table 3).
Added to the table is the “Organization” row to illustrate and compare the differences in the
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crisis response features of the two organizations. Further evidence of differences in crisis
response features between these two organizations is described below.
Goal of crisis response. The first difference between the organizations as a result of their
different cultures was in the perceived goal of crisis response. The EMU MPD’s concern in crisis
response was crisis coordination because it was mainly interested in meeting the individual
organizational goal of protecting others from terrorism and criminal activity. For example, when
the EMU MPD was in-charge of an emergency response, it thought of these other groups in the
out-group as providing a supportive role helping the EMU MPD fulfill their core mission. This
also included the city HSEM who lead the MEOC. They also did not see themselves as an
important part of larger crisis planning or response led by others if it did not involve their
individual organizational goal. For example, in natural disaster response, when the city HSEM’s
MEOC leads the response, EMU MPD was clear that they saw natural disasters as a “non-police”
response; and their role was only in providing their expertise of evacuating people, “only if ‘it’
hits the fan.
DRO also saw themselves as the “shelter people” and saw itself as experts in its role in
crisis response. However, DRO’s ultimate goal of crisis response was more crisis collaboration
in that it saw its goal of help the victims of a crisis in the larger goal of managing and mitigating
the overall crisis. They did not want to necessarily to gain credit as sole responders but wanted to
do its part to help manage the larger response. The DRO also was willing to change parts of its
organizational culture by learning and using the emergency management vocabulary and crisis
response structures so they could more easily understand other agencies and effectively
communicate and share information with them and the MEOC during a crisis.
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Table 3
Comparison of Crisis Response Types: EMU MPD and DRO within the context of an MEOC
Crisis Response Crisis Coordination
Crisis Collaboration
Feature
Organization
Goal of crisis
response
Tasks
and
resources

Communication

Decision-Making

Member
Trust/Loyalty
Organizational
Boundaries

EMU MPD
Concern for meeting individual
organizational goal
Organizations focus on “expert
area” of crisis response; can lead
to competing for resources or
redundancies.
Lack of sharing of information
between organizations or one way
from EOC to crisis response
organizations.
Top-down orders (command-andcontrol) from crisis manager or
incident
commander
to
organizations.
To their individual organization;
sees other organizations as
competitors.
Rigid – Members identify strongly
with their organizational culture;
organizational boundary spanning
of members is rare.

Regional Chapter DRO
Common definition of problem by
group and agreed goal to reach
Realization of interdependence of
organizations; results in sharing of
resources and tasks to avoid
redundancies.
Continuous flow of communication
and willingness to share information
between organizations and the
collaborating group.
Power and status among collaborating
group members equal so participation
and consensus decision-making is
encouraged.
To the collaborating group; sees other
organizations as partners.
Flexible – Members more willing to
adapt to fit collaborating group culture;
organizational boundary spanning of
members is common.

Tasks and resources. The next difference in EMU MPD’s crisis coordination versus
DRO’s crisis collaboration was how each organization viewed its crisis response tasks and
resources. EMU MPD tasks and resources focused on their expert role of preventing and
mitigating terrorist threats or dangerous situations and saw other organizations as resources to
support their crisis response. The HSEM which heads the coordinating MEOC group is also seen
by the EMU MPD as working side by side but not together in crisis response. The EMU MPD
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stated that if they were in charge of a response, they would only contact HSEM if they needed
resources such as buses.
As stated earlier, the DRO does claim expertise as the “shelter people” in disaster relief.
However it recognizes its lack of resources and therefore interdependence with other
organizations to provide shelter services. For example, the DRO managed the shelters, but it
relied on and welcomed other organizations to provide resources such as shelter locations, food
service, social services, and pet sheltering. Some of this resource sharing among organizations
did reflect more crisis coordination activities, especially when organizations were providing
services in their “expert” area of crisis response. But there were many examples of the DRO
recognizing and accepting its interdependence with the community, the media, and other
organizations so they could provide the resources necessary for successful crisis response. The
outcome of sharing of resources and tasks was necessary in order to provide the most
comprehensive services and assistance to fire and disaster victims. This interdependence also
helped the DRO view its relationships with those organizations as partnerships rather than
independent crisis response organizations working in conjunction with one another.
Communication. Communication is the third crisis response feature that was affected by
the different organizational cultures. The EMU MPD’s crisis response communication was
clearly identified as crisis coordination because it consisted of tightly controlled information
sharing. Sensitive information was only communicated by members to a few organizations
considered in their in-group because they shared a similar organizational culture. Those
organizations outside of their in-group macroculture were only allowed information to be shared
on a “need to know” basis determined by the EMU MPD. Information about threats or dangerous
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people was also encouraged to be communicated by other out-group organizations and to the
EMU MPD without any reciprocal information sharing.
In contrast, the DRO’s culture conveyed a willingness to share information and keep lines
of communication open with continuous meetings with other organizations often initiated by
DRO. This even occurred when they felt tension or competition with the Salvation Army for
resources or community recognition. They also saw crisis trainings and exercises as a way to
create a shared understanding of what each organizations role is in a local response and
reinforced the idea that working together to prepare for disasters lead to better overall crisis
response effort. Again, their willingness to learn and adopt the use of the ICS and paramilitaristic
vocabulary of the MEOC, law enforcement and first responders reflected their goal of improving
communication and increasing information sharing with these organizations. This reflected a
more crisis collaboration approach to communication.
Decision-making. Next, the EMU MPD’s culture reflected their bureaucratic approach of
coordinated decision-making in crisis response. Their organization’s day-to-day emergency
response culture involved a very hierarchical structure of top-down decision-making. However,
the Incident Command System (ICS) and NIMS structure mandated for larger crisis response and
used by the MEOC reinforced this same crisis coordination decision-making structure. Therefore
it was readily accepted and used by members of the EMU MPD. When they were considered the
experts for a particular crisis response (i.e. active shooter or bomb threat), they were considered
the incident command to coordinate the crisis response. They then expected to make the
decisions and other organizations to follow their orders. They also accepted following orders of
others if they were not the incident commander of the response. This is because it was outside
their area of expertise.
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The DRO’s service-oriented culture allowed them to work collaboratively with other
organizations and share decision-making. It initiated meetings with other organizations such as
the Salvation Army and SART to discuss how to improve sheltering during disasters. It
encouraged members to participate as victims in other organization’s crisis exercises so they
could more effectively practice crisis response plans. They saw these meetings and exercises as
opportunities to learn from others and engage in problem-solving and collaborate with several
organizations so they could better serve their clients.
Member trust/loyalty. Member trust and loyalty was the next crisis response feature
difference between the EMU MPD and DRO. The EMU MPD’s security-minded and closed
culture resulted in a high level of member loyalty to their organization and trust with members
from other organizations in their in-group macroculture. However, outsiders could not be trusted
with the same level of information as insiders because they did not have similar cultures. For
example, hospital security chiefs felt law enforcement organizations such as the EMU MPD
didn’t have mutual respect for them because they didn’t share information with them like the city
HSEM did.
The HSEM was also seen as a competitor rather than ally because they had similar crisis
response mission that threatened the EMU MPD’s identity. Members maintained loyalty to the
EMU MPD by redefining the HSEM as a resource coordinator or supportive role and interacting
with them as such to maintain this distinction. By vigorously defining their membership
boundaries and member loyalty to that organizational boundary, the EMU MPD culture prevents
crisis collaboration from occurring.
Juxtaposed against the EMU MPD, the DRO clearly identified other organizations as
partners in crisis response and were loyal to that greater collaborative partnership. The DRO
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used words and phrases like “partner”, “team”, and “we’re there together” to convey a reciprocal
crisis collaboration relationship of trust and support among other organizations it interacted with
for daily fire response and larger disaster response. Similar to the EMU MPD, members of the
DRO were loyal to the organization and did feel competition with the Salvation Army because
they had similar missions of providing disaster relief to victims. They also competed for funding
from the community and media recognition. However the leadership of the two organizations
decided to form a strong collaborative relationship by sharing leadership of the local VOAD
group, running joint service centers for certain emergencies, and meeting regularly to work out
tensions when they arose between the two groups.
Organizational boundaries. As stated in chapter one, creating identity through
organizational culture also creates and maintains organizational boundaries. Boundaries can be
either rigid or more flexible through the use of both physical (e.g., badges, uniforms, etc.) and
informational means (e.g., stories, jargon, etc.). Abrams, O’Connor and Giles (2002) stated that
organizational members maintain rigid boundaries between in-group and out-group identities by
developing different ways of communicating within the organization and externally to others (p.
230). It is through these communicative actions that “members display their belongingness to
the organization as well as their opposition to those outside the organization” (Trujillo &
Dionisopoulos, 1987, p. 199), as well as “constitute a system of common social meanings and
shared interpretive schema within an organization” (Trujillo & Dionisopoulos, 1987, p. 199).
The EMU MPD’s organizational culture reinforced crisis coordination as opposed to
collaboration because it was unwilling to engage in boundary spanning activities with other
organizations outside of their in-group macroculture. EMU MPD also had rigid organizational
boundaries due to its culture of expertise and secrecy. Members did not have institutional
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familiarity and cultural similarity with organizations outside of law enforcement, security and
other first responder organizations. In addition, they did not interact regularly with the DRO in
day-to-day operations or during special events. Therefore, boundary spanning activities were not
initiated by members of the EMU MPD toward the DRO or other out-group organizations.
In contrast, the DRO already had a crisis collaboration group culture in how it viewed
crisis response and a more flexible organizational boundary. The DRO had boundary
permeability because it was fluid it its membership and relied mostly on volunteers who came
from a wide variety of other organizations such as emergency managers, school principals,
nurses, fire fighters, business leaders, and social workers. This allowed members to act as
boundary spanners with other organizations as they had previous trusted relationships with
members and understood their unique organizational culture. It also worked regularly with
cultural dissimilar organizations such as the fire department and city officials in its daily
operations or in response to smaller emergencies. It too recognized that it had a different crisis
response culture than that of first responders and the HSEM MEOC. Therefore, members were
willing to adopt some of the language, training, and ICS command and control structure in order
to be able to participate in larger crisis response efforts. DRO volunteers also came from a wide
variety of other crisis response organizations, either as current employees or recently retired.
This allowed members to act as boundary spanners with those organizations as they had previous
trusted relationships with members and better understood their different organizational culture.
In summary, the EMU MPD’s organizational communication culture allowed it to engage
in crisis collaboration with culturally similar or in-group organizations part of a larger
macroculture but prevented it from having a crisis collaboration relationship with culturally
different or out-group organizations. This resulted in a crisis coordination view of crisis response
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by EMU MPD, since the MEOC and many crisis responses involve working with these outgroup organizations. This “us versus them” culture also inherently constrains collaboration. This
was evident in the tension and frustration communicated by members of those out-group
organizations who wanted a crisis collaboration relationship with the MPD.
The DRO’s more open and service-oriented culture allowed it to view crisis response as
crisis collaboration and to engage in a more collaborative relationship with other organizations.
This organizational culture also allowed for members to redefine and modify their culture in
order to maintain crisis collaboration relationships with culturally different organizations.
This study has explored and described the cultures of two crisis response organizations
and identified their distinct crisis response worldviews of coordination and collaboration. The
next section discusses the implications of these findings for interorganizational collaboration of
crisis response and crisis communication.
Overall Implications for Crisis Communication and Collaboration
The findings of this study illustrate that the two different organizational communication
cultures of the EMU MPD and regional chapter of the DRO resulted in two different worldviews
of how organizations think they should work together and communicate with each other when
responding to a crisis. The findings also suggest that these different worldviews give rise to
processed, structures, and procedures of crisis coordination and crisis collaboration that are
cultural artifacts of the organizations. For example, this study discovered that crisis response
organizations like the EMU MPD whose culture is a more hierarchical, authoritative and
bureaucratic organization adopted a bureaucratic coordination perspective featuring tightly
focused rules and ridged roles. Whereas the DRO that is more of an open, service-oriented and
interdependent culture adopted a collaboration structure characterized more by relationships and
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value statements. The organizational culture determines what coordination or collaboration
structure is the most natural match and therefore most easily accepted and adopted by the
organization.
Therefore, once cannot assume the three perspectives of crisis coordination described by
Tierney (2005) can easily be imposed on an organization or coordinating group as ways to
improve coordination/collaboration and communication. As discussed in chapter one, Tierney
(2005) proposed the structural and network perspectives are better alternatives to the
bureaucratic perspective because they allow more flexibility for involvement of emerging groups
and the changing disaster situation. Similarly, Drabek (2003) proposed that his emergent multiorganizational network perspective allows for emergency managers to respond to the unique
needs of each disaster. But the network structure can also make coordination and information
sharing more difficult because trust is needed between network members that may not be
established in comparison to long-established teams or bureaucratic structures. As seen in this
study, trust in other organizations, especially out-group organizations, is a cultural artifact of
organizations not a structural artifact.
The current study suggests that if an organization’s culture does not match the crisis
coordination or collaboration structure, then two things may occur. First, the mismatch may lead
to a rejection of that structure by organizational members. These members may then revert to the
coordination or collaboration structure that best matches their culture. Second, the mismatch may
be so alien and disconnected from the culture that they have great difficulty understanding and
following the processes and procedures dictated by the structure. This could lead to organization
members choosing not to participate in coordination activities. Either of these outcomes could
result in information that would help manage and mitigate the crisis more quickly and effectively
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not being shared. This culture and structure mismatch also aligns with Weick’s (1990) argument
that organizational members in crisis response “under pressure, those responses acquired more
recently and practiced less often, should unravel sooner than those acquired less recently and
practiced more often, which have become more habitual. Thus, requisite variety [the relative
variety of enactment capacity available within an organization] may disappear right when it is
most needed” (p. 577).
Matching the organizational culture with the crisis coordination or crisis collaboration
process and structure is a new way of understanding the needs of crisis response agencies. This
approach may assist organizational leaders and emergency managers quickly identify and
understand the crisis coordination or collaboration worldview of their organization and take into
account the coordination perspective of other organization with whom they interact. However,
this does not solve the potential communication and information sharing issues that may occur
when organizations with different coordinating perspectives must work together to manage and
mitigate a larger crisis. Crisis coordinating groups, such as an EOC, cannot assume that training
and exercising a particular coordination structure, process and procedures will automatically
result in every organization understanding and adopting that worldview during a crisis response.
For example, because an EOC uses the ICS structure that takes a bureaucratic coordination
perspective, it cannot assume that organizations with similar cultures to the DRO will understand
all of the cultural assumptions that are wrapped up in that coordinating perspective. In addition,
if an EOC moves to adopt a more crisis collaboration structure, as I argue in the next section, it
also cannot assume that first responder organizations will automatically start sharing information
more freely with organizations or emergent groups that it doesn’t work with on a regular basis.
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This investigation suggests that the different crisis coordination and crisis collaboration
worldviews need to first be understood by crisis management groups, such as an EOC, and the
organizations involved in those groups. Then additional planning and management process need
to be developed in order to ensure effective interorganizational communication and collaboration
during a crisis response. This next section discusses why crisis collaboration should be the
superordinate goal of EOCs, how to develop internal EOC processes to increase crisis
collaboration, and how to identify the potential adverse effects of individual organizational
communication cultures on an EOC.
Crisis Collaboration as the Superordinate Goal of EOCs
Crisis management groups, such as an EOC, must contend with the complexities of a
crisis under time constraints and lack of resources sufficient to handle the crisis alone.
Therefore, communities and governments have chosen different levels of coordination plans and
policies such as the National Response Framework or mutual aid agreements that detail how
coordination should occur between organizations in crisis response. As noted earlier, crisis
coordination and crisis collaboration are two fundamentally different ways for EOCs to manage
a crisis response.
Crisis coordination is necessary, but may not always be sufficient for an effective
response. Coordination can be an acceptable level of response for everyday emergencies (e.g.,
fires, highway accidents, etc.) and responding to smaller crises (e.g., a bad snowstorm, seasonal
flooding, city-wide foodborne outbreak, etc.). In this and other cases, crisis collaboration may
not be the desired strategy or outcome due to characteristics of the emergency manager,
characteristics of the disaster, and characteristics of the community. However, it should be a
purposeful decision and not based on the fact that coordination is easier or because the EOC
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manager isn’t aware of the distinction between the two. The unpredictable and dynamic nature of
crises and the inherent time pressures of response also increase the difficulty and complexity of
managing the response beyond day-to-day emergency response and thus requires a more
collaborative rather than coordinated effort. It is too easy for an organization or a macroculture
of culturally similar organizations (i.e. first responders) to focus on their own tasks and work
independently instead of understanding how their role during a crisis fits with the entire response
effort (Auf der Heide, 1989).
Crisis coordination has also focused too much on interoperability of communication
systems between organizations instead of information sharing as a way to improve
communication between organizations. Again if organizations are too focused on their own tasks
and goals during a crisis response they may filter out information they receive that is important
for the overall crisis response effort and not share it. In addition, if they do not trust how outgroup organizations will use “sensitive” or “classified” information, they will label information
as “need to know” and won’t feel a duty to share it even if it the information is considered useful
or necessary for crisis response operations by the other organizations or larger response effort. In
other words, these organizations may have 800 MHz radios that can talk to one another, but if
they do not realize the information they have is important to share with other organizations or
they don’t trust how members will use the information, then they won’t push the button to talk.
Crisis collaboration should therefore be the target outcome of interorganizational crisis
response because it allows for more flexible response targeted to the emerging dynamics of the
situation and those groups that naturally emerge to respond to and manage a crisis. Crisis
collaboration also more closely aligns with the role of communication in a crisis today that is
also dynamic and information is freely shared among the public, media, and crisis response
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organizations. This provides opportunity for all members of the EOC to go beyond individual
organizations coordinating actions to create an alliance in which they value member
interdependence, equal input of participants, and shared decisions making. Then all organizations
can reach their shared goal of effective crisis response and mitigation, even under severe time
and decision-making pressures.
But as Eaton and Brandenburg suggest, “forced partnerships cannot penetrate to a deeper
level [of collaboration] without cultural acceptance from all partners” (2008, p. 105). Putnam and
Stohl’s bona fide group perspective (1990) illustrates that group membership and group
environmental characteristics can influence communication practices. This is especially evident
for groups, such as EOCs, that have members who represent individual organizations. Therefore
the organizational communication cultures of individual organizations that are a part of an EOC
can have a negative impact on crisis collaboration efforts. For example, if the EOC allows
member organizations that have a more crisis coordination organizational culture to supersede
EOC collaboration efforts, then the lack of information sharing and increase in conflicts between
organizations may increase. This could then result in overall poor decision-making, time delays
in action, or inadvertently increasing the harm during a crisis response.
In order to understand this, the focus needs to be on EOC internal processes and the
external environments, which have an equally important effect on crisis collaboration (see Figure
6). By identifying the potential adverse effects of individual organizational communication
cultures on an EOC via the bona fide group perspective, one can then develop internal EOC
processes to increase crisis collaboration. In addition, individual organizations, including the
EOC, need to become more aware of how their organizational communication culture can affect
larger crisis collaboration efforts.
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Figure 6: EOC as viewed through a bona fide group perspective.
Next, we will discuss how EOC managers can develop internal EOC processes to help
increase interorganizational crisis collaboration.
Develop Internal EOC Processes to Increase Crisis Collaboration
To increase crisis collaboration of EOCs, one must first understand where on the
continuum of crisis coordination and collaboration it currently stands. The HSEM MEOC, and
many other EOCs, are required to follow the federal National Response Framework (FEMA,
2013) so they can get access to federal funding to assist with emergency management planning
and disaster relief efforts. As stated in chapter one, the NRF is a bureaucratic approach to crisis
coordination because it’s structure is very command and control. It has an incident command
system (ICS) with a very top-down hierarchical structure, centralization of power, and
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standardized and inflexible set of policies and procedures. Its boundaries are rigidly defined and
information is not widely shared. Therefore, there is a fundamental tension and contradiction
built into this traditional emergency management function between a vigorously defended
boundary and membership (like EMU MPD) and the need to collaborate with others. The “us
versus them” is evident in these organizations, a condition that inherently constrains
collaboration.
One cannot expect EOCs to easily change from a crisis coordination culture to one of crisis
collaboration. Most managers that run EOCs come from a military or paramilitary background
steeped in bureaucratic processes and will tend to fall back on those when placed in high-stress,
decision-making situations (Harrald, 2006). But these leaders can identify where their current
EOC culture and communication practices result in hindrances to crisis collaboration and
information sharing, such as the example above. They can then employ various cultural
strategies (Drabek, 2003) to move the EOC along the continuum toward increased crisis
collaboration. An EOC organizational communication culture assessment is recommended, such
as the one done by the researcher with the DRO and EMU MPD for this study, to determine
which cultural strategies might be most effective. However, based on the information gathered
from this study, the general cultural strategies that follow may help foster interorganizational
understanding and communication among EOC members.
Be aware how the organizational culture of the EOC affects members. As discussed
earlier, EOCs use a bureaucratic approach to crisis coordination. Therefore, one first needs to
increase awareness of how the EOCs culture of crisis coordination affects how members interact
within the crisis response organization. For example, ICS training states that members should not
use agency-specific jargon, acronyms or radio codes (NIMS, 2008, p. 29). However, this fails to
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realize that ICS vocabulary in itself uses many acronyms and terminology that may be familiar
with some organizational members, such as first responders and paramilitary groups like the
EMU MPD, and unfamiliar with others, like the DRO, because it is not a part of their everyday
organizational culture. Many ICS procedures were taken from military and fire service
emergency response sources; and therefore tend to be steeped in militaristic and paramilitaristic
language. Some organizations, such as the DRO, have recognized this and undergone the
required ICS training in order to learn the vocabulary. However there will be times when
emergent groups will need to be involved in a response. EOC managers then need to be hyperaware of this possibility and take time to explain jargon or have a quick list of common
terminology ready to review with these members at the beginning of a response. This could make
the overall response effort more effective because these organizations could more easily
understand other agencies and effectively communicate with them during a crisis.
Create shared understanding of crisis collaboration by EOC members and
organizations. The second cultural strategy is to understand what level of collaboration the EOC
and its members expect when working together in a response. For the purposes of this study, it
has been demonstrated that the EMU MPD has a more bureaucratic approach to crisis
coordination while the DRO has more of a crisis collaboration approach. Therefore, one can infer
that the DRO could become frustrated if the EMU MPD or other culturally similar crisis
coordination organizations don’t see them as partners. Conflicts could also arise between crisis
collaboration and crisis coordination organizations if they feel those organizations aren’t sharing
information with them during a response. Admittedly, there was no direct observation of this in
the study between the DRO and EMU MPD. However, frustrations were shared in a meeting by
members representing hospitals and the HSEM who wanted more of a collaborative information
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sharing relationship with the MPD. An EOC must then clearly define understandings and
expectations for crisis collaboration efforts during a crisis response. This must include a
discussion of the EOC mission and values, a common goal to reach in crisis response, and
agreement by members to share information and participate in consensus decision-making. This
needs to mainly occur in EOC planning meetings or incorporated in crisis exercises, but also
needs to be emphasized again at the beginning of each crisis response as new EOC members or
organizations may be involved.
Understand that good communication is more than interoperability. Lack of
interoperability of communications equipment between organizations has been demonstrated to
be a barrier in past high profile crises. But as demonstrated in this study, training on
interoperability of communications equipment needs to go beyond the how to work the device to
explaining how sharing information helps consensus decision-making and increases the
effectiveness of the overall response. This also could be demonstrated by developing an exercise
that has information integral to the response spread across culturally dissimilar EOC
organizations. Therefore in order for the response to be effective, groups must share this
information with each other and the decision-making unit back in the EOC.
Foster interorganizational understanding and communication among EOC members
and organizations. Many of these organizations involved in crisis response do not necessarily
work together on daily operations or to manage routine emergency responses. Researchers (Auf
der Heide, 1989; Bennington, Shetler, & Shaw, 2003; Kapucu, 2006; Tushman & Scalan, 1981)
suggest that time spent together on joint crisis planning and exercises and the development of
informal network relationships among EOC organization members can help build trust and the
process of negotiating meaning of crisis response and management through communication. For
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example, in chapter four, the EMU MPD was part of an Auto Show security planning group. The
familiarity of working day-to-day with these organizations and years of planning Auto Show
security resulted in a high level of trust, teamwork, and willingness to put forth extra effort to
ensure that collaboration and successful crisis response occurred among these organizations.
Although this group consisted of a macroculture of similar organizations, these results could be
replicated by an EOC whose members have more unit diversity. This can be done in a couple of
ways.
First, trainings and exercises need to be structured to involve more of a cross-section of
diverse units that may be involved in a crisis. This will allow organizations to become more
familiar with the valuable resources other organizations provide to enable a successful response.
Also, crisis planning meetings should occasionally give time for organization representatives to
discuss what skills and strengths they bring to an EOC and crisis response. This will also allow
non-first responder organizations a chance to make their case as to why they are integral to an
effective response and hopefully elevate them on a more equal level as first responder
organizations. As discussed in chapter three, the DRO leadership knew they didn’t work with all
organizations of EOC on a regular basis. So participation in crisis planning meetings and training
exercises was invaluable for them because they could correct assumptions other organizations
have about what they do and do not do in crisis response. They also understood that it helped
them develop relationships with people in other organizations so they would be more willing to
contact the DRO if a crisis were to occur.
Second, more organizations, such as businesses, faith-based organizations, and community
groups, need to be invited to participate in crisis planning and exercises. The recently updated
2013 version of the National Response Framework (NRF) states it is “intended to be used by the
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whole community” and how organizations like those mentioned above should be “full partners in
incident response” (2013, p.4). This change has been primarily driven by FEMA’s Whole
Community framework (FEMA, 2013). As FEMA and the newest NRF recognize, these
organizations can bring great value as members of an EOC because they are typically the first
groups to mobilize during a crisis. They have strong community networks already established
and can reach the public, especially vulnerable populations, more quickly with valuable
information and resources. However these groups are typically only afterthoughts by EOC
managers during a response unless the particular group is specifically impacted by the crisis.
Having them involved in crisis planning and exercises, strengthens the ability of EOCs to
respond when official resources have difficulty gaining access to a community in the first 24 to
48 hours of a crisis. These organizations can also help EOCs better manage the spontaneous
volunteers and groups that naturally emerge during a crisis response. This also gives these
groups access to learning the culture of the EOC so there is not such a large gap in understanding
when they naturally emerge to become part of a crisis response.
Finally, organizations like the DRO can help EOCs facilitate this whole community approach
to crisis planning, training and response. In this study, the DRO had shown to be cognizant of the
localization of crisis response and a need to maintain a collaborative relationship with local
organizations and the community. Its willingness to also adopt some cultural features of
emergency management agencies to be more involved in EOCs can be a powerful model and
bridge between EOCs and these non-first responder organizations.
Understanding the crisis response organizational culture of an EOC and improving the
internal processes would create a unique and strong collaborative organizational culture. This
crisis collaboration culture would encourage the flow of information and rewards risk sharing,
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empowerment of members, and innovation (Westrum 2004). However focusing on EOC internal
processes alone will not be enough to lessen the adverse effects individual organizational
communication cultures could have on an EOC and crisis response. This next section will
address those issues.
Increasing Awareness of How Individual Organizational Communication Cultures Affects
EOC Crisis Collaboration
Stress and ambiguity during a crisis response create conditions in which EOC members
may forget to utilize the emergency operations procedures which detail how interorganizational
collaboration should occur. Instead members may revert to their own organization’s way of
communicating and handling a crisis which may be more crisis coordination than collaboration.
Therefore, individual organizations need to become more aware of how their organizational
communication culture can affect an EOC and larger crisis collaboration efforts. They then can
adapt strategies to lessen the barriers to interorganizational crisis collaboration.
Be aware how their organizational communication culture affects EOC crisis
collaboration. Organizations first need to understand how their cultural constructs such as
vocabulary, rites and rituals, stories and symbols, defines, guides and sometimes constrains how
they communicate with other organizations during crisis response. As demonstrated in this study,
EMU MPD’s bureaucratic view of crisis coordination doesn’t affect their day-to-day emergency
response because they typically don’t work with organizations culturally different from them.
But crisis coordination organizations like the EMU MPD need to understand how their different
organizational cultures of crisis response organizations may create miscommunication and
conflict during larger crisis response just as different countries encounter communication
difficulties when attempting intercultural communication (Hofstede, 2001).
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Crisis collaboration organizations, such as the DRO, also need to be aware how they might
unintentionally defer to crisis coordination organizations because they value and rely on these
organizations to more successfully complete their humanitarian and service mission. Therefore
they assume the same reciprocal type of relationship and information sharing from other
organizations. For example, because the DRO had a smaller staff they didn’t always send a
member to the MEOC but assumed they would be called if they were needed or would receive
the information they needed during a response. However, by not being in the room and a part of
the EOC conversations the DRO may miss out of valuable information sharing that could help in
its crisis response efforts that crisis coordination organizations didn’t think would be important
to share. This overvaluation of partnership relationships may result in crisis collaboration
organizations having fewer opportunities to assert themselves as equal partner in crisis response
and shared decision-making in the EOC. Studies like this one can help organizations with this
awareness, which is often a first step in organizational cultural change. Another way individual
organizations can increase crisis collaboration in an EOC is by encouraging boundary spanning
between members of their organization and other crisis response organizations.
Increased boundary spanning of organizational members. Leadership of individual crisis
response organizations should encourage boundary spanning among organizations culturally
different from them. As discussed earlier, boundary spanning is when organizational members
reach across the boundaries of their group or organizational membership in order to seek or share
information and resources in order to reduce uncertainty or make decisions. However boundary
spanning is inhibited when organizations do not have an already developed relationship or feel
they cannot trust other organizations with information.
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To increase boundary spanning among culturally dissimilar organizations, they need to
increase boundary permeability (flexibility and fluidity in membership of crisis response
organizations) and institutionally familiarity (knowledge and understanding of other
organizations) (Batteau, Brandenburg, Seeger, and Eaton, 2007). This can be accomplished
through frequent communication among crisis response organizations in the form of nonresponse related informal networking and involvement in interorganizational crisis response
planning meetings, trainings, and exercises. Informal networking can be facilitated through
intermediary organizations that the other two organizations have a previously developed and
trusting relationship. For example, this study illustrated that both the DRO and EMU MPD have
a good relationship with the fire department. This is because the fire department works with both
of these organizations in regular emergency response operations. So the fire department can use
their positive relationship with these two organizations to facilitate trust and relationship building
between the EMU MPD and DRO. Or the DRO could ask the fire department to set up a
meeting to initiate a networking relationship between it and the EMU MPD. Organizational
leadership, therefore, should identify what interorganizational relationships need to be developed
or improved and then identify intermediary organizations to facilitate this networking.
Organizational leadership also needs to understand the value of boundary spanning and allow
its members to be involved in interorganizational collaboration groups such as the EOC and its
activities. In this study, both the DRO and EMU MPD touted the benefits of being involved in
interorganizational collaborative organizations such as Volunteer Organizations Active in
Disasters (VOAD) and the Auto Show security planning group. Years of involvement in these
groups increased institutional familiarity so they could trust other organizations with information
and make efforts to reduce conflicts between the organizations, especially when they were vying
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for similar funding resources. Therefore organizational leaders need to realize that they can
achieve these same beneficial outcomes for their organization by encouraging and valuing
organizational members’ full participation in EOC planning meetings and activities. Then
information sharing during a crisis can more freely flow between all crisis response
organizations and increase overall effectiveness of a response because members now know and
trust other interorganizational members.
Full participation also includes participation in these activities when they don’t include a
direct practice or demonstration of that individual organization’s expertise. For example, the
EMU MPD realized that they play a supporting role to the fire department during a fire incident
and are fine with that designation. But it also needs to understand that playing a supporting role
in EOC exercises is still an important function that helps increase trust and information sharing
among organizations.
Individual organization awareness of their own organizational communication culture and
leadership encouragement of boundary spanning by members will lessen the rigid boundary
defining tendencies of organizational membership identity and facilitate crisis collaboration of an
EOC.
This study demonstrated that individual organizational cultures can result in different
worldviews of how they communicate and collaborate in crisis response. This in turn can have
adverse effects on the effectiveness of the crisis response activities of an EOC. But these effects
can be mitigated by EOC managers focusing on improving internal EOC processes and
individual organizational leadership’s awareness of how their organizational culture can affect
crisis collaboration and information sharing and encouraging members’ boundary spanning
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efforts. The next section provides limitations of the study’s findings and directions for future
research.
Limitations and Future Studies
Limitations
There are three limitations which should be taken into account in interpreting and
applying the results of this study. First, the researcher had more access in terms of type of data
and observation hours with the DRO than with the EMU MPD. As noted previously, the
researcher was not able to gain full access to the EMU MPDs daily organizational life for
security reasons. Therefore, it was necessary to make some inferences, albeit grounded, that the
EMU MPDs organizational culture could be identified and described through member interviews
and interorganizational planning meetings. However, as stated in chapter four, access to
information clearly followed membership patterns, and therefore helped to inform the researcher
of the closed organizational communication culture and rigid membership boundaries of the
EMU MPD.
Second, the researcher was not able to view how the DRO and EMU MPD interacted
with each other within the MEOC group. No large-scale crisis or exercise occurred during the
study to observe the interaction of the two organizations. The researcher was able to observe a
three-day crisis response exercise by the MEOC to test a new communication collaboration
software package to potentially be used in crisis response. But neither the DRO nor the MPD
participated in the exercise and therefore, their interaction could not be observed. The MEOC
also hasn’t been involved in a large organizational crisis response for over a decade.
Third, due to the qualitative nature of this study, the findings from this study are not
generalizable to all EOCs. This evidence describes two crisis response organizational cultures
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and identifies how their different communication practices may influence crisis collaboration of
an EOC. But external environmental factors such as politics, history, and location are different
for each EOC and therefore make them unique entities. For example, due to its geographic
location, the MEOC has less frequency and experience responding to a large scale natural
disaster than metropolitan cities located in hurricane or earthquake prone areas. Therefore future
studies could compare interorganizational collaboration efforts of two different EOCs to better
determine generalizability of these findings.
However given these limitations, the study’s findings do add to the research literature and
expands the understanding of interorganizational crisis communication and crisis collaboration to
present some future research directions in these areas.
Future Research Directions
Given the findings of this study, there are several avenues of future research that can both
expand the research literature and improve crisis preparedness and response activities by
practitioners. First, subsequent studies should explore whether members of an EOC group are
aware of and understand the difference between crisis coordination and crisis collaboration. If
there are differences in the meanings of “coordination” and “collaboration” among EOC
members, it could be one of the sources of conflict and stress during a response. This problem
could further result in issues of information sharing, resource sharing, decision-making, and lack
of trust among EOC members and their organizations if not addressed by EOC managers and
individual organization leadership.

Additional research to determine how well EOCs are

integrating the new Whole Community Framework, emphasized in the 2013 version of the
National Response Framework, could measure the trend toward collaboration as the revision
appears to support a more interorganizational collaboration view of crisis response.
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In addition, this distinction between crisis coordination and crisis collaboration could
help crisis communication scholars better identify cases of crisis collaboration or “best practices”
that EOCs can then utilize to increase crisis collaboration efforts. Studies could then test, for
example, whether the cultural strategies of increasing communication cultural awareness by
organizations and different EOC internal processes identified in this study actually increase crisis
collaboration.
This distinction can also help EOC managers better determine if crisis coordination or
crisis collaboration is the better strategy for a particular response. For example, studies could
ascertain and categorize what characteristics of the emergency manager, characteristics of the
disaster, and characteristics of the community and in what combination would work best for
which strategy.
Future studies should also observe crisis coordination and crisis collaboration
organizations within EOC planning meetings, exercises, and actual crisis response. Direct
observations of how different organizational communication cultures interact during EOC crisis
planning meetings and exercises could help EOC managers and organizational leadership
identify barriers to interorganizational collaboration. In addition, observing the dynamics of how
these organizations interact within an EOC during a real-time crisis response will ideally yield
important information to facilitate organizational learning and change. These lessons learned can
then be implemented in future EOC crisis preparedness activities and response.
Finally, scholars such as Tierney and Drabek have focused on the collaboration and
coordination problem primarily through an emphasis on structures, processes and procedures.
Organizational culture has been largely overlooked. Subsequent studies should examine culture
more closely including seeking to understand the creation of a larger supra-culture that might
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encompass the various response agencies as subcultures. Part of this approach might include
examining the impact of crisis events as culturally unifying experiences. Agencies that have
worked together to manage a significant crisis might learn about other organizations and come to
see themselves as part of a larger community of responders.
Overall Conclusion
Recent history has indicated that crises are becoming more frequent rather than
exceptional events. Communities, therefore, need to expect and prepare for a more unpredictable,
dynamic, and large scale crises, whether they are a natural disasters, a pandemic influenza
outbreaks, or a terrorist events. Dozens and sometimes even hundreds of organizations, often
with very different missions, methods, technologies and cultures will be called upon to work
together in order to mitigate the crisis and assist in the recovery efforts. Although several
interorganizational coordination perspectives and strategies have been proposed by researchers
and practitioners, they have neglected to examine how the different organizational
communication cultures of crisis response organizations involved in an EOC may affect crisis
collaboration efforts. Previous studies have also disregarded the important distinction between
crisis coordination and crisis collaboration and the challenges and benefits of each to crisis
response efforts of EOCs. The findings of this study offer important new evidence not previously
explored in interorganizational crisis collaboration. Therefore this study is an important first step
in understanding the importance of these concepts in successful communication during crisis
response.
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APPENDIX A
Logbook of Data Collection and Codenames
DRO

Date

Time
Location
Frame
Fieldnotes 10/19/2010 1.5
Chapter HQ
#1
hrs.
Fieldnotes 10/26/2010 5 min Phone
#2
Fieldnotes 11/13/2010 7 hrs.
Training Center
#3
Fieldnotes 12/3/2010 2.5
Chapter HQ
#4
hrs.
Fieldnotes 12/6/2010 2.25
Chapter HQ
#5
hrs.
Fieldnotes 12/6/2010 3 hrs.
Fire Response
#6
Fieldnotes 12/7/2010 2 hrs.
Fire Response
#7
Fieldnotes 1/13/2010 1 hr.
Fire Response
#8
Fieldnotes 1/25/2010 1.5
Local High School
#8
hrs.
Fieldnotes 2/12/2011 3 hrs.
Chapter HQ
#10
Fieldnotes 2/14/2011 2 hrs.
Salvation Army
#11
Office
Interview 2/17/2011 1.5
Chapter HQ
#1
hrs.
Interview 2/17/2011 1 hr.
Chapter HQ
#2
Interview 3/1/2011
1.75
Chapter HQ
#3
hrs.
Fieldnotes 10/6/10Electronic
#12
2/24/11
Additional DRO Documents
2009 Chapter Disaster Plan
2004 Exercise Controller/Evaluator Handbook
DRO Training Schedule - Jan-April 2011
DRO Recovery & Information Booklet
DRO Little Red Book
DRO DAT Mtg. Handouts 2/13/11
DRO Postcard

Description
Mtg. with Des to discuss study and
observation opportunities
Phone conversations with Des re:
severe storms
SART Meeting, Co-Sheltering
Workshop
Volunteer Christmas Party
Mtgs. with Jim, Michelle, and Des
2 fire responses calls with DRO
volunteer team
Fire response call with DRO volunteer
team
Fire response call with DRO volunteer
team
Des presentation to DRO High School
club meeting
Quarterly Volunteer Meeting
Case Worker interviews of 5 families
recent fire response
Interview with Des, ES Director
Interview with Ken, Mgr. Dis.
Services - Part 1
Interview with Ken, Mgr. Dis.
Services - Part 2
Emails between Researcher and DRO
members
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DRO SEM Website – Captured on 4/26/2011
DRO Annual Report 2008-2009
DRO Regional Blog – Captured on 4/26/2011
DRO Regional Facebook - Captured on 4/26/2011
DRO Regional Twitter - Captured on 4/26/2011
DRO 901 Form
EMU
MPD
Fieldnotes
#1
Fieldnotes
#2
Fieldnotes
#3
Fieldnotes
#4
Fieldnotes
#5
Interview
#1
Fieldnotes
#6

Date

Time
Location
Frame
10/26/2010 2 hrs.
Auto Show HQ

Description

11/10/2010 .5 hr.

EMU MPD Office

Mtg. with Sam re: Study

11/18/2010 1.5
hrs.
12/14/2010 6 hrs.

MPD Station

12/16/2010 1.75
hrs.
12/16/2010 1 hr.

Convention Center

Auto Show Security Mtg. #2 - Law
Enforcement Only
Fusion Liaison Officer Training - Non
First Responders
Auto Show Security Mtg. #3

1/18/2011

2 hrs.

3/16/2011

.5 hr.

EMU MPD
Office/Convention
Center
EMU MPD Office

Interview
#2A
Interview
#2B
Fieldnotes
#7
Fieldnotes
#8
EMU
MPD
Memos

3/17/2011

1 hr.

EMU MPD Office

Interview with Michael Part B

3/16/2011

3 hrs.

EMU MPD Office

Talking with Sam while waiting for
Michael
Emails between Researcher and EMU
MPD members
Researcher thoughts/frustrations with
access

10/6/103/8/11
Various

Local Hotel

EMU MPD Office

Electronic

Additional EMU MPD Documents
Auto Show Ops. Plan for 2011
Auto Show Agendas/Packets Oct. 26 Mtg., Nov. 18
Mtg., Dec. 16 Mtg.
Auto Show Threat Assessment
Non-First Responder FLO Training Invitation
Paperwork
FLO Training Agenda & Attendance Sheet

Auto Show Security Mtg. #1

Interview with Sam - General
Operations
Auto Show Visit; Interview #2 with
Sam
Interview with Michael Part A

Notes only, could not obtain actual
plan
Handouts from attending mtgs.
Electronic, received Jan. 2011
Electronic
Handouts, Dec. 14 training
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CIP-Desk Brochure
Auto Show/HSEM
Field
1/15/2011
Notes #1
Fieldnotes 1/23/2011
#2
Fieldnotes 2/22/2011#3
2/24/2011

Handout, Dec. 14 training

2.25
hrs.
.5 hr.
7 hrs.

Auto Show, Security
Office
Auto Show, Security
Office
HSEM HQ

Auto Show Visit 2; Talk with Dir.
HSEM, and Auto Show Sec. Staff
Auto Show Visit 3 w/Family;
Fight/Crowd Control
MEOC joint exercise testing new
secure database software

DRO
Codename
Des
Jim
Sue
Tom
Dwayne
Michelle
Noah
Mario
Jenny
Ken
Mark
Shelia
George

Title
Director, Disaster Services
Head Volunteer (my title), Disaster services
Co-leader DRO volunteer response team
Co-leader DRO volunteer response team
DRO volunteer response team member
Development & Marketing
Emergency Services Specialist
Emergency Services Specialist
Emergency Services Specialist
Manager, Disaster Services
Marketing guy for DRO; Outside Marketing and PR firm
Finance Department Accountant
Long-time DRO volunteer for response team

MPD
Codename
Michael
Sam
Bruce

Title
EMU MPD Supervisor
EMU MPD Officer
MPD Tactical Operations

Auto Show/DHSEM/SPD
Codename
Title
Ross
Director, DHSEM
Harry
Chief of Auto Show Security, Auto Show
Dan
State Police officer/state IOC
Rick
State Police analyst/state IOC
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APPENDIX B
Interview Guide: A Study of the Effect of Organizational Communication Cultures on
Interorganizational Collaboration of Crisis Response
1. What role(s) does your organization play when it responds to a crisis (disaster)?
2. These next few questions are going to ask you about the communication procedures of
your organization when a crisis occurs; from the initial call to the end of the crisis.
a. What people/organization/entity do you receive information from that a crisis is
occurring?
b. How does the communication get passed along to the decision-maker(s) in the
organization?
c. How are decisions made in the organization as to who responds and what
resources are used?
d. How do decisions get passed along to the personnel in your organization who are
tasked with responding to the crisis?
e. How formal is the crisis communication and decision-making structure within
your organization during a crisis?
f. In what instances does your organization decide to work with other organizations
in responding to a crisis? How does your organization communicate and make
decisions with others when responding to a crisis? Can you please give me an
example of this?
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g. Are there ever any issues of miscommunication of information during a crisis? If
so, please describe for me an instance in which this occurred and what your
organization did once it realized there was a miscommunication.
h. How does your organization decide when a crisis is over? What communication
occurs in your organization and with other organizations at this time?
i. After the crisis is over, what is the post-event communication that occurs within
your organization and with other organizations?
3. Please describe for me in general terms the last crisis/disaster training exercise your
organization did in regards to communication?
a. How often do these trainings occur and who is involved in the training?
b. What do you find most helpful in the crisis training and why?
c. What do you find least helpful in the crisis training and why?
d. If not mentioned, prompt: What crisis/disaster training, if any, do you participate
with other organizations in regards to communication? Please describe for me
this last training exercise?
4. How often does your organization participate in crisis planning meetings? (Researcher
will clarify/define planning meetings if asked.) Who is involved in these planning
meetings?

Please describe for me what occurred during your last crisis planning

meeting?
a. What do you find most helpful in the crisis planning meetings?
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b. What do you find least helpful in the crisis planning meetings?
5. Organizations often have to work with other organizations when planning for and
responding to a crisis. Because of this umbrella crisis planning/management
committees/organizations are formed or are mandated by the federal government to be
formed. What umbrella organizations do you work with? (Researcher will prompt with
a couple of organizations if the interviewee cannot initially think of any.)
a. How does your organization interact with this/these umbrella organizations during
a crisis? Please give me an example of this.
b. Who would you say is the leader of the crisis response within this umbrella
organization?

How does he/she communicate information/decisions to your

organization during a crisis? Please give me an example of this.
c. How does your organization communicate information/decisions to the umbrella
organization during a crisis? Please give me an example of this.
d. What is the credentialing process during a crisis so your organization can gain
access to the crisis site and the umbrella organization?
e. How does your organization interact with this/these umbrella organizations on a
day-to-day basis or when a crisis is not occurring?
6. What would you describe are the primary challenges in working with other organizations
in responding to a crisis? What suggestions do you have for organizations working better
together in crisis response?
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7. Have you ever been involved in responding to a crisis with this organization? (If yes)
Please walk me through your experience responding to this crisis with this organization
from the moment you received notice of the crisis until the end of the crisis.
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Recent history has indicated that crises are becoming more frequent rather than
exceptional events. Dozens of organizations, often with very different missions, methods,
technologies and cultures, are called upon to coordinate activities in order to mitigate the crisis
and assist in recovery efforts. Although several interorganizational coordination perspectives and
strategies have been proposed, they have neglected to examine how different organizational
communication cultures of crisis response organizations involved in an Emergency Operations
Center (EOC) may affect crisis collaboration efforts. Previous studies have also disregarded the
important distinction between crisis coordination and crisis collaboration and the challenges and
benefits of each to crisis response efforts of EOCs.
This study examined in depth two crisis response organizations that are active in most EOCs,
a regional chapter of a disaster response organization (DRO) and a metropolitan police
department (MPD) in a large U.S. metropolitan city. Data for this instrumental case study was
collected using the qualitative approaches of participant observation, interviews, and document
analysis.
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The findings illustrate that the two different organizational communication cultures of the
EMU MPD and the DRO resulted in two different worldviews of how organizations think they
should work together and communicate with each other when responding to a crisis. The DRO’s
humanitarian and service-oriented organizational communication culture defined their crisis
response practices as crisis collaboration with all organizations. In contrast, the EMU MPD’s
bureaucratic and closed organizational communication culture defined their crisis response as
crisis collaboration with similar organizational cultures and bureaucratic crisis coordination with
others. This suggests that these different worldviews give rise to processes, structures, and
procedures of crisis coordination and crisis collaboration that are cultural artifacts of the
organizations. Therefore, once cannot assume a crisis coordination or collaboration structure can
easily be imposed on an organization as a way to improve interorganizational collaboration,
coordination and communication.
This investigation suggests that the different crisis coordination and crisis collaboration
worldviews need to first be understood by EOCs and the organizations involved in those groups.
Then additional planning and management processes need to be developed in order to ensure
effective interorganizational communication and collaboration during a crisis response.

265
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT
Laura E. Pechta is a McKing Consulting Corporation contractor and Health
Communication Specialist with the Division of Emergency Operations, Emergency Risk
Communication Branch (ERCB) at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). For
the past two years, she has been a member of the Research and Evaluation team conducting realtime communication surveillance of traditional and social media for several emergency
responses such as the global polio eradication initiative, multi-state meningitis outbreak, and
Hurricane Sandy. Laura is also involved in research projects on emergency communication and
coordination with internal and external CDC partners and the second edition of Crisis and
Emergency Risk Communication (CERC).
In her doctoral work at Wayne State University under her advisor Dr. Matthew W.
Seeger, her primary research focus was on risk and crisis communication, including issues such
as interorganizational communication and collaboration between crisis response organizations,
models of risk and crisis communication, and applications of crisis and emergency risk
communication during crises and disasters. Laura has been involved in research projects with the
CDC, National Public Health Information Coalition, and University of Kentucky. In addition,
she has published in the Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, was project
manager for the book Theorizing Crisis Communication, and has presented at the National
Conference for Health Communication, Marketing and Media (NCHCMM), National
Communication Association (NCA) Annual Conference, Second International Conference on
Crisis Communication, and Great Lakes Homeland Security Training Conference and Expo.

